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SUMMARY
The present thesis examines in detail the negoti­
ations that led to Greece's accession to the European 
Communities and establishes an analytical framework within 
which the internal structure, progress, and final outcome 
of the negotiations are interpreted and assessed. According 
to the central hypothesis of the research, the detailed 
structure of the negotiations was largely determined by 
internal mechanisms of Community decision making within 
the constraint of the "acquis communautaire," while their 
overall progress, momentum, and successful conclusion were 
influenced by external (and primarily political) consider­
ations. The results obtained are generally consistent with 
this hypothesis as well as with the conclusions reached 
by other authors.
The thesis is organized in three parts. Part One 
examines Greece’s move from association to full membership 
and analyzes the broad contours of the accession negoti­
ations. Part Two investigates in detail the conduct and 
outcome of the negotiations by following a sectoral analy­
sis of the individual dossiers on the basis of a thorough 
research of the official negotiation documents. Part Three 
places the discussion in a wider context by establishing 
a causal link between Greece’s association and accession 
and interpreting the Greek experience as part of an on­
going process of Community enlargement.
Within this conceptual framework, the thesis 
attempts to establish an analytical link between the pre­
accession and postaccession periods of Greece’s relations 
with the Community; and to identify certain general nego­
tiating mechanisms that transcend the specific circum­
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PREFACE
The empirical aspects of the thesis, especially 
those based on the examination of primary-source material, 
derive from my own personal involvement in the acces­
sion negotiations as a member of the Greek Permanent 
Delegation in Brussels. The moulding of this knowledge 
into a workable analytical framework owes much to the 
unfailing guidance and encouragement of my supervisor 
Dr. Alan Butt Philip, to whom I am deeply grateful.
In addition to the resources of the Centre for 
European Industrial Studies and the University Library,
I have made use of the facilities of the Chatham House 
Press Library in London, the Central Library of the Com­
mission of the European Communities in Brussels, the Athens 
Offices of the Commission and European Parliament, and 
the Library of the Bank of Greece. I wish to express my 
sincere thanks to the staff of all these institutions.
Finally, I am grateful to my family, whose 
patience and understanding have helped me through many 
unseen obstacles, delays, and frustrations during the 




The object of the present research is the detailed 
examination of the negotiations that led to Greece’s entry 
to the European Communities and the investigation of their 
internal structure, progress, and final outcome within 
a proper analytical framework. This will hopefully con­
tribute not only to a fuller understanding of the evo­
lution and prospects of the relations between Greece and 
the European Community1 but also to a clearer view of the 
Community’s negotiation and decision-making processes.
The problem under investigation is to identify 
the functional relationships that underlie Greece's choice 
for full membership, the opening of the accession negoti­
ations, their conduct, and final outcome. As a working 
hypothesis, the view adopted is that the detailed structure 
of the negotiations, the questions raised, and the so­
lutions reached were largely determined by internal
mechanisms of Community decision making and constrained
2
by the state of the "acquis communautaire"; on the other 
hand, the opening of the negotiations as well as their 
overall progress, momentum, and final outcome were influ­
enced by external, and primarily political, factors.
Furthermore, the negotiations are seen as being 
essentially linked with the postaccession period in two 
different ways, suggesting in turn two separate but
1
2complementary theoretical approaches. Viewed as part 
of an on-going process of Community negotiations and 
decision making, the analysis of the Greek experience 
transcends the details of the particular historical 
context and helps illuminate the nature of Community 
negotiations in general and enlargement negotiations 
in particular. At a different level, viewed as part of 
the wider spectrum of Greece’s attitudes towards the Euro­
pean Community, an analysis of the negotiation strategies 
and overall approach to the question of membership con­
tributes to an understanding of Greece’s ’’policy style”
towards the Community and of the links between Greek
3domestic politics and Community decision making.
Given the vastness and complexity of the subject 
matter, it is necessary to impose certain limits to the 
research in order to ensure that it retains a clear focal 
point. While the details of these limits emerge in the 
course of reviewing the relevant literature, the overall 
scope of the thesis is best delineated by distinguishing 
two stages in the enlargement process. The first one com­
prises the conduct and outcome of the negotiations, 
ending with the signing of the Treaty of Accession; the 
second covers the process whereby both sides adjust to 
the new reality of an enlarged Community. In actual 
practice the two phases are not entirely distinct, as 
adjustments often take place in anticipation of membership 
and not only on the basis of the strictly defined terms 
of entry. However, for the analytical purposes of the
3present research, it is helpful to distinguish between 
these two themes and focus primarily on the conduct and
outcome of the Greek negotiations as a process having
. . 4its own unity.
A . Review of the Literature 
Greece’s relations with the European Community 
and the issues connected with the Community’s enlargement 
constitute complex fields of study with a voluminous liter­
ature that does not cease to expand, following the evo­
lution of the Community and integrating themes which 
in their genesis were dealt with under separate lines 
of investigation. However, a careful examination of the 
relevant literature reveals that while Greece’s pre­
accession experience and postaccession prospects have 
been amply investigated in terms of both a national and 
a Community perspective, the conduct and internal structure
of the accession negotiations themselves--and for that
5matter of the association negotiations --have received 
little scholarly attention. The reasons for this gap 
should be sought not only in the lack of adequate em­
pirical evidence but also in the inherent difficulties of 
designing an appropriate analytical, rather than de ­
scriptive, framework. It is with these considerations 
in mind that the present thesis has been conceived. Thus, 
while it draws from a number of significant contributions 
and secondary sources in order to analyze the wider 
aspects of the Greek accession negotiations, it relies
4mainly on primary sources to examine in detail their 
internal logic. (These sources, together with various 
issues connected with their use and interpretation, are 
examined methodologically further below.)
Before reviewing the existing literature as it 
relates to the specific areas of the present research, 
certain general points should be noted which bear on the 
thesis as a whole.
The study of the Greek negotiations lies at the 
crossroads of the study of Greece’s previous relations 
with the EEC as an associate member; of the first enlarge­
ment of the Community through the accession of Denmark, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom; and the Community’s 
last enlargement through the accession of Portugal and 
Spain. It is not surprising, therefore, that in his task 
to conduct a literature survey, the researcher faces a 
formidable challenge. In terms of quantity, any hope to 
achieve an exhaustive search should be abandoned; given 
the vast and expanding volume of published material, it 
is possible, and even preferable, to be selective. In 
terms of quality, the unwary researcher runs the risk-- 
greater, perhaps, than in other fields of inquiry--of 
drowning in a sea of paraliterature, where questionable 
scholarship mingles with partisan polemics and hagiography.
These observations are particularly relevant in 
the case of the Greek bibliography:6 the entries run 
into thousands, but an assessment of their relative merits 
reveals profound differences. The same conclusion is
5reached by Mitsos in his comprehensive and critical survey 
of the Greek literature.7 Although covering only works 
published between 1974 and early 1979, this is an indis­
pensable tool in an area where the conspicuous lack of 
scholarly journals results in the use of quality news­
papers (especially their Sunday editions) and magazines 
as a publishing medium for the presentation of analytical
Q
works. These shortcomings are not peculiar to the present
subject but extend to the wider field of foreign affairs
g
and international relations, as Couloumbis notes. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that among the major Greek 
studies, those that predominate are primarily technical 
in nature and concerned with the economic and legal 
implications of membership rather than with the broader 
aspects of Greece’s accession and the Community’s Medi­
terranean enlargement.
Among the numerous--mainly English, French, and 
German--contributions to the study of these latter issues, 
the work of Loukas Tsoukalis is particularly significant; 
as specified in the course of the present research, his 
analytical framework bears on it in a number of important 
ways. In his book The European Community and Its Mediter­
ranean Enlargement.10 Tsoukalis provides a comprehensive 
study of Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the context of 
their Community membership; and of the implications of 
accession for the three entrants as well as for the en­
larged Community. From this perspective, the entry of 
Greece into the Community is seen as part of an on-going,
6and conceivably open-ended, process of Mediterranean en­
largement. Focusing on the interaction between the Three 
and the Nine, Tsoukalis shows that, while enlargement 
will provide an opportunity for a critical internal 
examination of Community policies and institutions, it 
will undoubtedly have a greater impact on each of the 
three entrants than on any of the existing members. His 
central argument that Community membership is a political 
and economic necessity for the three entrants is based 
on certain assumptions--namely, the growth of protectionist 
trends in the world economy which enhances the attractive­
ness of free intra-Community markets; the increasing 
importance of international negotiations which makes a 
country’s peripheral existence problematic; and the real 
influence that a small member state can exercise in Com­
munity decision making which compensates for its size.
These assumptions suggest, in turn, the extent to which 
Community membership is a challenge involving certain 
calculated risks--a challenge that does not absolve 
national governments from their responsibilities to 
provide for economic development at home. From a Community 
perspective, enlargement is also seen by Tsoukalis as 
a challenge, given that it will intensify an already 
strained situation with respect to Community policies and 
institutions. His general conclusion is that the Mediter­
ranean enlargement testifies to the Community’s growing 
political importance--although, in a rapidly changing 
international evnironment with its attendant increase
7in the economic and political divergence inside the Com­
munity, this importance largely rests on the extent to 
which enlargement will become a catalyst for internal 
Community reforms.
A special category of sources that should be 
singled out concerns the proceedings of Conferences devoted 
wholly or partially to an analysis of the problems and 
prospects of Greek membership--especially those that 
took place during the course of the Greek accession negoti­
ations as well as during the period immediately preceding 
or following them. The timing of these Conferences, coupled 
with the fact that among the participants were often 
members of the Greek and Community negotiating teams 
or officials responsible for the conduct of the negoti­
ations,11 suggests that their importance should not be 
measured purely on the scholarly quality of the papers 
presented and discussed. Such Conferences were those held 
in Athens (1975), Brussels (1977), Oxford (1977), Bruges 
(1978), Sussex (1979), and Madrid (1979);12 their pro­
ceedings have been researched, and their relevance to 
specific issues raised in the thesis is noted further 
below.
Another special category of sources concerns ma­
terial published by the European Communities. Leaving 
aside certain "derivative” publications that have been 
consulted for purely factual and descriptive purposes, 
the research has concentrated on those primary and docu­
mentary sources of the European Communities that bear
8on its central theme. Specifically, in addition to the
formal negotiating documents which are investigated ex- 
13haustively, the following have also been examined: the
14Association Council Reports; the Commission’s Opinions
on the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish applications for 
15membership; the Economic and Social Committee’s study
on the relations between the Community and Greece, as
well as its Opinion on the enlargement of the Community;16
the Commission’s ’’Fresco” on enlargement;17 the Committee-
1 8of-Three and Spierenburg reports; proceedings of the
19 20European Parliament (EP); and various EP Reports.
Quite apart from published sources, a biblio­
graphical search of unpublished doctoral dissertations
21has been conducted in order to identify material that
might usefully be examined in the light of the research
design. This has revealed that although the relations
between Greece and the European Community is a popular
area for doctoral dissertations, the central questions
raised and investigated in the present thesis have received
little attention. The tendency is to conduct either
analyses of past trends and relations, or impact studies
of future prospects, or a combination of both; and to
treat the accession negotiations as a parameter rather
than a variable that has to be functionally explained
22and conceptually interpreted.
Turning now to the investigation of the central 
and subsidiary themes of the thesis and the ways in which 
the existing literature bears on them, certain points
9should be noted in respect of Greece’s association with 
the EEC. In examining this topic, the objective has been 
twofold: to provide a historical background to the central 
theme and to identify those aspects of the association 
that shed light on the conduct and outcome of the accession 
negotiations. Accordingly, although Greece’s association 
has given rise to a large body of literature, it is the 
more recent studies that are of greater value, since they 
examine the Agreement not simply within its legal and 
institutional framework but also from the critical per­
spective of its historical record. However, this is 
not to deny the usefulness that certain older studies
have retained. This is especially true for Triantis’
23work, which is the first systematic attempt to assess
Greece’s association within a formal analytical framework.
Triantis raises the question of economic integration as
an engine of development, in the particular case of an
association of unequal partners and its impact on the
foreign-trade sector of the less-developed member. Although
his highly critical stand on the Association Agreement
in the context of Greece’s overall pattern and prospects
of economic development may appear premature in retrospect,
his underlying thesis that ”in trading arrangements between
underdeveloped and advanced economies a ’double standard
24of morality’ is both justified and necessary” is a legacy
that has survived in the Greek accession negotiations.
At a different level, the early papers on the subject 
25by Pesmazoglou are of particular relevance, given the
10
author’s position as head of the Greek team in the course 
of the association negotiations. Two important conclusions 
stand out from Pesmazoglou's numerous writings. Firstly, 
Greece's choice in favour of association rather than full 
membership in the late fifties was not an indication of 
a lukewarm stand on the issue of European integration 
but of an awareness of the state of Greece’s economic 
development, which clearly made association the optimum 
policy option and full membership the long-term objective. 
Secondly, the benefits of association were not seen as 
accruing automatically from the provisions of the Agreement 
but as being largely dependent on Greece’s effectiveness 
in defending her interests within the organs of the associ­
ation and in adapting her internal structures. Although 
coming at a time when the first clouds were beginning 
to appear in the implementation of the Agreement, 
Pesmazoglou's thoughts on this matter should more appropri­
ately be interpreted as a sober assessment of the realities 
of European integration and Community decision making 
rather than as a note of disillusionment with the prospects 
of association.
26Among the more recent contributors, Yannopoulos 
provides a concise and balanced analysis of the association 
as well as of the wider economic and political issues 
surrounding it. Looking at the association’s troubled 
record, he traces the roots of its distortion in the 
"freezing” of the Agreement during the period of dictator­
ship. According to Yannopoulos, the Community’s initial
11
intention of limiting the Agreement to its current adminis­
tration became rather hazy and was gradually diluted in 
practice, losing along the way much of its effectiveness 
as an instrument of exerting political pressure against 
the Greek military regime: association proved mutually 
advantageous in economic terms to an extent that economic 
self-interest outweighed and even bypassed political 
considerations and ideological commitments. Taking the
27freeze of the Agreement as his central theme, Coufoudakis 
develops the political aspects of the argument further 
and attempts to analyze the wider significance of the 
Community’s policy. He concludes that, in spite of the 
Community’s inherently limited capacity to exercise 
political pressure against the Greek military regime, 
the freeze did have a positive (though mainly indirect) 
impact on political developments in Greece by contributing 
to the junta’s isolation; on the other hand, it also con­
tributed to the evolution of a Community association 
policy based on the political criteria of membership.
Given the distortion of the Agreement and the
inconclusive nature of the available evidence, it is
difficult to assess the effects of the association on
the Greek economy. The relevant literature has been
28reviewed by Yannopoulos who concludes that, within the 
empirical and analytical limitations involved, the 
Agreement was of significant economic value to Greece; 
and although the picture is less clear with respect to 
agricultural goods than with respect to industrial goods,
12
the position of Greece would have been much worse without
her association agreement. Recently the literature has
29also been reviewed by Pomfret who reaches similar
conclusions but tends to be more skeptical about the
strength of a causal relationship between preferences
and economic performance; trade is thus seen, in line
with Irving Kravis’ thesis, as a handmaiden of growth
rather than as an engine of growth. This is a problem
30that has also been examined by Mitsos. who attempts
to separate the impact of association from the effects
that were the natural outcome of the inherent problems
of Greek industry and the development policy pursued.
He argues that the significance of the association should
be sought more in the intensifying impact that it had
on Greek industrialization and trade expansion, and less
in any direct qualitative effect on the course of the
country’s economic development.
For an understanding of the political climate
and diplomatic moves that surrounded the period from
the submission of the Greek demand for membership until
31 .its acceptance by the Council, the work of Siotls is 
particularly valuable. According to his argument, it was 
not only the Commission’s visible line of reasoning in 
its Opinion on the Greek application that affected ad­
versely public opinion at home but also what seemed 
to lie behind it: it was felt that Greece’s motives for
applying in the first instance were wrongly perceived 
and the strength of their essentially political nature
13
underestimated. Siotis interprets the Council’s swift 
and firmly positive response to the Greek demand for 
membership as primarily the outcome of intense bilateral 
contacts within the Community; on the other hand, Greece’s 
assurances that she would not use her future status as 
a full member to block the development of Turkey’s re­
lations with the Community was, in his view, an additional 
contributing factor.
The relations between Turkey and the European 
Community form a vast subject with economic, political, 
and strategic dimensions; and with a correspondingly ex­
tensive bibliography which has been consulted only se­
lectively. Thus, Turkey’s association agreement is ex­
amined only briefly and to the extent that its comparative
analysis vis-a-vis the Greek one throws light on the
32latter. Yardas’ study is particularly relevant in this 
respect. Beginning with a perceptive analysis of the wider 
aspects of associate status under article 238 of the EEC 
Treaty, it proceeds to identify Turkey’s preparatory 
stage as the critical element that differentiates the 
two agreements. Quite apart from the economic reasons 
that made it necessary, this provision is seen as the 
main source of uncertainties in Turkey's early relations 
with the Community through which the interplay of in­
herently volatile political factors assumed a greater 
significance in the case of the Turkish agreement than 
in the Greek one, making the former prone to a chequered 
development. The two agreements have also been examined.
14
33 .following Heni g * s analysis, in the context of the Com­
munity’s early bilateral policies and external relations. 
Henig argues convincingly that, given the Community’s 
doctrinal vacuum with respect to the concept of associ­
ation and its limitation of competence in the field of 
external policy, the scope of the association agreements 
was necessarily confined to the economic sphere--even 
though the Community’s motivation for such bilateral 
agreements was essentially political.
The Greco-Turkish dispute has added new dimensions 
to an already complex issue, interacting significantly 
with the Community’s equidistant policy towards the two 
countries in the light of Greece's application for member­
ship. This problem is examined in detail by Tsaka1ovannis
34and also by Kohlhase. According to Tsaka1oyannis, the 
acceptance of the Greek application for membership meant 
that the Community became inevitably involved in the dis­
pute between the two countries, terminating the equi­
distant approach which characterized the Community's policy 
towards them since the late fifties; and even though Greek 
membership has led to a greater political sensitivity 
on the part of the Community to Turkey’s needs and a con­
cern about her possible alienation from the West, it 
is difficult to see how the balance can be restored in 
the foreseeable future. Looking at the problem from a 
Community perspective, Kohlhase similarly identifies Greek 
accession as the main cause for the deterioration of re­
lations between Europe and Turkey but ends his analysis
15
with a more optimistic note about the Community's capacity
to restore a new and lasting balance in Greco-Turkish
! + • 35relations.
While an analysis of the internal structure and 
processes of the accession negotiations has to rely almost 
entirely on primary sources, a critical assessment 
of their record and final outcome is aided by a review
36of the press. In addition, a group study by Mitsos et a l .
is particularly valuable in its analysis of the terms
of entry and the sectoral implications of membership.
On the question of Greece’s internal developments
in the course of the negotiations, the research by 
37Valinakis provides a useful overall view. An important 
theme which emerges from his analysis of the domestic 
scene, and which helps explain the peculiarities of 
Greece’s decision-making process at the time of the negoti­
ations, is the role of interministerial conflicts and 
the gradual shift of power in Community matters from the 
Ministry of Coordination to the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs. According to Valinakis, the urgency of the ac­
cession negotiations accelerated this development, intensi­
fying at the same time the overcentralization of the 
administrative machinery and the emphasis on personal 
relations--both by-products of bureaucratic inefficiency 
that influenced the conduct of the accession negotiations.
The Greek administrative framework has also been examined 
38by Yataganas who extends the analysis to the post­
accession period and to the legal and organizational
16
problems surrounding Greece’s process of adjustment to
the terms of entry and the acquis communautaire. Yataganas
argues that the urge to speed up the negotiations affected
adversely--both in form and substance--the quality .and
precision of the instruments of accession and hence the
process of adaptation.
The overall conduct of the negotiations and the
terms of entry concluded have been debated with varying 
39skepticism. Of particular relevance are the criticisms
regarding the Government's approach and handling of the
40negotiations expressed by Kvriazidis and Varfis --head 
and member, respectively, of the Greek team in the early 
stage of the negotiations who resigned in January 1977. 
Their views throw considerable light on the domestic 
controversies surrounding the choice of an optimum bar­
gaining strategy. The central argument that emerges from 
their numerous writings in the Greek press is that the 
Government’s preoccupation with speed and political lever­
age at the cost of tougher and more careful negotiations 
was the wrong approach to follow. The abandonment of a 
hard bargaining line based on the defense of the ’’acquis 
d ’association” could only mean the serious compromise 
of the Greek interests. No trade-off existed, in their 
view, between political benefits and economic gains: 
the Government's approach would ultimately lead to the 
loss of both. The government line is presented in a number
of public statements by senior officials. Those by 
41Theodoropoulos. the chief negotiator that succeeded
17
Kyriazidis, are particularly relevant, although (in line
with the Government's secretive attitude) his diplomatic
language sheds little light on the real issues and pre-
occupations of the Greek negotiating team. In his view,
it was the acceleration of the negotiations that led to
the dissociation of the Greek candidature from those
of Portugal and Spain--a development that formed the prime
defense of the Government’s negotiating approach. A
recently published personal account of the events leading
42to accession by Kontogeorgis. --then Deputy Minister 
and, later, Minister of Relations with the European Com­
munities- -shoul d also be noted in this context; it is 
primarily useful in interpreting the way in which the 
question of membership and the conduct of the negotiations 
were perceived and handled by the Greek Government. What 
comes clearly out of his account is the decisive role 
played by Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis through­
out the negotiations--a role that is inextricably linked 
with their successful completion. Although understandably 
eulogistic, written by one of his closest assistants, 
it is a work that contributes to an assessment of the 
extent of Karamanlis’ personal handling of the negoti­
ations. The above analyses lead to the much wider subject 
of the attitudes and policies of Greek political parties 
towards the Community. This field, which is examined in
the present thesis only in general terms, has been sur-
43veyed extensively by Mitsos. The domestic political 
attitudes may be examined from a longer perspective by
18
looking also into the previous debate on the question
44of association, as Svrianos has done; it is easy to 
discern in this manner the degree of change and continuity 
in party philosophies, and the ways in which old arguments 
were recycled and resurfaced on the question of accession.
Despite the large and growing volume of the liter­
ature relating to the effects of membership on the Greek 
45economy, the works that may lay claim to detached 
scholarship are relatively few. Furthermore, the majority 
of the purely economic studies, even those whose internal 
consistency cannot be questioned, are of limited use 
to an understanding of the elusive issues that marked 
the negotiations--issues whose inherently political nature 
was often concealed with an economic and legal argumen­
tation. By almost invariably adopting a static analytical 
framework and a set of highly restrictive assumptions, 
such studies tend to ignore or play down the dynamic 
aspects of membership; and their conspicuous lack of con­
sensus leads to a situation where more questions are being 
raised than answered.
Within these constraints, certain recent contri­
butions are nevertheless worth noting, as for example
Aktan*s attempt to measure the static allocative effects 
46of enlargement. With more confidence in the direction 
of the effects than in their absolute size, Aktan con­
cludes that the elimination or reduction of trade and 
factor-movement restrictions is likely to lead to resource 
reallocation gains for both the old members and the three 
new entrants.
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Regarding the Greek industrial sector--which has
been analyzed less, in terms of both quantity and quality,
than agriculture--the general studies by Mitsos and
the more specific ones by Katsos & Spanakis and by
47Yannopoulos should be noted. According to Mitsos, Com­
munity membership will have a direct impact on Greek indus­
try due to the liberalization of trade and capital 
movements, the application of Community rules (especially 
in the fields of competition and indirect taxation), and 
the availability of new sources of finance; but it will 
also have indirect effects, deriving primarily from 
changes in industrial structure and the status of workers. 
On the other hand, the magnitude of these effects will 
depend on the extent of implementation of the Association 
Agreement and on the length of the transitional ar ­
rangements envisaged in the.terms of entry. The investi­
gation by Katsos and Spanakis is a further contribution 
to the debate concerning the effects of Community member­
ship on the rate of protection enjoyed by industry: their 
work aims at measuring the rate of protection, both nomi­
nal and effective, of Greek industry before and after 
accession. Their basic conclusion is that accession will 
lead to a substantial reduction in the rate of protection, 
with a high likelihood that the effective rate may even 
become negative; and although a shock to Greek industry 
in the short run, this effect may give rise to welcome 
structural changes in the long run. Yannopoulos goes 
further and attempts to estimate the likely effects of
20
membership on the pattern of Greek manufacturing pro­
duction. Although no clear answer is provided to the 
problem in hand (given the inherent weakness of an analy­
sis that relies on past trade performance to estimate 
future trends), his work identifies nevertheless certain 
strengths and weaknesses in the pattern of Greek industrial 
production which are indicative of the direction of the 
allocative effects of membership stemming from Greece's 
adoption of the Community's industrial customs union.
It is worth noting that the sectors found to be best per­
formers largely coincide with declining sectors in the 
Community--texti1es and clothing; manufactures of rubber, 
leather, etc.; iron & steel and non-ferrous metals and 
metal manufactures. On the other hand, sectors likely 
to face the greatest difficulties include transport 
equipment, mechanical & electrical engineering, and 
chemicals.
Regarding the agricultural sector, there are 
various strands in the existing literature which should 
be noted with reference to certain representative studies. 
On the question of resource reallocation, it is generally 
thought that Community membership will affect the pattern 
of Greek agricultural production through the application 
of the common agricultural policy's (CAP) market organi­
zation. However, there are two constraints in reaching 
specific conclusions on this issue, emphasized respective­
ly by Efstratoglou-Todoulou^8 and Marsh^9 : the analytical 
problems of quantification and Greek agriculture’s lack
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of flexibility due to environmental factors. Given the 
latter constraint and a competitive EEC economy. Marsh 
argues that the likely changes in the Greek pattern of 
production will reflect Greece’s difficulties in shifting 
towards the products with the greatest degree of CAP pro­
tection (cereals, milk, and beef) as well as her relative 
advantage in producing certain fruit and vegetables, wine, 
tobacco, and cotton. A related issue concerns the trade 
effects of membership from the adoption of the Com­
munity’s customs union and commercial policy. Although 
it is reasonable to expect an increase in Greek agri­
cultural exports to the Community, the extent of the
50increase, as both Efstratoglou-Todoulou and Pepelasis 
emphasize, will largely depend on domestic structural 
improvements. On the other hand, the sector will be ex­
posed to greater competition from Community Mediterranean 
producers and third countries in products such as olive 
oil, tobacco, and certain fruit and vegetables. Trade 
diversion may also be expected to occur, especially in 
meat and dairy products, with Community imports into 
Greece replacing third-country ones. The relative weight 
of these factors in the overall balance is open to debate, 
leaving room only for qualitative and tentative con­
clusions. Marsh, for example, sees more scope for growth 
of Community exports to Greece than for Greek exports 
to the Community.
The above issues lead to a general discussion 
of the impact of CAP on Greek agriculture. Although it 
is generally held that membership will benefit Greek
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farmers, a number of authors have adopted a dissenting
view, raising doubts not only about the magnitude of
the benefits but also about their very occurrence. This
line of analysis is followed, for example, by Marsh, who
nevertheless recognizes that his conclusions, based on
a static view of the CAP, would have to be reexamined
to the extent that Greek entry and the further enlargement
of the Community would set in train an evolution of the 
51CAP. As already noted, reliance on a static framework,
often exclusively so, is a common shortcoming of most
economic studies, largely a reflection of the state of
knowledge in applying theoretical constructs to complex
52real-world situations. This problem is noted by Ries 
(in the particular case of the implications of membership 
for Greek agriculture) who is skeptical about the pre­
dictive and prescriptive value of analyses that ignore 
or play down the dynamic impact of enlargement on the
evolution of Community policies, a  case in point is a
53study by Christou and S a m s . Focusing on the domestic 
adjustments that will arise due to relative price changes 
among products after the adoption of the Community’s 
price structure, they estimate the likely static effects 
of membership and conclude that Greek agriculture would 
probably fare worse if Greece entered the Community than 
if not. It is worth noting that their analysis has given 
rise to certain methodological criticisms which, in ad­
dition to the above general comments, make their argument
54not entirely convincing. Shifting the emphasis from
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relative price adjustments to the structural implications 
of membership for Greek agriculture, Pepelasis argues 
that the overall effect will be positive, although it 
is expected to be neither automatic nor immediate. Ac­
cordingly, the extent of the likely benefits is seen 
to depend on the formulation of a long-term development 
policy for Greek agriculture and for the Greek economy 
as a whole. On the other hand, given the C A P ’s emphasis 
on market mechanisms rather than on structural measures, 
the immediate structural impact of membership will be 
limited. In Pepelasis’ view, which is shared by Efstra- 
toglou-Todoulou, it is primarily the future trends in 
Community structural policies which are encouraging and 
which allow for an optimistic assessment of the prospects 
of Greek agriculture.
Another area of analysis concerns the financial 
implications of the CAP; it is an area that has attracted 
considerable attention, overlapping with the wider dis­
cussion of the budgetary aspects of membership. Con­
sidering the impact that Greek membership would have on
the Community, it has been argued (as, for example, in
55the Commission’s Opinion on the Greek application ) 
that the effect of integrating Greece's agriculture and 
economy as a whole into the Community is likely to be 
significant only in budgetary terms. This conclusion holds 
only when Greece, with the small size of its economy, 
is seen in isolation; the magnitude of effects is obvi­
ously of a different order when the Greek case is set
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in the context of Mediterranean enlargement. Similarly, 
when considering the impact of Community membership on 
Greece, there is a tendency to inflate those aspects 
relating to financial transfers. Whether from a Community 
or a Greek perspective, such preoccupation with the direct 
financial implications of enlargement often leads to a 
distorted analysis, since it bypasses other significant, 
though less visible, factors. This point is made by Ries, 
who stresses the need to avoid exaggerations when con­
sidering the implications of Greek agriculture for the
56 .Community budget. It is also made by Ritson in a paper
which, by classifying conceptually the various dimensions 
of the subject, suggests a logical sequence in the investi­
gation of the agricultural aspects of enlargement. He 
argues that, given a limited Community budget, what consti­
tutes the real problem is not the transfer of Community 
resources to the new members but rather the irrationality 
of the criteria (with their emphasis on the disposal 
of agricultural surpluses) that determine the pattern 
of these transfers.
A detailed analysis of the effects of membership
on the Greek economy, both as a whole and in terms of
specific sectors, lies outside the scope of the present
research. Accordingly, the purpose of the preceding
comments is simply to direct attention to certain recent
57trends in the relevant literature. Clearly, any attempt 
to exhaust the subject and establish an overall balance 
of the debate would lead into a separate field of inquiry--
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a field in which one would have to consider not only the 
impact on all the individual sectors of the Greek economy, 
including the government’s role and its spectrum of policy 
options,58 but also the effects of Greek membership on 
the further enlargement of the Community as well as the 
effects of the Mediterranean enlargement as a whole on 
Community policies and institutions. Given the structure 
and scope of the thesis, these effects are not examined 
as a separate topic but as inputs in the bargaining process 
and the negotiation argumentation. Within this framework, 
the important point to note is the virtual lack of any 
serious attempt on the part of the Greek Government--and, 
to a lesser extent, on the part of the Community--to formu­
late its various negotiating positions within a clearly 
defined analytical framework, in which the study of the 
sectoral impact of membership would not merely be given 
lip service but be properly integrated in the supporting 
argumentation of both initial statements and compromise 
solutions.
In developing the wider aspects of the analysis, 
Greece's association (and the difference in the way it 
was perceived by each side) emerges as an important factor 
in the accession negotiations, affecting significantly 
their conduct and outcome. In this context, the Associ­
ation Agreement is seen and examined not only in terms
of its ’’uniqueness” but also in terms of its Mediterranean
59dimension. In this respect, Tsoukalis' contribution 
towards an overall assessment of the limitations and
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implications of the Community’s ’’global” Mediterranean 
policy should be noted. As he points out, the hetero­
geneity of the area and the Community’s difficulties in 
reconciling internal economic interests and external 
demands (especially in the field of agriculture) re­
stricted the scope for an overall policy, while the Com­
munity’s limited instruments in the exercise of its ex­
ternal policy confined the content of the policy to eco­
nomic measures. On the other hand, Greece’s bid for 
membership and the prospect of further enlargement may 
have reduced even further the globality of the Community’s 
Mediterranean policy but made more difficult at the same 
time the separation of high from low politics--a develop­
ment with a catalytic effect on the evolution of a Com­
munity foreign policy.
The study of the Greek negotiations from the per­
spective of the Community’s northern and southern enlarge­
ment completes the main body of the research. As on previ­
ous occasions, the use of secondary sources is by ne­
cessity selective, often highly so, and once more limited 
by the specific requirements of the central theme. On 
Britain’s early attempts for membership, the work of 
Camps60 is indispensable in gaining an overall view of 
the 1955-1963 period; on the other hand, for the crucial 
period following De Gaulle’s 1967 veto and the alterna­
tives to accession that were considered at the time, the 
proceedings of a Conference held in Brussels in 196861 
are particularly relevant. For the 1970-71 accession
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negotiations and the public debate on British membership,
the major reference--and classic, in both its breadth
62of coverage and depth of analysis--is Kitzinger. while
C O
Davidson *s work retains its usefulness as a short non­
specialist account of the British experience. Also helpful 
is Pui ssochet * s analysis of the procedure, conduct, and 
legal framework of the Community negotiations with the 
three first-round applicants, which is followed by a
commentary on the general structure and detailed content
64of the 1972 Documents of Accession. Given the analytical 
framework of the present research, the above sources have 
been consulted not only for gaining background information 
on the British experience but also for examining, as 
chapter IX does, the ways in which the British negotiations 
and public debate compare with and throw light on the 
Greek experience.
In investigating the further enlargement of the 
Community, the research does not enter into the detailed 
record of the Portuguese and Spanish negotiations but 
examines instead the ways in which the prospect of the 
Iberian enlargement--by affecting attitudes, policies, 
and bargaining strategies--interacted with the Greek 
accession negotiations. This part of the analysis owes 
much to the work of Tsoukalis, which has already been 
noted. On the specific question of member states’ atti­
tudes (Greece's attitutes are covered under the discussion 
of her internal developments) the thesis is confined to 
a general examination of the issues involved, drawing 
from more specialized studies.65
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The global approach to the study of southern en­
largement has given rise to a large number of published 
works; and although in many instances one could raise 
doubts as to their analytical detachment, the approach 
as a whole may reasonably be seen as an extension of an 
established trend in scholarship which interprets national 
developments from the wider perspective of Mediterranean 
society and politics. A Federal Trust study by Edwards 
and Wallace66 marks one of the first attempts to view 
the Greek candidature within the prospect of the further 
widening of the Community and to examine the impact of 
this development on the Community’s economy, institutions, 
and external relations. In the authors' view, the problems 
posed by the Greek application, the candidature of Portugal 
and Spain, and Turkey's special importance could not be 
examined separately but should be analyzed from a common 
perspective and in the wider context of enlargement.67 
In practice, however, the inner logic of viewing en­
largement in its global context was distorted by two 
tendencies. Firstly, as this approach gained ground, it 
gave rise to fears, and hopes, that therein lay the seeds
C Q
of the globalization of the negotiations themselves.
69Secondly, as Pavno points out, it led to unwarranted 
generalizations concerning the problems faced, and raised, 
by the three applicants.
Greece’s postaccession relations with the Community 
have been marked by a number of important developments. 
Among them, the one that is most closely related to the
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negotiating period concerns the "Greek Memorandum"70 
(although, in retrospect, the latter's importance derives 
more from the light that it sheds on Greece’s policy 
profile and less from its impact on the record of member­
ship). The Memorandum, submitted to the Community in 
March 1982 by the Socialist government that came in power 
following the October 1981 elections, was an attempt to 
emphasize the essential problems and peculiarities of 
the Greek economy and the ways in which Community member­
ship fell short of taking them fully into account. Although 
clearly not a renegotiating bid, it nevertheless aimed 
at identifying those areas which necessitated special 
treatment within the Community rules and financial instru­
ments. The Memorandum, like other postaccession issues 
(Greek Presidency, European elections, political co­
operation, and relations with Turkey, to name but a few), 
has received considerable descriptive coverage but rela­
tively little analytical treatment in the literature.
B . Methodological Procedure 
The weighing of the available evidence raises 
certain problems which stem partly from the nature of 
the bargaining process and partly from the nature of the 
relevant primary sources. The negotiations did not follow 
a neat pattern. The examination of the various dossiers 
and the evolution of the outstanding problems towards 
compromise solutions assumed the shape of a complex jigsaw 
puzzle: in any given period, many dossiers were being 
negotiated in a parallel manner and at different levels.
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from technical to ministerial. This fragmented develop­
ment is reflected in the existing documents. The pro­
duction of a large number of technical reports, back­
ground papers, working documents, memoranda, and official 
position papers creates a labyrinth of primary material, 
the detailed and systematic analysis of which is a formi­
dable task requiring certain constraints and the es­
tablishment of an appropriate methodological procedure.
The formal negotiations were conducted at both 
deputy and ministerial levels within a Conference between 
the Community and Greece; they lasted from 27 July 1976 
(opening ministerial meeting) until 23 May 1979 (con­
cluding deputy meeting). The Conference documents comprise 
the various position papers of the Community and Greek 
delegations, the agendas and summaries of conclusions 
of each Conference session, and Commission reports on 
the examination of Community secondary legislation. Given 
the scope of the thesis and the design of analysis, the 
consultation of primary sources has largely focused on 
the official Conference documents, which are researched 
in their entirety,71 in conjunction with other related 
documents as specified above in the review of the liter­
ature .
It was often the practice of both sides to repeat 
a given position in the course of the negotiations in 
order to pick up the thread of the argument or to re­
emphasize a previously stated point. In such cases, refer­
ence in the thesis is made only to the document containing
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the initial formulation of the position--unless, of course, 
its subsequent restatement was made within a different 
context or involved changes of emphasis, or nuance, in 
the choice of its wording. A similar convention has been 
adopted with respect to the final agreement reached on 
each negotiation issue. Each point agreed upon by both 
sides was not only recorded in the respective position 
papers but was subsequently repeated in a formal Conference 
statement of agreement. In the thesis, reference is made 
only to those documents containing the substantive aspects 
of the agreement, thereby excluding subsequent references 
to documents which simply repeat and confirm in a formal 
manner points previously agreed upon--unless such refer­
ences shed light on the substantive development and con­
clusion of the relevant discussions.
Given the above considerations, the thesis attempts 
to unravel the pattern of development of each negotiation 
issue out of the maze of the discussions and the related 
documents. An overall view of the negotiations is thus 
established within a historical perspective, followed by 
an analysis of each negotiation dossier that traces the 
evolution of specific subtopics--from the formulation 
of the two sides’ initial positions to their gradual con­
vergence towards compromise solutions. Given their es­
sentially complementary nature, both approaches are needed. 
A broad-brush view that looks only at the surface of the 
negotiations tends to mask the fact that the road to a c ­
cession involved a long series of highly technical problems
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and an elaborate set of minute considerations. On the 
other hand, a myopic view that treats the negotiations 
as a bargaining process of balancing narrowly defined 
costs and benefits misses the wider political and economic 
dimensions of Greek membership. What is required is an 
integral approach within which the analysis of the micro­
cosm of the negotiations is combined with a more distant 
view away from momentary specifics and cast against the 
overall process of European integration.
Looking at the internal structure of the negoti­
ations, the thesis distinguishes between ’’horizontal” 
issues, permeating the negotiations as a whole, and 
"vertical" ones concerning the various individual fields of 
Community activity. However, such a conceptual scheme does 
not imply that each negotiation issue is sealed in a vacuum; 
an attempt is made, instead, to identify and investigate 
the various linkages existing among them, while each 
dossier is also analyzed in relation to the overall evo­
lution of the negotiations. Furthermore, the relative 
importance of an issue is not necessarily measured by 
the difficulties encountered in the bargaining process: 
the corresponding discussions could be long and arduous 
and still reveal little more than the existence of, and 
necessary preoccupation with, an extensive and highly 
developed body of Community secondary legislation. For 
example, the negotiations proceeded in a complex and intri­
cate manner in the case of specific agricultural products, 
while they turned out to be brief and uneventful in the
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case of broader issues, such as economic and monetary 
affairs and competition policy. This point has been duly 
taken into account, the object being to analyze the ne­
gotiations in a manner consistent with the relative sub­
stantive weight of each issue and thus to prevent some 
hard-fought but technical point from looming too large 
or a seemingly secondary point from being lost altogether.
Two further methodological constraints should
be noted. Firstly, an overall view of technical issues
relating to Community secondary legislation is sufficient
72for the purposes of the present research. Similarly, 
of the substantive points identified in the course of 
the examination of the Community secondary legislation 
(most of them fragmentary points relating to various legal 
adjustments that Greece was required to undertake in­
ternally), only those which were integrally related to 
the wider negotiation topics will be examined; otherwise, 
the thesis would be burdened unnecessarily with an arid 
and pedantic exercise of only marginal importance to its 
main thrust. Secondly, the analysis will not generally 
enter into an investigation of individual differences 
of position among member states held prior to agreement 
and adoption of a common position on any particular issue. 
Given the ’’singleness” of Community representation, the 
analysis is mainly concerned with the Community positions 
as they emerged out of internal debates and intra-Community 
negotiations and as they contrasted with the corresponding 
Greek positions; and this constraint determines in turn
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the choice of primary sources consulted. On the other 
hand, however, while the detailed conduct of the negoti­
ations is analyzed at this level, the interpretation of 
their wider aspects includes a general discussion of 
national attitudes to Greek membership. Without attempting 
to be exhaustive, this discussion aims at highlighting 
those factors which, at the national level and within 
the wider context of the Mediterranean enlargement, influ­
enced the conduct and outcome of the Greek negotiations.
While the analysis assumes more manageable pro­
portions when contained within the above limits, the 
fundamental problem of maintaining an optimum level of 
generalization cannot be solved in a uniform manner for 
the thesis as a whole: allowance must be made for the 
specific requirements of each part of the thesis, as at­
tention shifts from the detailed account of the negoti­
ations to the broader aspects of the enlargement process.
One of the objects of the research has been the 
construction of an accurate record of the Greek negoti­
ations. This proved a highly complex and arduous task 
requiring in itself an extensive amount of analysis.
Given the volume of available documents, it may seem 
curious at first sight that the record of the negotiations 
could not be counted on as a known parameter. Such is the 
nature of the subject matter, however, that the available 
evidence acquires an elusive quality: immersed in the 
world of diplomacy, a world inordinately filled with 
emotion and suspicion, the perception of facts surrounding
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the Greek negotiations often obscures the facts them­
selves. This shortage of hard facts coupled with a surplus 
of documents has inevitably shaped the course of the 
research and is bound to confront future historians of 
the European Community. As Richard Mayne has pointed out,
at once glutted and starved, the historian can only 
sketchily reconstruct what actually happened; and 
his account will often seem far too remote, well- 
ordered and reflectively analytical to t h o s e ^ h o  
took part in the muddle and drama of events.
As a participant in the ’’muddle and drama” of 
the Greek negotiations, the present writer's requirements 
for an objective and detached approach have remained 
stringent throughout the research. On the other hand, 
the time which has lapsed between the conclusion of the 
Greek negotiations and the conclusion of this thesis allows 
for an additional safeguard, for a healthy distance 
(measured perhaps by the yellowing of the official negoti­
ation documents) conducive to a proper balance of the 
overall argument.
C . Organization of the Thesis 
Within the above methodological framework, the 
thesis is organized in three parts. Part One (Chapters 
I-I I) examines in broad terms Greece's move from associ­
ation to full membership. Chapter I focuses on her as­
sociation with the EEC--the nature and scope of the 
Agreement, its record and effects on Greece’s economic 
development, and Greece’s policy choices in the mid 
seventies. These considerations help place the Greek
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accession negotiations in a proper historical perspective. 
Chapter II analyzes the application for membership and 
establishes an overall view of the evolution of the negoti­
ations, set against Greece’s domestic developments.
Part Two (Chapters III-VII) investigates in detail 
the conduct and outcome of the accession negotiations by 
following a sectoral analysis of the individual dossiers. 
Chapter III examines certain general issues which, together 
with the institutional and budgetary problems of accession 
make up the "horizontal” aspects of the negotiations. The 
’’vertical” dossiers are investigated in Chapters IV-VII: 
customs union and the free movement of goods in the in­
dustrial sector, external commercial relations, agri­
culture, and the various other fields of Community ac­
tivity.
While Part Two analyzes the Greek negotiations 
as a self-contained system, Part Three (Chapters VI11-IX) 
places the discussion in a broader context, in which the 
Greek experience is assessed within the continuous process 
of European integration. In this manner, the thesis helps 
isolate certain critical explanatory factors; and by as­
signing their due weight in the general balance of the 
argument, it helps clarify their role in the negotiations. 
Chapter VIII establishes a causal link between Greece’s 
association and accession; and Chapter IX places the Greek 
case within the overall process of the Community's enlarge- 
ment--both the experience of the first and the prospect 
of the last.
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Finally, in the Conclusion, an attempt is made 
to assess the extent to which the results of the investi­
gation are consistent with its central hypothesis and 
with the conclusions reached by other authors, to examine 
the implications of the thesis within a wider analytical 
framework, and to analyze Greece’s po.staccession relations 
with the Community in the light of the present research.
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NOTES
1 Often used in place of the more formal ’’European 
Communities,” the term "European Community" (or 
simply "Community") is taken to cover collectively 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). In discussing 
Greece’s Association Agreement, however, the term 
"Community" is also used to refer to the EEC alone.
2 This and other terms are defined in the course of 
the thesis.
3 Concerning the purely theoretical aspects of the 
thesis, two studies by Hutton and Bulmer (though 
not directly relevant to its field of inquiry) 
have helped clarify the methodological framework 
of the research and the underlying functional re­
lationships of its working hypothesis. See Nicholas 
Hutton, "The Salience of Linkage in International 
Economic Negotiations," Journal of Common Market 
Studies 13 (nos. 1&2, 1975):136-60; and Simon Bulmer, 
"Domestic Politics and European Community Policy- 
Making," Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (June 
1983):349-63.
4 Accordingly, the thesis does not enter into certain 
problems that arose during the interim period. These 
are more appropriately examined within a study that 
focuses on the adaptation of the Greek legal system 
to the requirements of Community membership. For an 
analysis of these issues see Xenophon A. Yataganas, 
"Main Legal Problems Arising during the Interim 
Period and immediately after Greece’s Accession to 
the European Communities," Journal of Common Market 
Studies 20 (June 1982):333-59.
5 Although the association negotiations are outside 
the present field of investigation, it is reasonable 
to expect that a comparative analysis of the associ­
ation and accession negotiations would shed consider­
able light on the wider aspects of the subject matter. 
Given that the association negotiations have not
been systematically analyzed, the interested reader 
is confined to various short and descriptive accounts. 
See, for example, Spyros I. Haritos, Hellada-EOK. 
1959-1979: Ap o  ten Syndese st£n Entax£ [Greece-EEC, 
1959-1979: From Association to Accession), 2 vols. 
(Athens: Ekdoseis Papaz£se, 1981- ), 1(1981):39-58.
(The transliteration rule followed in the present 
thesis is noted in the Bibliography.)
6 See, for example, European Communities, Commission, 
Athens Office, "Hellenik§ Bibl i ographia Eurbpai'kes 
Henopoi£s§s, 1957-1984" [Greek Bibliography of Euro-
comp. K. Voudouris
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7 Achilleas Mitsos, ”Hellada-EOK. Henas Hod£gos se 
mian Ateleibty alia kai Elleipestaty Philologia" 
[Greece-EEC. A Guide to an Endless and Incomplete 
Literature), Svnchrona Themata. Summer 1979,
pp. 31-57. His survey contains more than 550 Greek 
entries (books, articles, and unpublished studies) 
as well as approximately 50 foreign contributions.
8 Particularly valuable in this respect are the Athens 
newpapers H£ Kathfemerine and To B§ma (the latter
is published weekly from 6 October 1985 onwards; 
it also appeared weekly from 22 August 1982 until 
8 July 1983); and the magazines Ho Oikonomikos Tachv- 
dromos (weekly) and Svnchrona Themata (quarterly).
For factual information as well as for an assessment 
of the reactions of contemporary observers, the 
Greek press has been researched in conjunction with 
the resources of the Press Library of the Royal Insti­
tute of International Affairs in London. Of particular 
value were the Library’s files ”W. Europe-Greece” and 
”W. Europe-EC-Membership Enlargement” (for the period 
1975 onwards).
9 Theodore A. Couloumbis, ’’The Structures of Greek 
Foreign Policy,” in Greece in the 1980s. e d . Richard 
Clogg (London: Macmillan in association with the 
Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College, 
University of London, 1983), p. 110.
10 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981). See also his 
"Second Round of Enlargement and the Mediterranean,” 
in Greece and the European Community, ed. Tsoukalis 
(Westmead, Hants.: Saxon House, 1979), pp. 152-69; 
and ”A Community of Twelve in Search of an Identity," 
International Affairs 54 (July 1978): 437-51.
11 For example, L. Natali (Vice-President of the Com­
mission, responsible for the enlargement negoti­
ations), G. Kontogeorgis (Greek Minister in charge 
of relations with the European Communities), St. 
Stathatos (Greek Permanent Delegate to the European 
Communities during the accession negotiations), and 
I. Nielsen (head of the Commission’s task force for 
the Greek accession negotiations). Although intended 
to express personal rather than official views, their 
public statements provide helpful insights into the 
philosophy and attitudes of the two negotiating 
parties.
12 Syndesmos Hellenon Biomechanon [Confederation of 
Greek Industrialists), He Synantes£ ton Ath£n6n:
Hellas-Europaike Koinotfes (The Athens Meeting: 
Greece-European Community), Proceedings of a Con­
ference, Athens, 1-2 December 1975 (Athens: Syn­
desmos Hellenon Biomechanon, 1976); University Libre
AO
de Bruxelles, Institut d ’Etudes Europ£ennes, La Gr£ce 
et la Communauty: Probiymes pos6s par 1*adhesion. 
Proceedings of a Colloquium, Brussels, 5-6 May 1977, 
Colloques Europ6ens Series (Brussels: Editions de 
1 ’University de Bruxelles, 1978); L. Tsoukalis, ed., 
Greece and the E C . Proceedings of a Conference held 
under the auspices of the University Association 
for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) and St. 
Catherine’s College, Oxford, 23-24 September 1977;
W. Wallace and I. Herreman, eds., A Community of 
Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the 
European Communities. Proceedings of the Symposium 
’’Bruges Week 1978’’ held under the auspices of the 
College of Europe, Bruges, 16-18 March 1978, Cahiers 
de Bruges Series, n.s. 37 (Bruges: De Tempel, 1978); 
Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, eds., Inte­
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PART ONE
FROM ASSOCIATION TO FULL MEMBERSHIP
CHAPTER I
THE ASSOCIATION OF GREECE WITH THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
On 8 June 1959, two years after the establishment
of the European Economic Community, Greece submitted its
application for associate EEC membership1 in accordance
2
with Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. This move re­
flected a political choice in favour of European inte­
gration but also an awareness of the state of the Greek 
economy, which pointed to association, rather than to
3full membership, as the preferable immediate objective.
From the point of view of the Community, the underlying
motivation to conclude an association agreement with Greece
(and later with Turkey) was primarily political and should
be placed in the context of the origins of a Mediterranean
dimension in the Community’s external relations. On the
other hand, given the doctrinal vacuum with respect to
the concept of association and the Community’s limitations
of competence in the field of common external policy,
the context and content of such an agreement - though
ambitious - was inevitably confined to commercial and
economic matters.'4
The preliminary exchanges of views and substan-
5tive negotiations lasted almost two years. The delay in 
their conclusion can partly be attributed to the fact 
that Greece was the first country to conduct bilateral
52
53
negotiations for a separate agreement with the EEC, her 
Association Agreement being the first of its kind to be 
concluded. Hence, the Community was careful in working 
out the details of the agreement, realizing that it was 
setting a precedent. A more important reason, however, 
was the divergence of interests between Greece and the 
EEC as well as among member states--which explains not 
only the delay in concluding the negotiations but also 
the complexity of the agreement finally reached. The 
Association Agreement, known also as the Athens Agreement, 
was signed in Athens on 9 July 1961 and came into force 
on 1 November 1962, after having been ratified by the 
Parliaments of the six member states and Greece.
A . Nature and Scope of the 
Association Agreement
The concept of association as laid down in Article 
238 of the Treaty of Rome had an intentionally built-in 
vagueness which allowed flexibility in the construction 
of association agreements so as to suit the special circum­
stances and needs of the contracting parties, leaving 
open the question of how extensive their objectives ought 
to be. In fact, in the absence of a well-defined associ­
ation doctrine, two views were prevalent at the time, 
providing alternative interpretations to Article 238 of 
the 'Beaty of Rome. Accordingly, (a) the article allowed 
for the ’’normal i zat i on” of a country's relations with 
the EEC in those cases where the option of full membership 
was excluded and association was treated as an end in
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itself; (b) association was regarded as a temporary first 
step of a process eventually leading to full membership.6
In the case of Greece, the contracting parties
chose the second alternative,7 According to article 72
of the Agreement,
as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced 
far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by 
Greece of the obligations arising out of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, the 
Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility 
of the Accession of Greece to the Community.
Although the available evidence is not conclusive, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the vagueness of this 
provision was intentional, attempting to satisfy con­
flicting views as to the future of Greece’s relations 
with the Community and to reconcile differences between 
the positions of the two sides. Thus, while full membership 
was not meant to follow automatically after the transi­
tional period, the association being of unlimited duration, 
the Agreement did provide for the possibility of Greece’s 
joining the Community as a full member when considered 
opportune by the contracting parties; on the other hand, 
it allowed for the opening of accession negotiations at 
any time before the end of the twenty-two-year tran­
sitional period.
1. The Economic Provisions of the Agreement
The Agreement established an association between 
the EEC and Greece, the aim of which was "to promote the 
continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic 
relations between the Parties, while taking full account 
of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the
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Greek economy and to improve the level of employment and
o
the living conditions of the Greek people.” This was 
to be attained through the establishment of a customs 
union, the promotion of joint measures and harmonization 
of Greek and Community policies in various fields, and 
the making available of financial resources for the de-
Q
velopment of the Greek economy. The underlying principle 
was that there should be no balance between the commitments 
of the two parties: Greece’s obligations had to be adapted 
to her resources and circumstances so as to ease the burden 
of adjustment.10
a) The establishment of a customs union
In line with the above principle, the overall 
pattern that emerges in the establishment of a customs 
union--among a staggering number of exceptions, derogations, 
and special provisions--is the asymmetry in the tran­
sitional arrangements of the two parties, with trade liber­
alization proceeding slower for Greece and faster for 
the Community. Within this general scheme (applying to 
the elimination of internal tariffs, the adoption of the 
common external tariff, and the abolition of quantitative 
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect), the 
important provisions of the Agreement are specified below.
Greek exports to the EEC. In the case of manu­
factured goods, the EEC tariffs were reduced on 1 November 
1962 at the level applicable at that time on intra-EEC 
trade. Since 1 July 1968, this level has been zero,
coinciding with the completion of the E E C ’s own customs 
union for all industrial products.
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In the case of agricultural goods, the Agreement 
distinguished between certain sensitive Greek products 
(wine, tobacco, dried grapes, olives, rosin, and turpen­
tine), for which special arrangements were provided; and 
all other products, for which the same provisions applied 
as for manufactured goods.11
Greek imports from the E E C . In the case of manu­
factured imports, the Agreement distinguishes between two 
categories, depending on whether or not a given good was 
produced in Greece at the time the association took effect: 
for those manufactured goods not produced in Greece at 
that time, Greek tariffs were to be reduced progressively 
within a twelve-year period on the basis of a specified 
time schedule; the period was extended to twenty-two years 
for those manufactured goods produced in Greece at that 
time. Within the former category and its twelve-year period, 
new Greek manufacturing industries created after the coming 
into force of the Agreement were given preferential treat­
ment: Greece was allowed to protect them by imposing 
tariffs of up to 25% ad valorem on products similar to 
those produced by them. But this protection was limited 
to products which in 1958 did not constitute more than 
10% of Greek imports from the EEC, and to a period which 
normally could not exceed nine years.
The agricultural imports of Greece from the EEC 
were divided into three groups: (1) Products specified 
in annex III of the Agreement, covering Greek agricultural 
goods exported or exportable to the EEC except wines;
Greek tariffs were to be reduced progressively within
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a twelve-year period on the basis of the same timetable 
as in the case of Greek manufactured imports not produced 
in Greece at the time the Agreement took effect. <2) Prod­
ucts under protocol 13, covering goods exported or ex­
portable to Greece by the EEC, such as dairy products 
and meat; Greek tariffs were to be reduced progressively 
within a twenty-two-year period, following the same time­
table as in the case of Greek manufactured imports pro-
12duced in Greece at the time the Agreement took effect.
(3> All other agricultural products, for which Greek 
tariffs were to remain until agreement was reached fol­
lowing the setting-up of the common agricultural policy.
Greek imports from third countries. Greece was 
to adopt the EEC common customs tariff by the end of the 
twelve-year or twenty-two-year transitional periods, depen­
ding on the product. Furthermore, the association provided 
for certain exceptions in the cases of imports which were 
included in bilateral agreements between Greece and third 
countries.
b) The harmonization of policies
It was agreed that in formulating and developing 
its various policies, the Community would take into account 
the special problems, interests, and prospects of Greece. 
This would be followed by progressive harmonization of 
the policies of Greece to those of the Community for each 
field of Community activity envisaged in the Agreement, 
specifying the terms and conditions of the transition 
period. In practice, however, this process did not reflect
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an equality of the contracting parties: Greece had to 
conform to the policies of the Community without the right 
to participate in its decision-making process and hence 
with little power to influence Community rules bearing 
on her. It was this imbalance that, as it will be seen 
later on, became the source of difficulties besetting 
the association.
In the particular case of agriculture, a prior 
condition to free trade was the harmonization of the agri­
cultural policies of the two contracting parties. The 
Agreement included certain exceptions to this rule, al­
lowing the attainment of free trade in certain Greek ex­
ports without requiring their prior harmonization with 
the relevant Community policy--the reason being that, 
given the uncertainties at the time of negotiating the 
Agreement as to how and when a common agricultural policy 
would develop, total adherence to the rule would have 
postponed the removal of trade restrictions for certain 
crucial Greek agricultural products and would have accord­
ingly postponed and restricted Greece’s potential benefits
13from the association. The products subject to these 
special provisions were those listed in annex III (mainly 
fruit and vegetables) and others mentioned in protocols 
attached to the Agreement (wine, raisins, tobacco). On 
the other hand, as a counterbalance to these concessions, 
the Agreement included safeguards to which the Community 
could resort in case the abolition of trade barriers re­
sulted in serious marketing difficulties for its own
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agricultural products; it also included special provisions 
for certain important products of member states (specified 
in protocol 13) which were also to be liberalized prior 
to harmonization.
In addition to agriculture, the Agreement envisaged 
harmonization and joint action in many other fields but 
generally left unspecified the means of implementation.
The fields covered reflected the state of development 
of the Community at the time of the association negoti­
ations and included free movement of persons and services, 
provisions relating to competition, taxation and approxi­
mation of laws, and coordination of economic and commercial 
policies. Special mention should perhaps be made of the 
competition provision with respect to state aids (article 
52, paragraph 2), which allowed for the compatibility 
of Greek state aids with the functioning of the common 
market on the basis of article 92 (paragraph 3 (a)) of 
the Treaty of Rome--that is, justified on grounds of eco­
nomic development. In this connection, the whole of Greece 
was treated as a single area. This provision was to re­
surface in the context of the accession negotiations, 
employed by the Greek delegation in an effort to provide 
leverage to its request for a similar treatment under 
the Treaty of Accession.
c) Financial assistance
The Agreement included a financial protocol 
(no. 19), which made available to Greece within the first 
five years of the association $125 million in investment
60
funds at subsidized interest rates and long maturity 
periods.1* The primary purpose of this assistance was 
to help in the industrial restructuring of the Greek eco­
nomy. On the other hand, given the growing deterioration 
of the Greek balance of trade--a development that was, 
to a certain extent, expected as a result of the gradual 
abolition of tariffs--the inflow of Community financial 
assistance also had a welcome short-term counterbalancing 
effect.
Given the financial requirements for the economic 
development of Greece, the amount of aid accorded in the 
framework of her association (including the aid subse­
quently made available under the second financial protocol) 
was regarded as modest--and perhaps not in the right form, 
since more was needed in the form of grants rather than 
loans. On the other hand, as the contrary view held, this 
aid was not intended to meet fully the financial require­
ments of Greek economic development but simply to con-
15tribute towards this end.
Before proceeding with an examination of the insti­
tutional arrangements of Greece's Association Agreement, 
it would be useful to compare it with that concluded 
between the EEC and Turkey.
Reflecting an urgency in the light of Greece's 
application, Turkey's application for association was 
submitted on 31 July 1959, two months after the Greek 
one. Although Greece accepted the political importance
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of an organic link between Turkey and the Community, she 
had reservations as to the exact nature of Turkey’s asso­
ciation agreement, fearing the increased competition of 
Turkish exports in the case of certain sensitive products 
such as tobacco and raisins. During consultations within 
the Association organs, Greece tried unsuccessfully to 
have the Turkish agreement under negotiation interpreted 
as not a fully-fledged association agreement, i.e. as 
falling outside the scope of article 238 of the EEC 
Treaty.16 The agreement was signed in Ankara on 12 Sep­
tember 1963 after four years of negotiations and came 
into force on 1 December 1964. The two agreements are 
very similar in nature and scope. However, in contrast 
to the Greek one, the Turkish agreement includes a pre­
paratory stage preceding the transitional stage of associ­
ation and distinct from it, during which no tariff re­
ductions or other adjustments based on the principle of 
reciprocity were to take place; instead, Turkey alone 
was to receive benefits unilaterally from the Community 
in order to strengthen her economy and prepare it for 
association. These benefits took the form of commercial 
concessions and loans under a financial protocol. (Finan­
cial assistance was to extend in the transitional period 
under a second financial protocol.) Turkey, on her part, 
was expected during this stage to undertake internal 
measures of adjustment, measures that would enable her to 
assume the obligations arising from the progressive estab­
lishment of customs union within the transitional stage.
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Turkey’s agreement, like that of Greece, includes refer­
ences to full membership as the ultimate objective of the 
association, though it is more cautiously worded in this 
respect.17
It is important to note that it was Turkey that 
had insisted from the outset of the association negoti­
ations on this distinction between a preparatory and a 
transitional stage; by contrast, the initial Community 
position was for the immediate establishment of a single
transitional stage of twenty-two years, similar to 
1 8Greece’s. On the other hand, the terms of the Agreement 
specified that the move from the preparatory to the tran­
sitional stage was not to be automatic but subject to 
a decision by the contracting parties, reflecting the 
preparedness of the Turkish economy to enter into a customs 
union with the EEC. This injected a degree of uncertainty 
in Turkey's agreement and in her relations with the Com­
munity in general, leaving open to interpretations on both 
sides whether or not Turkey was ready to enter her tran­
sitional period. In this sense, the Ankara Agreement es­
tablished a framework for negotiations whose object was 
to fix the conditions of the transitional stage. Thus, 
the play of political circumstances have assumed a much 
greater role than mere economic considerations, making 
the development of Turkey’s association heavily dependent
on the political will of the contracting parties--a factor
1 9that proved to be volatile. The fact that the source 
of such an uncertainty was absent in the case of Greece’s
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association was ignored by its early critics who argued,
on economic grounds, that an arrangement similar to
20Turkey's would have been preferable.
The passage to the transitional stage was completed
on 1 January 1973, following two years of negotiations
(from December 1968 to November 1970) and considerable
delays in the procedure for the ratification of the
Additional Protocol--the instrument intended to regulate
the conditions, detailed rules, and timetables for imple-
21menting the twenty-two-year transitional stage.
Another difference, perhaps a reflection of the 
relative economic situation of the two countries, involved 
the terms under which financial aid, as provided for in 
the respective agreements, was administered. In this con­
nection, Greece was treated by the European Investment 
Bank (ElB) under the same terms and conditions as the 
member states, while Turkey was not. Any political ad­
vantages and prestige derived by Greece from this dif­
ference in treatment were at the cost of a certain rigidity
in the Bank’s policy towards the financing of Greek pro-
22jects, which Greece subsequently attempted to relax.
2. Institutional Arrangements 
The provision of an institutional framework is 
an important element that distinguishes an association 
from a mere trade or cooperation agreement. What made 
such institutional arrangements even more important in 
the case of Greece was the fact that her agreement was 
to a large extent a "framework" agreement, similar in
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this respect to the Treaty of Rome: its aims and objectives 
were clear, but the means of achieving them were not; 
hence the need for institutions entrusted with the working 
out of the means of implementing it.
The Agreement lays down the rules for the compo­
sition, functioning, and powers of an Association Council.
In areas where the Agreement was specific about arrange­
ments, as in the case of the establishment of a customs 
union, the Council acted to a large extent as a supervising 
body. But in those fields where the means of implementation 
were left unspecified, as for example in the case of har­
monization of agricultural policies, its role was decisive 
in laying down the conditions, terms, and timetable for 
such implementation. On the basis of article 66, the Associ­
ation Council set up two committees, each composed of ex­
perts from the member states, Greece, and the Commission: 
an Association Committee, which assisted the Council in 
its tasks; and a Customs-Cooperation Committee, which 
ensured the correct application of the customs provisions 
of the Agreement.
On 5 April 1963, and on the basis of article 71
of the Agreement, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was set
up, composed of members of the European and Greek Parlia- 
23
ments. The Association Council was to prepare annual 
reports on the progress of the association. These were 
to be submitted to the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
which would use them as the basis for suggestions and re­
commendations concerning the further development of the
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association. The recommendations of the Joint Parliamen­
tary Committee generally tended to reflect the interests 
of Greece. This was particularly observed at the time of 
Greece's bid for full membership--a time that coincided 
with a rise in the power of the European Parliament and 
a corresponding increase in the importance of the Com­
mittee's role.
B. The Record of the Association 
As it has been pointed out above, the Association 
Agreement is similar to the Rome Treaty in one aspect-- 
namely, that in many instances they both provide only 
the framework, having left precise policies and their 
implementation to be worked out after their entry into 
force. Their similarities, however, end here; for while 
the Rome Treaty has been implemented, the Association 
Agreement, as its record shows, was never implemented 
or even attempted to be so in many of its provisions-- 
especially in the harmonization of policies and the de­
velopment of common action.
l. The ’’Freezing” of the Association Agreement 
With the imposition of a dictatorship in Greece 
on 21 April 1967, the association ran into difficulties.
On the legal side, the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
couldn’t convene without a Greek Parliament. On the poli­
tical side, the Community was not prepared to continue 
normal relations with Greece under a military dictatorship. 
Thus, the Commission, responding to initiatives by the
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European Parliament, decided to limit the application 
of the Association Agreement to its "current adminis­
tration” (gestion courante). The keeping alive of the 
Agreement in this clinical form was seen as the preferable 
means of exerting pressure on the military regime: it 
was feared that its complete abrogation might lead the
regime to adopt an isolationist and protectionist stand,
24through which it could retain a grip on its power.
According to dissenting views, however, even a limited
application of the Agreement would provide the regime
with a source of political legitimacy. Despite such
frictions, which often surfaced in the relations between
the European Parliament and the Commission over the policy
towards Greece, the essence of the Community position
during the dictatorship was that the Association Agreement
would not be further developed as long as democracy was
25not restored in Greece. The Association was in fact 
reactivated after the normalization of political life 
in Greece, when the Council of Ministers met on 17 Sep­
tember 1974 in Brussels and decided for the resumption 
of the procedures for its development.
Before examining the record of the association, 
it is important to clarify the exact meaning of limiting 
it to its "current administration,” rehabilitating in 
the process the term "freeze," as the Community action 
came to be described. This action, which was shaped by 
the end of 1967, was clear to the extent that it meant 
that the Community unilaterally limited the association
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to progress towards customs union (through mutual tariff
reductions on the basis of the Agreement’s timetables),
while suspending the other provisions. In actual practice,
however, the term became hazy, especially when applied
to the Community position towards discontinuing the process
of harmonization of agricultural and other policies. The
26case of Greek wines illustrates this point.
The association protocols concerning Greek agri­
cultural exports were agreed upon at a time when there 
was no common agricultural policy, the intention being 
to revise them when this policy was to be introduced.
Its introduction, however, was not followed by such a 
revision--a situation that created difficulties in the 
management of the common agricultural policy. When the 
EEC common policy on wines was introduced in December 1970, 
the question of the status of Greek wines was raised, 
given that the Agreement did not treat imports of Greek 
wines uniformly in the six member states. Negotiations 
resulted #in a readjustment of the Agreement providing 
for a uniform, albeit less favourable, treatment of Greek 
wines in exchange for concessions on the territorial ex­
tension of the customs-union part of the association to
27the three new member states. The case of Greek wines 
thus shows how difficult it was in practice to limit the 
association strictly to tariff reductions and to exclude 
interdependent issues of agricultural policy harmonization.
It seems, therefore, that the term ’’gestion cou- 
rante" gradually came to mean not only tariff reductions 
according to the timetables but also adjustments of the
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Agreement to new Community developments. This gradual 
dilution of the idea of limiting the Agreement to its 
current administration resulted in the loss of the Com­
munity policy’s sharpness as a potential instrument of 
political pressure against the Greek military regime. In 
fact, it can be argued that the association was mutually
advantageous in economic terms to a degree that outweighed
28and even bypassed political considerations. And one
may go even further and point to the Greek military
regime’s readiness to exchange economic for political
concessions, given that it saw the continuing functioning
of the association as a means of enhancing its image at
home and abroad and made efforts to keep the Agreement
alive. However, the debate of this issue is by nature
speculative, the weight of the argument depending on the
way the underlying motives of the Community and its members
are perceived to vary between idealism and calculating 
29self-interest.
2. An Assessment of the Implementation 
of the Agreement
The analysis of the freezing of the association
leads to a more detailed examination of its overall record,
focusing on its three main areas--namely, customs union,
30harmonization of policies, and financial assistance.
In accordance with the timetable of the Agreement, 
Greek industrial exports to the EEC have been duty-free 
since 1 July 1968--except coal and steel products, which 
were not covered by the agreement. Furthermore, Greece
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has, since 1 November 1974, abolished all customs duties 
on her imports of Community industrial products subject 
to the twelve-year transitional period, which represented 
approximately two-thirds of the Community's industrial 
exports to Greece; and she has also adopted the Community's 
common customs tariff for the same products. Customs duties 
for the remaining Community industrial exports to Greece 
were also gradually dismantled, having attained by 1 May 
1976 a 52% reduction from the basic duties, and were 
scheduled to be abolished by 1 November 1984 when their 
twenty-two-year transitional period was to end. Customs 
union progressed very little with respect to agricultural 
goods because in most cases the extension of customs union 
to agriculture was made dependent upon the prior harmoni­
zation of agricultural policies--a precondition that did 
not materialize despite efforts to achieve this.
In the area of policy harmonization, the first 
attempt at harmonization of agricultural policies involved 
five products--pigmeat, poultry, meat, eggs, and fruit & 
vegetables--for which the Community had, by November 1962, 
defined its common policy for the whole of its own tran­
sitional period. Although Greece had declared from the 
outset her readiness to accept the principles involved, 
subsequent discussions revealed a fundamental difference 
of positions. According to the Greek view, harmonization 
implied that Greece should participate in the institutional
and financial arrangements of the Community’s common agri-
31cultural policy. The Community reacted negatively,
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arguing that this represented a move away from harmoni­
zation proper, i.e. trade liberalization, and towards in­
tegration of agricultural policies which was not envisaged
32in the Association Agreement. The reasons behind the 
Community position were threefold. Firstly, as a matter 
of principle, the Community was not willing to allow a 
third country, not even an associated one, to participate 
in its institutional mechanisms, even if the participation 
were to be confined to consultations. Secondly, the Com­
munity was not ready to add such a consultations procedure 
to a procedure already beset by practical difficulties 
in reaching compromise agreements among the Six. Finally, 
the Community was reluctant to assume the financial burden
involved, which would have diverted resources away from
33its own agriculture.
This disagreement on the harmonization of agri­
cultural policies preceded the suspension of the relevant 
sections of the Association Agreement during the dictator­
ship; but there were some indications during the last 
meeting of the Asssociation Council before the freeze 
that a compromise could be reached, especially with respect 
to the financial burden of harmonization.34 The negoti­
ations were resumed after the reactivation of the Agreement 
but under different circumstances: the Community decided 
to stop the regime under which certain Greek products 
were treated on an equal footing with Community ones 
”in anticipation of harmonization" and which excluded 
recourse to countervailing charges and safeguard clauses.
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Greece reacted strongly, arguing that if the freeze was im­
posed on political grounds and with the purpose of helping 
restore democracy in Greece, then, upon reactivation of 
the Agreement, the relative positions of the two partners 
should at least have remained unaltered; in fact, however, 
she found herself worse off, facing third-country treat­
ment for a number of her agricultural products, mainly fruit 
35and vegetables.
The main obstacle to an agreement was overcome 
when Greece indicated her readiness to accept the financial 
burden of harmonization--linking it, nevertheless, to 
the conclusion of a second financial protocol. However, 
this move towards a convergence of views emerged as late 
as 1977, by which time the entire harmonization issue 
was beginning to be submerged into the accession negoti­
ations.
Regarding financial assistance, of the $125 million 
in loans that Greece was to receive over a five-year period 
according to protocol 14, only $69 million had been ab­
sorbed before the imposition of the freeze. The remaining 
funds were blocked for almost 7£ years; they were released 
in 1975, after the reactivation of the Agreement. A second 
financial protocol, amounting to 280 million EUA to be 
paid out by 31 October 1981, was signed on 28 February 
1977 after a long delay which was mainly due to an attempt 
to place the issue within the broader context of the Com­
munity's overall Mediterranean policy. The assistance 
was made up as follows: 225 million EUA in loans from
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the European Investment Bank, 45 million in non-refundable
aid, and 10 million in special loans for the modernization
of Greek agriculture--the last two amounts coming from
3 6the Community budget.
The above record clearly shows that whole areas 
of Community activity which were covered by the Agreement 
were left dormant during the period of Greece’s association 
with the EEC. In fact, apart from the financial-aid pro­
visions of the Agreement, the only field that was developed 
(and even this not fully) was that of customs union.
Such an assessment necessarily limits itself to a 
static view of the Community as reflected in the provisions 
of the Agreement. But the Community has since then evolved 
in many important ways, being much more ’’complete” and 
also qualitatively different. Hence, there are whole areas 
of Community activity that are not even touched upon by 
the Agreement. In the field of customs union, for example, 
the association provisions are quite similar to the Com­
munity’s own arrangements of the early sixties. Since 
then, however, customs union has been completed within 
the Community and has served as the basis for the devel­
opment of the Community’s commercial policy towards third 
countries.
In other words, even if fully implemented, the 
Agreement would have still led to a rather unsatisfactory 
arrangement, given the growing gap between association 
provisions foreseen and implemented within a static view 
of the Community, on the one hand, and Community provisions
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dynamically evolving in a changing world, on the other. 
Nevertheless, the Athens Agreement did mark an important 
turning point in Greek commercial policy and remains the 
most far-reaching agreement ever signed by the Community 
with a third country. The difficulties and problems en­
countered in its implementation made the Community increas­
ingly parsimonious and pragmatic in its other agreements.
C. The Effects of Association on Greek 
Economic Development
In trying to assess the impact of association 
on the Greek economy, it is difficult to venture beyond 
the realm of foreign trade and speculate on the effects 
of association on the overall economic growth and devel­
opment of Greece: it is not clear, with such serious gaps 
in the implementation of the Association Agreement, what 
these broader effects have been or how extensively they 
have worked themselves into the Greek economy. Even in 
the field of customs union in industrial goods, whose 
implementation under the Agreement progressed more than 
in any other sector, it is extremely difficult to extricate
the effects of association from those that were the natural
37outcome of Greek industrialization. Furthermore, given 
the linkage of outstanding association issues with the 
accession negotiations, it becomes difficult to disentangle 
the later effects of association from those of full member­
ship. These are important considerations to keep in mind 
when applying theoretical constructs to the Greek expe­
rience and attempting to assess the extent to which
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association with the EEC could be considered an optimum
Q O
trade policy for Greece. Given these limitations, it
would nevertheless be useful to look at the profile of
the performance of the Greek economy as a whole, and of
the export sector in particular, during the period of 
39association.
1. Overall Performance of the Economy 
During the period 1962-77, the gaps in income 
per capita and productivity between Greece and the Com­
munity were narrowing. The average annual growth rate 
of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 5.5% for 
Greece, one of the highest among the OECD countries, and 
2.9% for the Community average (at constant 1970 prices) 
during the period 1965-75; the corresponding figures 
for labour productivity were 6.5% and 3.6% for the period 
1966-75. Greek GDP per capita in 1975 was equal to $2306, 
just below half the Community average ($5195). This figure, 
however, hides the considerable disparities which exist 
in the Community at national level (Ireland's GDP per 
capita in 1975 did not exceed $2500). Greece’s unemployment 
rate was approximately 4% during the 1965-75 period, lower 
than the Community average.
Whereas the ratio of the total labour force to 
the population does not differ considerably between Greece 
and the Community, the distribution of the labour force 
among sectors of economic activity shows significant vari­
ations. Although the period of association had seen a 
gradual reduction of labour participation in agriculture
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and a corresponding increase in the other sectors, the 
percentage of the Greek working population employed in 
agriculture remained significantly above the Community 
average of 8.7%--even above Ireland’s 24.5%, the highest 
individual country share. As noted in chapter VI, subse­
quent empirical evidence has led to the downward revision 
of the Greek figure, reducing the gap considerably but 
leaving the general picture unaltered.
The share of agriculture in the total GDP dropped 
by 9.6 percentage points between 1961 and 1975, although 
agriculture’s GDP at constant prices rose by 48.7%. On 
the other hand, 28% of the Greek working population was 
engaged in industry (the Community average was 42%).
During the same period industry’s GDP tripled, while its 
share in the total GDP rose by 7 percentage points. 
Productivity growth in the manufacturing sector was at 
an even higher rate than for the economy as a whole: value- 
added per worker (at constant 1958 prices) increased at 
a rate of 12.8% per annum during the period 1961-71.
The above figures provide a rather tenuous basis 
for a comprehensive assessment of economic performance.
It seems reasonable to conclude, nevertheless, that, quite 
apart from persistent structural weaknesses and problems, 
the overall record of the Greek economy during the first 
fifteen years of association has been quite impressive, 
without however being able to gauge accurately the extent 
of the association’s contribution.
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2. The Foreign Sector
During the period 1963-71 Greek exports underwent
a significant reorientation towards the Community. The
increase of the EEC share in total Greek exports may be
attributed not only to the increased competitiveness of
the Greek exports but also to the preferential treatment
accorded to them by the terms of the Association Agreement,
which also led to their diversification--though an attempt
to assign relative weights to such causal links is inher-
40ently risky and should be approached with caution. And
although the EEC share in total Greek exports declined
after 1973, mainly due to the growing importance of the
Middle East for Greece’s trade, its 1977 level (47.7%)
was close to the Community average (50.7%).
Although there is disagreement on the magnitudes
involved, there seems to be a measure of consensus on
the positive direction of the welfare effects of associ- 
41ation. Thus, the record of the association does not 
seem to lend support to contrary predictions that were
i Q
made in the beginning of the association. It could be 
argued, however, that this welfare measure does not tell 
the whole story and should be qualified accordingly. For 
even if trade creation exceeded trade diversion, this 
was not translated into an outright benefit. This would 
be so in an economy of high factor mobility but not in 
Greece, whose economy is characterized by structural weak­
nesses and factor-market imperfections resulting in low 
resource mobility to changing market conditions.43 It is
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these weaknesses which, despite the impressive record 
of Greek exports (exports to the Community were growing 
at an average annual rate of approximately 20% at current 
prices over the 1961-78 period, with the total of Greek 
exports growing at 17% over the same period), have not 
allowed any improvement in the ratio of exports to imports: 
it rarely exceeded 40%. And although persistent visible- 
trade deficits have been largely covered by invisible 
trade flows, the Greek balance of payments has deteriorated. 
Nevertheless, the ratio of trade coverage between Greece 
and the Community has been less problematic than between 
Greece and the rest of the world over the same period.
Apart from the total level of Greek exports, it 
is also important, perhaps even more so, to look at the 
separate performance of agricultural and industrial ex­
ports, and at the changes which have occurred in the compo­
sition of Greek exports to the EEC. (The evidence regarding 
Greek imports during the period 1962-75 does not reveal 
any significant structural changes. Imports from the Six 
grew at approximately the same rate as total imports; 
and with or without tariffs, the EEC was, and still is, 
Greece’s principal supplier of industrial products. Fur­
thermore, the internal structure of Greek imports has 
remained relatively stable over this period.)
In the case of agricultural exports, it is diffi­
cult to assess their performance with detailed reference 
to the Association Agreement, since the harmonization of 
Greek agricultural policy did not materialize. Furthermore,
78
the growth of agricultural exports to EEC markets depended 
not only on the provisions of the Agreement but also on 
how the preferential treatment of Greek agricultural ex­
ports compared with other similar trade arrangements con­
cluded between the EEC and other countries exporting to 
the Community goods competitive to Greece’s (tobacco from 
Turkey, currants from Iran, citrus fruit from Israel, 
etc.). In any event, the record of the period 1962-75 
shows that Greek agricultural exports to the Community 
expanded faster than the same exports to third countries.
Turning now to manufactured goods, it is observed 
that in 1962 they made up about 10% of Greek exports to 
the Community, increasing to 50% of total Greek exports 
to the Community by 1976; on the other hand, the share 
of industrial imports from Greece in the total industrial 
imports of the EEC remained below 0.5% despite substantial 
increases. However, this latter aggregate figure hides 
the growing importance of the Community market for Greek 
industrial products: looking at the twenty-four products 
where Greek exports have been concentrated, Greece a c ­
counted in 1977 for over 30% of total EEC imports from
third countries in eight products, and between 10% and
44.30% in six others.
This development should be assessed in connection 
with a distinct change that occurred in the composition 
of industrial output during the period of association-- 
with a rise in the share of intermediate goods (chemicals, 
basic metal products, non-metal lie minerals, paper and
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wood products), a small rise in the share of capital goods, 
and a fall in the share of basic consumer goods. A related 
development during the sixties was the rapid increase 
in the capital intensity of Greek manufacturing industry, 
although most exports have remained relatively labour 
intensive. This increase was mainly due to a reduction 
in the relative price of capital, brought about to a large 
extent by a change in government policy--favourable in­
terest rates, exemption from duties on imported machinery, 
and an open emigration policy, through which unemployment
was reduced and real wages rose at a relatively faster 
45rate.
Within this policy reorientation, an attempt was 
made to redefine foreign-investment policy in a manner 
that would contribute to the country’s export potential. 
Although foreign investment had been an important factor 
in Greek economic development even prior to association, 
most of what had been attracted since 1953 had gone into 
the production of import substitutes behind a protective 
tariff wall. From the early days of the association, the 
Agreement's transitional period of gradual tariff dis­
mantling was seen as an opportunity to adopt new criteria 
for the approval of foreign investment, channelling it 
away from import substitution and towards export promotion 
in line with the Community’s philosophy and purpose.46 
Those hopes, however, have largely remained unrealized, the 
available evidence pointing instead to a correlation be­
tween foreign investment in Greece and import substitution
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as well as to an overall weak link between foreign in-
47vestment and association.
The above considerations suggest that the effects 
of association lack transparency and are not easily attrib­
utable; this is partly due to the fact that they do not 
occur in a vacuum but are considerably influenced by the 
conscious effort of government policy to maximize the 
potential benefits and minimize the potential costs in­
volved. This sober view of the challenges and risks in­
herent in association (and for that matter in full member­
ship) was shared by many of its supporters who realized 
that its success did not derive automatically from the 
provisions of the Agreement but depended on the effective 
defense of Greek interests within the institutional mecha­
nisms of the association, on the implementation of struc­
tural changes in the Greek economy, and on the identifi­
cation and promotion of those exports having potential 
48for expansion. However, the troubled history of the 
association left little room or time for materializing 
such intentions. What did materialize was an increased 
awareness of the real problems facing the Greek economy, 
which the association helped to stand out in relief and 
reveal their true magnitude.
D. Association vs. Full Membership 
Given the record and prospects of the association, 
the state of the Greek economy, and the overall orientation 
of the country’s foreign policy, the choice confronting 
Greece in 1974 following the restoration of democracy
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was between renegotiation of the Association Agreement
and a bid for full membership. The Greek Government’s
decision to opt for full membership emerged out of the
political realities of the period, and especially out
of the desire to safeguard Greece’s fledgling democratic
institutions. On the other hand, coming at the time of
the Cyprus crisis and Greece’s military withdrawal from
NATO, the decision to apply for full membership should
also be interpreted within the wider context of Greece’s
49security considerations. In addition to the above fac­
tors, it was also the internal evolution of the Community 
and the proliferation of association agreements that 
pointed clearly in favour of full membership. However, 
there was hardly any serious public debate on the economic 
costs and benefits of full membership--only unsubstantiated 
generalizations and slogans along political party lines.
The question of full membership dates back to the 
preassociation days: association was seen from the be­
ginning, at least by Greece, as simply a preparatory stage 
dictated by economic circumstances and leading even­
tually to full membership. During the two decades that were 
to follow, the questions being asked have roughly remained 
the same; but the changes that have taken place at the 
national, European, and international levels during this 
period have altered their frame of reference, invalidating 
old arguments and throwing off balance previously held 
ideas. What has remained constant during these years, 
leaving aside the period of dictatorship, is the commitment
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of the successive Greek governments to eventual full 
Community membership. There was never any doubt about 
this final objective, the only question being the right 
approach with respect to timing.
83
NOTES
1 In Greece the timing of the application was criti­
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CHAPTER II
FROM ASSOCIATION TO FULL MEMBERSHIP: 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Greece’s Application for Membership
Shortly after the restoration of democracy and 
during preparations for the "revival” of the Association 
Agreement, the Greek Government submitted a memorandum, 
dated 26 November 1974, in which it stated its intention 
to seek membership to the European Communities in the 
near future. The formal application was submitted on 
12 June 1975. 1 According to its legal basis,
Any European State may apply to become a member 
of the Community. It shall address its application 
to the Council, which shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the opinion of the Commission.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments 
to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the sub­
ject of an agreement between the Member States and 
the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted 
for ratification by all the Contracting States in 
accordance wi£h their respective constitutional 
requi rements.
At its session of 24 June 1975, the Council of Ministers 
took note of the application and called upon the Commission 
to draw up its Opinion.
1. The Commission’s Opinion 
Adopted on 28 January 1976, the Commission’s
3Opinion amounted to a qualified and lukewarm statement. 
Even though it spoke of a "clear affirmative" response 
to Greece's application, the clarity of its affirmation
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left a lot to be desired. The Commission’s key proposal 
was the establishment of a preaccession stage, a stage 
which was to precede any transitional period that might be 
agreed upon in the context of the accession negotiations. 
What made such a preliminary stage necessary in the eyes 
of the Commission was the existence of certain crucial 
problems: the Greco-Turkish relations, the structural 
weaknesses of the Greek economy, the further enlargement 
of the Community, and the functioning of Community insti­
tutions.
These problems are raised in broad terms in the 
first part of the Commission’s statement; its second part 
is devoted to a more detailed analysis of specific economic 
and technical issues. Although this latter section was 
open to certain criticisms, it was primarily the first 
part of the Commission’s Opinion that became the object 
of controversy, given the sensitive nature of the political 
and strategic issues that it raised. It is interesting to 
note in this respect that the Opinion was adopted after 
long discussions and amidst considerable disagreement 
among the Commissioners.^
On the question of Greco-Turkish relations, the 
Commission viewed Greece’s application for membership as 
disrupting the existing balance in the Community's re­
lations with each country. The fact that the Community 
placed itself at an equal distance from the two countries 
was emphasized by the Commission’s view that their status 
as associates was identical, with full membership as their
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common final objective--though with different timetables
5 • .for its realization. The implication of this position
was that, by entering into accession negotiations with
Greece, the Community would disrupt this delicate balance
and hence become a party to the disputes between the two
countries. To avoid this situation, the Commission suggested
that the Community should play an active role in helping
Greece and Turkey resolve their differences in parallel
with the preparatory work for Greek accession.6
Undoubtedly, the prospect of Greek membership 
introduced a new disruptive dimension in the Greco-Turkish 
balance, prompting the Council to declare on 24 June 1975 
that the examination of Greece’s bid for membership would 
not affect Community relations with Turkey and especially 
Turkey’s rights as guaranteed under her Association Agree­
ment. However, the Commission’s position clearly repre­
sented an effort to take the matter a step further, its in­
tention being to implement specific actions in order to 
’’give substance” to the Council’s declaration.7
Although the question as to the identical status 
of the two associates leaves room for interpretations, as 
noted in the previous chapter, what matters for the point 
in hand is that the Community has always treated their 
association agreements in a similar and non-discriminatory 
manner. It is interesting to note that since the Turkish 
Agreement did not lay down a fixed schedule of tariff reduc­
tions in the move to full membership, some members of the 
GATT were initially reluctant to accept it as consistent
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with article XXIV of GATT--in contrast with Greece’s 
Agreement which was generally regarded as compatible with 
GATT rules, being an interim agreement leading to a 
customs union within a reasonable time period and even-
O
tually to full membership. However, with pressure from
the Community and the United States, the two agreements
9were granted equal status under GATT rules. The reasons 
for such a balanced treatment in the early sixties were 
not different from those which lay behind the Commission’s 
position in the mid seventies: the sensitive nature of 
the Cyprus issue and the status of Greece and Turkey as 
NATO allies.
Quite apart from the above considerations, the 
Commission could not conceal its fears that the structural 
weaknesses facing the Greek economy might prove formidable 
enough to preclude the possibility of an early accession. 
Furthermore, viewed within the wider perspective of the 
Community's Mediterranean enlargement,10 Greece’s accession 
was regarded as a source of additional complications: 
on the one hand, the Greek terms of entry were bound to 
create precedents for the Iberian candidates; on the other 
hand, the widening of the Community would leave little 
time for stabilizing its institutional functioning and 
for improving its decision-making processes, the more 
so given that the full consequences of the previous en­
largement had still to be fully absorbed.11 However, it 
is difficult to assess the extent to which this factor 
weighed in the Commission’s thinking, given that the
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prospect of the candidatures of Portugal and Spain was 
still uncertain.
At a more technical level, the central question 
that had to be considered was the economic impact that 
Greek accession would have on the Community. In the Com­
mission’s view, the economic impact was expected to be 
limited, given the relatively small magnitudes involved
in the Greek case; the main implications of Greek member-
12ship were thought to be financial and budgetary. On
the working hypothesis that Greece were a full member
13in 1976, the Commission estimated that the Community
budget expenditures of that year would have to increase
by approximately 6% at current prices and exchange rates.
Looking at both receipts and expenditures, Greek accession
in 1976 would have resulted in a net increase in Community
expenditure of 300 million u.a. (table 1). These estimates
were based on existing Community policies and hence did
not take into account their possible evolution and the
full financial requirements of the Greek economy; they
also had to leave out the impact on the budget of any
transitional arrangements to be concluded in the course
14of the negotiations. In other words, the Commission’s 
initial exercice on the budgetary burden of Greek member­
ship simply served the purpose of indicating the orders 
of magnitude involved. The issue was taken up in greater 
depth during the accession negotiations and is analyzed 
below in chapter III.
94
Table l .--Hypothetical budgetary consequences of Greek 
membership on the basis of 1976 estimates (in million u.a.)





Agricultural policy: guarantee 220





NET INCREASE IN COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE 302
3Estimates refer only to the ’Commission’ section
of the overall budget.
b0.52% of the VAT base in a Community of Ten, as 
opposed to 0.47% of the VAT base in a Community of Nine.
c
Reimbursement of 10% of own resources (collection
costs).
SOURCE: EC, Commission, "Opinion on Greek Application," p. 42.
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Taken as a whole, the above analysis allows the 
Commission’s proposal to be viewed from the proper per­
spective. At face value, the preaccession stage was pre­
sented as a period during which the Community would under­
take a substantial economic-aid programme enabling Greece 
to carry out structural economic reforms and to prepare 
her integration into the Community’s institutional mech­
anisms; at the same time, it was suggested that accession 
negotiations should proceed parallel to the implementation 
of these measures. However, although the Commission ap ­
peared to take a positive stand on the principle of Greek 
membership, the reservations that it expressed regarding 
its timing undermined seriously the principle itself.
While it proposed the opening of negotiations, it took 
a rather long view as to their completion, attempting 
in effect to fit them to the modalities of its proposals: 
it wanted, for example, to give priority to those dossiers 
which had proved difficult in the previous enlargement 
negotiations; and implicitly suggested that it would have 
been better for Greece to wait first for the full imple­
mentation of its association agreement before proceeding
15with accession. This view persisted even after the 
opening of the negotiations, and is partly reflected 
on the spread which initially existed between the two 
sides’ estimates of the probable length of the negoti­
ations, with Greece expecting them to be over by 1978 
and the Community by as late as 1982.
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Thus, the problems and issues that the Commission 
raised in connection with the Greek application could 
have easily been translated into obstacles, compromising 
seriously the prospects of a smooth accession. In this 
sense, the unavoidably lengthy negotiations would have 
turned into a de facto preaccession period, their formal 
opening having lost its significance along the way. Ad­
mittedly, the solution of these problems was not rigidly 
linked, in the form of a precondition, to the successful 
completion of the negotiations.16 But the very intro­
duction of sensitive issues, often lying at the margin 
of the proper terms of reference of a political-economic 
analysis of the implications of Greek membership, could 
have easily strained the delicate balance of European 
politics, transforming the outcome of Greece's bid for 
membership into a rather nebulous affair.
2. Greece’s Reaction 
Utilizing fully its diplomatic channels, the 
Greek Government made immediately clear to the Community 
and the individual member states its strong negative stand 
on the Commission’s Opinion.17 Its main criticism centered 
on the idea of a preaccession period, which was seen as an 
attempt to shelve its bid for membership. There was no 
need, in its view, for such a period, the Association 
Agreement having served exactly this purpose; it was the
1 8other prospective candidates, not Greece, that needed it.
In the same vein, references to the need for improvements
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in the functioning of Community institutions, to the extent 
that they had to precede Greek accession, were viewed 
by Greece with suspicion as a potential source of inertia 
in the progress of the negotiations.
The Commission’s proposal for financial assistance
19prior to accession was also received with resentment.
Greece felt that her motivations in applying for membership 
were not fully understood. Her impression was that the 
Commission had acted as if the Greek application, coming 
at a time when the second Financial Protocol had not yet 
materialized, was a mere tactic to secure more financial 
aid under the Association Agreement. It was this implied 
attribution of mendacity to Greece’s move which added 
insult to injury: it was felt that the Commission had 
underestimated and misjudged the serious political com­
mitment behind Greece’s decision to apply for full member­
ship.
Predictably enough, the most controversial aspect 
of the Commission’s argumentation was the raising of the 
issue of Greco-Turkish relations. At a different point 
in time, it would probably have seemed natural for this 
issue to form part of the debate on the wider political 
implications of Greece’s bid for membership. But coming 
at a time when relations between the two countries were 
dangerously strained in connection with the Cyprus and 
Aegean disputes, the Commission’s views raised formidable 
and sensitive questions of a strategic nature which Greece 
was not willing to consider in the context of her
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application for Community membership--al1 the more so 
given the Commissions’s equidistant position on the 
Greco-Turkish dispute.
3. The Council’s Position
The initiative to secure a quick and categorically
positive response by the Council was undertaken by the
Dutch Foreign Minister Van der Stoel. On 2 February 1976
a meeting in Bonn between Van der Stoel and Germany’s
Foreign Minister Genscher resulted in a publicly announced
agreement, which in turn created the necessary momentum
20for a favourable Council position. With a rapid decision
at its session of 9 February, only two weeks after the
submission of the Commission's Opinion and almost without
any debate, the Council simply took note of the Commission
statement and rejected its notion of a preaccession period
together with its corollary political proposals. With a
’’grand gesture," that proved far more difficult to im-
21plement than to design, it accepted without any qualifi­
cations the Greek application for membership and asked 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) to 
prepare the mandate for the negotitions with a view to 
open them as soon as possible.
With Turkey's anxieties looming up before it, 
what undoubtedly eased the Council’s decision was the 
assurances given by Greece at the highest level that,
once a full member, she would not block the development
22of Turkey’s relations with the Community. Seen from 
this perspective, the Council's response was not only
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an act of ideological commitment and firm support to 
Greece's newly restored democratic institutions but also 
an act of confrontation with the Commission--an affirmation 
of the Council's power as the sole organ to assume poli­
tical initiatives on such sensitive issues as the Greco-
23Turkish dispute.
Greece's assurances did little to alleviate 
Turkey’s fears. The Council’s firmly positive response 
to the Greek application unavoidably strained the psycho­
logical climate in Turkey and her relations with the 
Community--a situation that was to deteriorate further 
with Greece’s subsequent accession. As Kohlhase has aptly 
put it,
In politics as in Pythagorean geometry, you cannot 
alter your relationship to one of two equidistant 
points without simultggeously changing your position 
as regards the other.
A series of attempts to reestablish a certain amount of 
balance has characterized the Community’s attitudes towards 
Turkey to the present--although, with Turkey’s reach 
for full membership exceeding for the moment her grasp, 
the restoration of complete symmetry remains an elusive 
and remote objective. On the other hand, it seems reason­
able to argue in the light of the available evidence that 
the Turkish factor, while it played a crucial role in 
the opening of the Greek negotiations (which it has re­
tained in Greece’s postaccession relations with the Com­
munity), receded in the background during the actual 
conduct of the negotiations.
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B. An Overall View of the Negotiations
The accession negotiations were formally opened
in Brussels on 27 July 1976 with a ministerial session
in which Max Van der Stoel, President-in-Office of the
Council of the European Communities, and Panayotis Papali-
gouras, Greece’s Minister of Coordination, presented the
initial positions of the Community and Greek delegations,
while Frangois-Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission,
made a statement outlining the Commission’s role during
25the conduct of the negotiations.
The Greek Minister's statement made explicit from 
the outset the political dimension of Greece's bid for 
membership. Besides emphasizing that Greece’s orientation 
towards the Community was being consistently followed 
as part of the country's postwar foreign policy, his 
statement made reference to the smooth restoration of 
democracy as proof of Greece’s political maturity and 
readiness to join the Community --the implication being 
that Greece met not only the formal basic requirement 
of being a democracy but also the essential one that her 
democracy was durable. Although such lofty words fitted 
perfectly the occasion, the truth was somewhat different: 
it was the very fragility of Greece’s newly restored demo­
cratic institutions that lay behind Prime Minister Konstan- 
tinos Karamanlis’ firm and pressing bid for membership 
to the European Communities. Nevertheless, the idealism 
characterizing the opening Greek statement was not at 
the expense of spelling out the hard facts of the accession
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negotiations: it set out the essential features of Greece’s
initial negotiating positions in the form of concrete
proposals with respect to the various fields of Community 
27activi t y .
It is interesting to compare in this context the 
Greek statement with the United Kingdom delegation’s intial 
statement during the opening of the latter’s accession 
negotiations in June 1970: in both instances ideals were 
mixed with facts in roughly similar proportions. It is 
equally interesting to note that such similarities do 
not run only through the two delegations' initial positions. 
A comparative examination of the British and Greek negoti­
ations reveals a number of often unexpected parallels 
which allow for a better understanding of the dynamics 
of Community enlargement, seen as a continuous and on­
going process towards European integration. This theme 
is developed below in chapter IX. For the purpose in hand 
it suffices to point out that, quite apart from the sub­
stantive aspects of the previous enlargement, its formal
procedural arrangements were regarded by both sides as
28serving equally well the present negotiations.
1. Establishment of a Procedural Framework
The accession negotiations were conducted by the
Community and Greek delegations meeting in a ’’Conference
between the Community and Greece," within which the terms
of Greece’s entry and the adjustments to the Treaties
29were concluded. On the Community side, with singleness 
of Community representation, the negotiations were
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conducted by the Council at deputy and ministerial levels. 
(At deputy level, the Conference took place within the 
workings of COREPER and was presided by the latter’s chair­
man, i.e. by the Permanent Representative of the member 
state occupying the Community presidency.) This arrangement 
was in marked contrast to the association negotiations, 
which were conducted on the part of the Community by the 
Commission, on the basis of a mandate by the Council of 
Ministers. The Commission’s role in Greece’s accession 
negotiations was nevertheless crucial in paving the way 
for the drafting of the Community’s common negotiating
positions and in providing the necessary technical sup-
30 . .port. The technical side of the negotiations corresponded
to the examination of the Community secondary legislation
in the various fields, an examination which was conducted
by the Commission delegation and Greek experts concurrently
with the negotiations proper. In addition, the Commission’s
role was to keep the Greek delegation informed on up-to-
date developments in the Community and to keep the European
31Parliament informed on the progress of the negotiations.
Beyond this formal role, the unofficial contacts between
the Commission and Greece, which had started before and
extended after the negotiations, were equally important.
The Conference sessions were in principle scheduled
to take place quarterly at ministerial level and monthly
at deputy level--a frequency which was roughly observed
in the course of the negotiations--with some flexibility
32to account for special circumstances. All sessions of
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the Conference were held in Brussels--except the April,
June, and October ministerial sessions which were held 
33in Luxembourg.
2. Establishment of Common 
Negotiation Principles
The basic premise established at the outset of
the negotiations was that Greece accepted the Treaties
and their political objectives, the Community secondary
legislation as it evolved since the entry into force of
the Treaties (and covering implicitly its developments
up to accession), and the choices made regarding the de-
34velopment of the Community. The central principle, in 
other words, was Greece’s full acceptance upon accession 
of the Community patrimony or ’’acquis communautaire, ” 
with allowance of course for the adjustments to be en­
visaged within the terms of entry. With these adjustments 
the Conference was to seek solutions to problems posed 
by Greek accession in such a way so as to ensure that 
enlargement would not disturb the process of Community
integration and would not weaken the Community’s insti-
35tutional structure and scope for action. On the basis
of this criterion, solutions should not involve changes
to Community rules but transitional arrangements, upon
the expiration of which the acquis communautaire was to 
36apply in full. The assumption behind this principle 
was that the agreements reached at a given time in the 
negotiations were necessarily based on the acquis com­
munautai re as it stood at that time, and were thus without
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prejudice to any subsequent developments in it until 
37accession. Such additions to the acquis communautaire 
would have to be applied by Greece upon accession; this 
of course did not rule out the possibility that they could 
be the object of further adjustments to take account of 
Greek problems, either within additional negotiations 
(for any developments in the acquis communautaire occurring 
prior to the conclusion of the negotiations) or within
the consultations procedure (for any developments occurring
38during the interim period).
Another general principle agreed upon was that
the solutions adopted in one sector should not prejudge
39solutions in other sectors; and that any specific and
partial agreements reached in any given sector would become
definitive only at the final stage when the overall balance
40of the negotiations would be established and assessed.
Although reiterated on many occasions, especially in the
context of the agricultural negotiations, this principle
was not fully adhered to, since the negotiations were
concluded without any comprehensive assessment of their
41overall balance. The reason for this should be sought 
in the nature of Community decision making itself: the
incremental development of the acquis communautaire along
>
delineated sectors of activity has proceeded with only 
occasional references to the balance of the whole edifice 
(as, for example, Tindemans’ European Union attempted 
to do in the mid seventies). In much the same way, the 
negotiating process of Greece’s accession reflected the
105
partition of Community activity within a corresponding 
administrative framework. And although this arrangement 
was conducive to efficiency, it allowed little room for 
establishing an overall balance among the individual sec­
tors (apart from certain horizontal issues, such as the 
general transitional period and the budgetary aspects 
of membership). Thus, specific agreements were automa­
tically finalized once the substantive negotiations were 
completed, which in turn meant that the overall agreement 
was little more than the sum total of the partial agree­
ments reached in the course of the negotiations. It would 
have been very difficult indeed to assess an overall ba­
lance which did not exist. On the other hand, it was the 
very absence of such a final comprehensive assessment that 
provided a safety valve for the successful completion 
of the negotiations, since the parcelling of the issues 
along the narrowly confined lines of the acquis communau- 
taire prevented the wider problems of enlargement from 
surfacing on the negotiating table.
In contrast to the above principles whose accep­
tance created little or no complications, the general 
premise that Greek accession would be examined on its 
own merits was established in the midst of controversy 
and confusion, with forces pulling in the opposite di­
rection. The main factors which contributed to this situa- 
ation were the existence of the Association Agreement, 
the experience of the previous enlargement, and the pros­
pect of the future enlargement of the Community; this 
problem is analyzed below in chapters VI11 and IX.
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3. Evolution of the Negotiations
Within the general organization of the Conference,
42the negotiations were divided in two phases. During
the first ’’exploratory” phase, all areas of Community
activity would be examined with a view to identifying
the various problems of each side and the choices open
for their solution; in doing so, an overall, global view
of each side’s general statements of position would be
reached, enabling the negotiations to enter into their 
43second phase. In this, the ’’substantive” and more inten­
sive phase, the two sides would attempt to progressively
align their respective positions, thereby reaching an over- 
44all agreement.
The systematic examination of the Community second­
ary legislation ran parallel to the negotiations proper.
It began in October 1976 and followed along the lines
45of the previous enlargement negotiations. Undertaken 
by the Commission in consultation with the Greek dele­
gation, this was a major task--especially in the case 
of complex sectors such as the common agricultural pol- 
icy--requiring a vast amount of background work, prepa­
ration of exhaustive inventories of acts in all fields 
of Community activity, and appropriate editorial work.^6 
Given Greece’s acceptance of the acquis communautaire, 
the examination of the secondary legislation had a three­
fold aim: to identify in each field (1) those Community 
acts that would be immediately applicable upon accession 
without any adjustments or adaptations; (2) the technical
107
adaptations that had to be made to certain Community acts 
in order to take account of the new situation following 
Greek accession; and (3) any substantive problems arising 
from the application by Greece of certain Community acts, 
to be discussed and resolved under the relevant dossiers 
in the course of the negotiations proper (for a number 
of such acts, the Greek delegation had reserved the right
47to request their deferred application or implementation).
This process of identification was conducted in all sectors
48of Community activity --transport; environment & consumer 
protection; taxation; regional policy; social affairs 
(including social security for migrant workers); insti­
tutional, budgetary and staff-regulations matters; agri­
culture; economic and financial affairs; right of estab­
lishment and freedom to provide services; approximation 
of laws; rules of competition; Euratom acts and EEC &
ECSC acts in the areas of research and energy; external
relations; customs legislation; and informatics & sta- 
49t1stlcs.
Within the above framework, and although it was 
recognized that the various Community sectors were closely 
interlinked, the progress of the negotiations from the 
initial to their final stage observed faithfully the se­
paration of the negotiation dossiers according to the
conventional categorization of the acquis communautaire
50into areas of Community activity. This is a point already 
made but worth emphasizing in the present context. Looking 
at the conduct and outcome of the negotiations as a whole,
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the final agreement reached was little more than the 
formal approval of the sum total of the separate points 
agreed upon in the various negotiation chapters. Thus, the 
Greek accession negotiations should be appropriately seen 
as an "effeui1lage"--as a process whereby the individual 
issues were stripped and examined separately leaf by leaf 
with little or no reference to the whole. An exception 
to this pattern was the shared political will to ensure
that Greece would not be a net payer to the Community
51 .budget. Furthermore, one may discern in the course of
the agricultural negotiations an attempt by the Greek
delegation to contrast and equilibrate the terms agreed
upon in the industrial sectors with those to be negotiated
in the agricultural sector (this point is discussed in
chapter VI); and there are reasons to believe that Greece
managed to secure a five-year transitional period for
most of her products by relinquishing her demand for an
immediate application of the free movement of labour.
But this should be seen more appropriately as a last-minute
"package deal" for a final compromise; it had very little
to do with any conscious effort by the two sides to provide
an overall assessment of the individual terms of entry.
What set the general tone in the conduct of the
negotiations was the pattern adopted by the Community
in formulating its negotiation positions. According to 
it, the Community position papers in the first phase of
the negotiations set out the content and implications
of the acquis communautaire in each sector, indicating
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whether or not transitional arrangements could be con-
52sidered in principle and under what parameters. Thus,
the Community did not envisage proposing detailed solutions
before the completion of the first negotiation phase;
in fact, it repeatedly emphasized the need to acquire
a "vue d ’ensemble’’ of the Greek positions in the various
areas as a prerequisite for formulating its own definitive
53positions with respect to each negotiation dossier.
Although on the face of it this might seem a reasonable 
condition ensuring an orderly conduct of the negotiations, 
it was employed in practice as a means of delaying their 
progress and exerting subtle, or not so subtle, pressures 
to the advantage of the Community side.
Seen in this light, the purpose of the first 
phase of the negotiations turned out to be not so much 
the mutual and parallel establishment of each side’s 
overall positions, as was initially intended, but rather 
the complete establishment of Greece’s overall position 
as a precondition to the formulation of the Community’s 
positions and their eventual submission in the second 
phase of the negotiations. Apart from its obvious use 
as a delay tactic, the Community approach had as a result 
the cornering of the Greek delegation in a rather weak 
position, since the latter was continuously asked to show 
its cards with little or no initial feedback from the 
Community side on the substantive issues being raised.
A general look at the actual record of the negoti­
ations reveals that they do not fit into the neat pattern 
that was initially envisaged. As table 2 shows, the
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Table 2.--The progress of the accession negotiations3 
(quarterly periods)
Dossi ers
1976 1977 1978 1979
3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
Customs union X X X X X sb s s s r
Capital movements X X X sc s r r r
Ext. comm'1 relations X X X X sd s s s s r
ECSC X X X X X s s s r
EAEC X X s r r r
Regional policy X X X X X X s s s
Econ. & fin. affairs X s s s
Budgetary aspects X X X X X X X s s s
Agri culture X X X X X X X s s r
Social policy X X X X X X s r r
Transitional period X X X X X X s
Institutional aspects X X X X X s r r
Transport policy X X X X s S
Right of establishment X X X X X X X s r
ax: exploratory phase 
S: substantive phase
r: examination of residual substantive issues.
bSubstantive phase opened on 10 February 1978 (llth 
session of the Conference at deputy level).
c
Substantive phase opened on 27 February 1978 (12th 
session of the Conference at deputy level).
dSubstantive phase opened on 21 March 1978 (13th 
session of the Conference at deputy level).
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exploratory and substantive phases cannot be clearly de­
lineated for the negotiations as a whole, since certain 
dossiers (such as agriculture and social policy) lagged
in their development while others (such as capital move-
54ments) progressed more rapidly. Hence, the negotiations
could more realistically be regarded as having followed
a continuous process of development rather than a neat
pattern of easily distinguishable stages, with agriculture
representing the pivotal sector for the negotiations
as a whole. Official documents containing summaries of
conclusions of the various Conference sessions include
statements signalling the end of the first stage and the
beginning of the second, even though this did not corre-
55spond fully to reality. Such an approximate way of re­
porting on the overall progress of the negotiations seems 
to reflect the bureaucratic tendency to show that formal
j
deadlines set at a higher political level have been met.
Even though a clear-cut pattern does not seem 
to exist in the evolution of the negotiations when viewed 
as a whole, one may reasonably expect to discern such 
a pattern when attention is focused instead on the indi­
vidual dossiers and their transition from the initial 
to the substantive stage of the negotiations. As it was 
agreed upon, the substantive phase was to begin in those 
fields in which the examination of the corresponding Com­
munity secondary legislation by the Commission and Greek 
delegations had progressed adequately, allowing for the 
technical preparation of the respective negotiation
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56dossiers. On the basis of this criterion, the stage 
of substantive negotiations opened with the sectors of 
customs union, capital movements, and external commercial 
relations (in that order), followed by other sectors as 
their technical preparation reached an adequate level
57allowing for the identification of substantive issues.
It should be noted that although the capital -
movements chapter was ahead of all others in its readiness
to enter the substantive stage, the Community insisted
that the development of the customs-union chapter should 
58lead the way. It seems reasonable to assume, in line
with the Community's thinking, that such an ordering of
priorities was conceptually the most methodical one to
adopt, as was the subordination of progress in the ECSC
59chapter to progress in the customs-union chapter. But 
one cannot help suspecting, as the Greek delegation alluded, 
that a Community delay tactic was also at play in this 
instance.60
Despite the adoption in principle of such an ap­
parently straightforward approach, one is still left with 
the sour feeling that the negotiators in their formal 
statements--and in particular the Community side at minis­
terial level--were attempting to cover the actual progress 
of the negotiations with a superficial patina of orderly 
development. Given the practice of unanimity and the con­
comitant slowness and unwieldiness of Community procedures, 
it was a thinly veiled effort to diffuse and contain the 
numerous difficulties encountered within the Community
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as it constantly tried to align the positions of the member 
states and adopt common negotiation positions that ade­
quately accounted for individual interests and difficulties.
Matters were made even worse by a lack of well- 
defined guidelines for moving ahead with the negotiations. 
For example, whereas the Council’s precondition for en­
tering into substantive negotiations was the completion 
of the technical dossiers, or at least ’’further progress” 
in that direction, the Commission’s requirements were 
the reverse: it regarded progress in the substantive ne ­
gotiations as itself a necessary condition for progress 
in the technical preparation of the respective dossiers.
In fact, to complete the vicious cycle, the conclusion 
of the examination of the Community secondary legislation 
came to depend to a large extent on the outcome of the 
substantive negotiations.61
Such complications, together with the Community’s 
difficulties in resolving internal differences of position 
and its insistence on acquiring a complete overall view 
of the Greek positions on all sectors before proceeding 
with the formulation of its own specific proposals on 
any given sector, help explain the uneven pace at which 
the negotiations as a whole progressed. In no other areas 
was this situation more clearly observed than in the cases 
of agriculture and the length of the overall transitional 
period. Two years after the opening of the negotiations, 
Greece still had no detailed knowledge of the Community’s 
reactions on these two areas--a situation which prevented
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her from acquiring an overall view of the Community po­
sitions, thereby affecting the progress of the negotiations
CO
as a whole. This problem, far more serious than any
of the marginal gaps existing in the Community’s overall
view of the Greek positions, resulted in an asymmetrical
conduct of the negotiations and created difficulties for
the Greek delegation in formulating its position on various 
63
1ssues.
With respect to the question of the length of the 
overall transitional period and of specific transitional 
measures in various sectors (a ’’horizontal” issue per­
meating the entire spectrum of the negotiations), these 
complications became even more pronounced owing to the
strong links between the substance of transitional measures
64and their duration. The Community was arguing that 
it would be premature to formulate its position on the 
matter without sufficient progress in all the main negoti­
ation sectors, given the interconnections among the various 
transitional measures envisaged in the separate dossiers as 
well as between them and the overall transitional period.65 
The Greek delegation, while repeatedly criticizing the 
Community for its approach, could do little more than 
proceed with the formulation of its positions on the basis 
of a unilateral working hypothesis of a five-year general 
transitional period, with variations according to indi­
vidual circumstances calling for shorter or longer tran­
sitional measures.66 It also warned the Community dele­
gation that it might be forced to reconsider some of the
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terms of entry already agreed upon.67 Such a course of 
action was possible under the common negotiation prin­
ciples; in fact, the agreements reached in the course of 
the negotiations on various points were initially con­
ditional ones, subject to agreement on the duration of 
the relevant transitional measures or length of the tran-
CQ
sitional period. One wonders, however, given the high 
political cost involved, whether the Greek delegation 
could have contemplated seriously such a move as an effec­
tive negotiation tactic.
With respect to agriculture, the Community did
admit that the submission of its proposals was overdue,
but tried to play down the seriousness of the matter by
arguing that the agricultural dossier required further
extensive examination before negotiations on it could
69enter the substantive phase. Given the known volume of 
agriculture's secondary legislation, these delays were 
to a certain extent inevitable and foreseeable. It has 
been argued, however, that they also reflected a calculated 
move on the part of the Community to accelerate the exami­
nation of those sectors in which the Community stood to 
gain (such as customs union, commercial policy, and capital 
movements) while stalling until the very end of the negoti­
ations the development of sectors (such as agriculture) 
in which the Greek demands required the granting of consi­
derable concessions.70 What concerned the Greek side was 
that the rate of progress in the examination of this legis­
lation was slow, much slower than the progress registered
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in the other sectors--a situation that seriously affected
the substantive negotiations in the agricultural sector.71
Moreover, as the Greek delegation repeatedly emphasized,
the slow pace in the agricultural chapter was affecting
adversely other sectors closely linked with it, and hence
72progress of the negotiations as a whole. A case in point 
is the difficulties encountered by the Greek side in formu­
lating its position on the budgetary aspects of accession: 
it could not, for example, calculate income from agri­
cultural levies without knowing, at least approximately,
what the transitional arrangements were likely to be with
73respect to the agricultural products concerned.
In a rather hasty move, the Greek delegation made 
an attempt to oil the wheels of the negotiations by pro­
posing the establishment, on a regular basis and within
the Conference, of working groups of experts as a prepara-
74tory level to the work of the Conference at deputy level.
This move was in contrast with an earlier agreement between
the two sides that no working parties would be envisaged
as an integral part of the negotiations, except in specific 
75circumstances. Moreover, if it had been accepted, this 
procedure would more likely than not have slowed down the 
negotiations even more76 instead of speeding them up, by 
magnifying the technical ramifications of the negotiation 
issues and thus widening the potential areas of disagree­
ment between the two sides. It is interesting to note 
that it was on the Community's insistence that Greece 
finally abandoned this request, agreeing instead that
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the best means of making progress in the negotiations 
at the technical level would be by stepping up the existing 
procedure of contacts between the Commission and the Greek 
delegation.77
Seen in the context of Greece’s overall negotiation 
strategy, Greece’s proposal to establish regular working 
groups of experts was an unexpected move. For it was the 
broad sweep in the examination of most issues that pri­
marily characterized the Greek negotiators’ approach-- 
together with considerable flexibility in adjusting their
initial positions, often deliberately formulated with
78moderation in the first instance, in order to strike 
a quick compromise.
Such a preoccupation with speed inevitably entailed 
a certain cost to the Greek side: it meant that the care­
ful, detailed, and detached study of the possible impact 
of accession often entered only superficially in the for­
mulation of its negotiation positions. The argumentation 
in the Greek position papers rarely rose beyond a mere 
identification of the sectors of the Greek economy that 
were considered ’’sensitive”, coupled with a request for 
temporary protection to ’’avoid disturbances.” However, 
given the overriding eagerness of the Greek Government 
for a swift and successful completion of the negotiations, 
one wonders how expedient it would have been to follow 
a firmer and more cautious but inevitably time-consuming 
approach by focusing more closely on a narrow balance 
sheet of economic costs and benefits, at a time when quick
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benefits could be reaped from the existing political will 
at the highest level in favour of Greece’s accession. 
Greece’s choice to approach the negotiations with the 
eye fixed on the ultimate political objective of accession 
meant that some of the fine tuning of the terms of entry 
would have to be sacrificed; it was a choice which in­
evitably created a potential source of weakness in for­
mulating and defending specific detailed points and a 
corresponding source of persistent criticisms at home: 
the emphasis on the political rather than on the economic
aspects of the negotiations was seen as being harmful
. . 79to the Greek interests, both economically and politically. 
But, in retrospect, it was perhaps the right approach 
to follow, given that the accession negotiations were 
not conducted in a vacuum, and that the existence of poli­
tical consensus on Greek accession could not be regarded 
as anything more than a fragile and vulnerable equilibrium 
of the political forces of the particular period, fleeting 
by its very nature.
The deadlocks experienced in the course of the nego­
tiations can only partially be explained by the technical 
difficulties encountered in certain areas. In fact, it 
would be more realistic to treat such difficulties as 
symptoms of much deeper causes which, though they rarely 
surfaced formally on the negotiating table, nevertheless 
affected the willingness of individual member states to 
reach a consensus on various outstanding issues and hence 
their readiness to establish common positions. The real
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source of these difficulties is to be found within the 
conflicts arising from domestic (often electoral) consi­
derations on the implications of Greek accession, which 
had to be taken into account by each member state and 
which inevitably affected the pace at which Community
80positions could be established on the various issues.
Such obstacles existed from the beginning of the negoti­
ations; and as they were resolved, they were replaced 
with fresh ones. Three major difficulties marked the 
opening stage of the negotiations: Ireland's insistence 
that the volume of Community financial resources accruing 
to her, especially those of the Regional Fund, should 
not be reduced when establishing Greece's share; Italy's 
worries of the impact of Greek accession on her Mediter­
ranean agricultural exports; and Germany’s fears of the 
effects that the granting of free movement to Greek labour 
would have on the level of unemployment at home. The Euro­
pean Council managed to overcome these problems at its 
meeting of 12 July 1976, only to be faced with new ones 
in 1977 as France's and Italy’s difficulties with the 
prospect of Spanish membership spilled over to the Greek 
negotiati ons.
Although these difficulties did originate within 
individual countries and reflected national fears over 
the impact of Greek accession on their economies, many 
of them acquired a different dimension when they surfaced 
on a wider, Community level. At this level, there were 
talks about the need for phased accession, for a Europe
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deux vitesses,” and for globalization of the Greek 
candidature with those of the other applicants; there 
was also concern over the negative impact of enlargement 
on the in-depth development of the Community and on the 
functioning of its institutions.
Towards the middle of 1977 the negotiations were 
entering into a very sensitive phase. Although global­
ization of the negotiations was eventually averted, the 
factors outlined above continued to dampen the pace of 
the negotiations. This, in turn, was seen by the Greek
81delegation as affecting adversely public opinion at home
which should be interpreted against the backdrop of a
rising anti-Community opposition party as evidenced by
the November 1977 election results. (A more subtle but
no less crucial problem involved the adverse effects that
the uncertainties of protracted negotiations might have
on the business climate at home, as they had during the
82period of the association negotiations. ) The danger 
for the accession negotiations to enter such a vicious 
cycle with implications for public opinion and the poli­
tical climate in the Community as a whole was indeed quite 
real; and it was only the affirmation, following Prime 
Minister Karamanlis’ state visits to European capitals
in early 1978, of the political will to conclude the bulk
83of the negotiations before the end of 1978 which gave 
a second wind to the negotiations ensuring their successful 
completion. Thus, a strong political consensus by itself 
turned out to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition
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for Greek accession; what was also needed, and what this 
time constraint provided, was an ’’agreement to agree”-- 
a catalyst to overcome the inertia in the negotiations 
and to help translate the political will into concrete
economic arrangements corresponding to mutually acceptable
84terms of entry.
Although the negotiations did not proceed exactly 
within this time constraint, their overall progress was 
more or less satisfactory once the difficulties experienced 
in the fields of agriculture and social policy, and in
respect of the length of the transitional period, began
85to be resolved. This is not surprising, given that these 
fields were the most sensitive ones--which also helps 
explain why the substantive issues relating to them were 
among the last to be negotiated.
When, towards the end of 1978, the completion 
of the negotiations was in sight and accession unquestion­
ably within reach, the Greek delegation began paying much 
closer attention to the effects that the terms of erilry 
might have on Greece’s economy. As Foreign Minister Rail is 
warned, the Community positions as they stood at that 
time, and to the extent that they would be incorporated 
in the terms of Greece’s entry,
would have the effect of creating after accession a 
system of discriminatory treatment for Greece which 
would be a burden on the Greek economy and which, on 
every count, whether economic or political, no Greek 
Government could present to the people of Greece.
This was an extreme statement to make, especially at such
a mature stage when many of the terms of entry had already
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been negotiated. But it did make sense as a negotiating 
tactic, since the social-policy and agriculture chapters 
were still outstanding, and the Greek side had every reason 
to place the Community proposals in these fields in a 
negative perspective. On the other hand, however, given 
that in many, if not most, instances it was the Community 
position that dominated the agreements reached, the above 
Greek statement should be seen not as a mere manoeuvre 
but also as an indirect admission of weak and unsatis­
factory terms of entry--an admission that in retrospect, 
and for the same reasons, could have been extended to 
some of the terms eventually negotiated in the fields 
of agriculture and social policy.
In the last meeting of the Conference at minis­
terial level, held in Luxembourg on 3 April 1979, it was 
concluded that the negotiations were to be considered 
complete and that no substantive issues could be raised, 
otherwise the negotiations as a whole would be reopened; 
and in line with this conclusion, certain remaining points 
intended to be raised by the Greek delegation could only
be secondary in importance and without any budgetary or
87financial implications. These points were subsequently 
examined and resolved by the Conference at deputy level 
whose last meeting, marking the end of the accession ne­
gotiations, was held in Brussels on 23 May 1979. Thus, 
the negotiations lasted almost three years and were com­
pleted in twenty-six Conference sessions at deputy level
OQ
and eleven at ministerial level.
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One of the last tasks of the Conference was to
establish the procedure for drafting and finalizing the
legal instruments of accession, whose form, it was agreed,
89would be similar to that of the previous enlargement.
Within this procedure, the Conference finalized and authen­
ticated the texts of the accession instruments in the 
official languages of the Community, although the haste 
with which the negotiations were concluded affected the
quality of the wording and precision of the official
90texts. With the addition of Greek upon accession, the
official Community languages were increased from six to
91seven. Greek also became upon accession a working Com­
munity language, employed on an equal basis with the other 
working languages with respect to the translation and
interpretation requirements of the daily activities of
92the Community institutions. Greek entry also entailed
the preparation of an authentic Greek version of Community
primary and secondary legislation in force at the time 
93of accession, the latter amounting to approximately
40,000 pages. It was agreed that the date of entry into
force of the instruments of accession, i.e. the date
of Greek accession to the European Communities, would
94be 1 January 1981.
The signing of the instruments of accession-- 
the Treaty between the member states of the European 
Communities and Greece, together with the Final Act--took 
place in Athens on 28 May 1979. These instruments, together 
with certain accompanying Community texts, make up an
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integral whole, referred to as the "Documents Concerning
the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European 
95Communities”; they are set out below:
1. Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the appli­
cation for accession to the European Communities by
96 . .Greece. This is a formal Commission statement, giving
its favourable definitive opinion on Greece’s accession
97following the completion of the negotiations --to be 
distinguished from the previously examined initial Com­
mission Opinion in response to Greece’s application for 
membership
2. Council Decision of 24 May 1979 on the accession 
of Greece to the ECSC. This is a formal Council act ac­
cepting Greece as a member of the ECSC on 1 January 1981
on the basis of the negotiated terms of accession and
adjustments to the Treaty of ECSC (they are set out in
the Act of Accession); and on condition that Greece had
deposited its instrument of accession on that date and
that all the member states and Greece had deposited their
instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Accession
98of Greece to the EEC and the EAEC before that date
3.Council Decision of 24 May 1979 on the admission 
of Greece to the EEC and to the EA E C . With this act, the 
Council formally accepted Greece’s application for ad­
mission to the two Communities, on the basis of the con­
ditions of admission and the adjustments to the corres­
ponding Treaties that were negotiated within the Conference
99(they are set out in the Act of Accession)
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4. Treaty between the Member States of the European 
Communities and Greece concerning the accession of Greece 
to the EEC and to the EAEC (Treaty of Accession). The 
Treaty was to enter into force on l January 1981, provided 
that all contracting parties had ratified it and had de­
posited their instruments of ratification before that 
date, and that the instrument of accession of Greece to 
the ECSC was deposited on that date100
5. Act concerning the conditions of accession 
of Greece and the adjustments to the Treaties (Act of 
Accession). This Act is formally annexed to the Council 
Decision on the accession of Greece to the ECSC and to 
the Treaty of Greece’s accession to the EEC and the EAEC, 
and it thus pertains to all three Communities. Apart from 
the negotiated adjustments to the Treaties, it contains 
all the technical adaptations to Community acts together 
with the agreed-upon provisions for deferred application 
on Greece of Community acts
6. Final A c t . This Act rounds up all the residual 
points and provides a formal seal to Greek accession and 
its legal framework.
Following their signature, and during the interim 
period, the texts of the instruments of accession were 
ratified by Greece and by each member state. No problems 
arose during the process of ratification. In fact, with 
the exception of Greece, France, and Denmark, the favour­
able vote in the national parliaments was virtually unan­
imous. (In Greece, the 104 members of the Socialist and
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Communist parties did not take part in the voting or in 
the debate that preceded it, having also boycotted the 
signing ceremony; of the remaining 196 votes, 191 were 
in favour. In France, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, 
the ratification process gave rise to considerable debate 
and a relatively large percentage of dissenting votes-- 
42% and 22%, respectively.)101 Thus, the long and often 
arduous process which began with Greece’s application 
for membership on 12 June 1975 finally came to a successful 
end, with Greece becoming the tenth member of the European 
Communities on 1 January 1981.
C . The Domestic Scene
1. Greece’s Internal Organization 
for the Negotiations
In making the necessary internal arrangements 
and preparing the organizational structure for carrying 
out the negotiations, the Greek side did not have to 
devise an entirely new scheme. The nucleus of such a frame­
work already existed in the Greek administration within 
the context of the implementation of the Association 
Agreement, and this was suitably extended and adapted 
to meet the demands of the membership negotiations.
In the initial phase of the negotiations respon­
sibility was centered in the Ministry of Coordination, 
with a Deputy Minister responsible for European Community 
affairs, and a General Directorate staffed with civil 
servants and a team of lawyers and economists. This scheme 
was modified at a later stage, with the brief being shared
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between the Ministries of Coordination and Foreign Affairs. 
The bulk of the work for the preparation of the various 
negotiation dossiers, both at the preliminary and the 
substantive stages, was carried out by the Ministry of 
Coordination, which was also responsible (in cooperation 
with the Commission) for the examination of the Community 
secondary legislation; in these tasks it was aided by 
specialized departments of other Ministries. As the negoti­
ations progressed, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
acquired an increasingly prominent role, being responsible 
for the general political dimension of the negotiations-- 
which carried with it as a backwash effect an increasingly 
overlapping role in the coordination of specific negoti­
ating positions. Both Ministries were supported in Brussels 
by the Greek Permanent Delegation, whose staff was drawn
from the Diplomatic Corps and other sections of the Greek
. . , . 102 civil service.
The above scheme formed the backbone of the Greek 
governmental and administrative framework providing the 
necessary support to the team responsible for the actual 
conduct of the negotiations, officially named the Central 
Committee of Negotiations. The Committee’s brief was the 
finalization of the Greek positions, the actual conduct 
of the negotiations at deputy level, and the preparation 
for the negotiations at ministerial level. In the initial 
stage this team was headed by Nikolaos Kyriazidis, Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of Greece, while its balance of power 
weighed heavily towards the Ministry of Coordination and
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103its technocrats. This structure reflected a distinct 
philosophy and choice of negotiating tactics: the approach 
was to be aggressive, the objective being the minute and 
exhaustive bargaining of the Greek requests deriving in 
the first instance from what had already been negotiated 
within the Association Agreement. The Community’s political 
will for Greek membership was implicitly regarded as a 
given parameter; the negotiations were therefore seen 
as an effort to defend the interests of the Greek economy 
by formulating positions based primarily on the association 
patrimony or ’’acquis d 'association. ”
However, as the negotiations entered their initial 
stage and the magnitude of the task was brought home, 
it was becoming increasingly evident that the existence 
within the Community of a political consensus in favour 
of Greek membership could hardly be counted on as an ir­
reversible factor. Accordingly, the negotiation strategy 
switched to a more pragmatic one, characterized by swiftness 
and flexibility of approach, the subordination of economic 
considerations to political ones, and hence the inevitable 
relegation of defending the acquis d ’association to a 
lower level of priorities. This change eventually created 
a rift between the political hierarchy of the Ministry of 
Coordination and the negotiating team, as well as within 
the team itself, which led to the resignation of Kyriazidis 
and Grigoris Varfis (its leading member) in early January 
1977. Although their move was largely seen as being prompted 
by the clash between the two negotiating approaches,
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it also reflected a power struggle--a struggle whose 
substance lay in the competing ambitions, conflicting 
personalities, and even diverging political affiliations 
of the individuals involved.104
Reorganized within the new frame of reference,
the negotiating team was placed under the presidency of
Vyron Theodoropoulos, Secretary General of the Foreign
Affairs Ministry, with Athanasios Andreopoulos taking
over Varfis' responsibilities for the technical preparation
105of the various dossiers. In line with the reshuffling 
at deputy level, and while the Greek side was initially 
represented at ministerial level by the Minister of Coordi­
nation, it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs that even­
tually took the lead, supported in his task by the Deputy 
Minister for Community Affairs. This shift in the internal 
balance of power was an intricate process; what made it 
easier was the move of the Minister himself, Panayotis 
Papaligouras, from the Ministry of Coordination to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1977, following 
the November national elections. (He held the post until 
May 1978, when he was succeeded by George Rail is.) Conti­
nuity was also ensured by the fact that the sensitive 
deputy-ministerial (and, from November 1977, ministerial) 
post for Community affairs was held by the same person, 
Georgios Kontogeorgis, throughout the negotiations. Never­
theless, the dualism in ministerial responsibilities 
that persisted to a greater or lesser extent throughout 
the negotiations, and the interministerial conflicts that
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it fomented, was a considerable handicap for the Greek 
side. Furthermore, the quality of the work that had to 
be carried out by the Greek delegation and the effective­
ness of the argumentation in support of the Greek requests 
were limited by the structural weaknesses and inefficiency 
of the country’s administrative machinery (in fact, their 
very existence provides a measure both of the task facing 
the Greek Government on the eve of the negotiations and 
of the success in bringing them to a satisfactory con­
clusion). What, perhaps, compensated partly for this handi­
cap was the remarkably small number of people involved 
in the negotiations106--although the attendant overcentral­
ization of such an arrangement often worked in the opposite 
direction. On the other hand, the extensive technical 
support provided by the Commission and Council services 
was an additional factor that significantly eased the 
burden of the Greek delegation.
In reviewing the record of the accession negoti­
ations, it is important to underline the catalytic role 
played by Prime Minister Karamanlis. His overpowering 
single-mindedness to get Greece into the Community and 
his personal handling of the bid for membership at critical 
moments when the negotiations sagged or entered into serious 
difficulties, helps explain how the membership negotiations 
were successfully completed despite strong forces that 
could have steered them in the opposite direction. Under­
mined by internal feuds within the ruling party, battered 
by a strong anti-Community parliamentary opposition, faced
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with the danger of globalization of the enlargement negoti­
ations together with a growing concern of member states 
about the impact of Greek accession, the successful com­
pletion of the negotiations acquires the magnitude of 
a Herculean feat. And although Karamanlis* role in it 
is largely a reflection of the personal basis of Greek 
politics, the effectiveness of his initiatives would have 
been questionable if it were not for the fact that his 
relations with the European leaders were very much in 
tune (an understatement in the case of France, given his 
close personal ties with President Giscard d'Estaing).
2. The Public Debate on Greek Membership
The above analysis has focused on the governmental 
and administrative framework underlying the conduct of 
the negotiations on the Greek side. To complete the picture 
of the domestic front, it is important to look beyond 
the confines of official government policies and examine 
the wider aspects of membership as a public issue.
The general conclusion reached from such an exami­
nation is that the public debate on the issue of Greek 
membership remained at a very limited level throughout 
the negotiations. A major factor contributing to this 
state of affairs was the unquestionable predominance of 
political over economic considerations which, by placing 
a thick coat of varnish over the whole picture, tended 
to obscure the many facets of the issue in hand. Even 
confined to its political dimension, the debate remained 
at an emotional level eliciting monolithic responses in
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favour or against membership and preventing the development 
of a more sophisticated exchange of views. A look at poli­
tical party platforms and parliamentary debates clearly 
supports this view. And on those occasions when the dis­
cussion entered into the economic aspects of membership, 
the unalloyed party lines which it followed hardly left 
any room for detached argumentation--an observation that
applies equally to the attitudes of most organized interest
107groups.
During the period 1974-1981 the party in power 
was the conservative New Democracy; however, the national 
elections of 1977 showed an erosion of its strength and 
a parallel rise of the opposition parties with polemic 
anti-Community platforms, in particular the Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) which almost doubled its share 
of the vote from 14% in 1974 to 25% in 1977 (the combined 
share of the vote of PASOK and the Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) increased from less than 23% in 1974 to 34.5% in 
1977). In contrast to KKE *s dogmatic and rigid views,
PASOK's stand on the membership issue, although basically 
negative, proved to be a constantly evolving one, espe­
cially after the party's coming to power in the post­
accession years; but during the period of the negotiations 
it constantly favoured association over accession, arguing 
that the renegotiation of the terms of the Association 
Agreement--which in its existing form had served the Com­
munity rather than the Greek interests--was the best alter-
108native. The remaining, and much smaller, opposition
133
parties had distanced themselves from such an approach, 
supporting the bid for full membership and limiting their 
criticisms to the handling of the negotiations.
Caution should be exercised when attempting to 
gauge the extent of public support for Community membership 
on the basis of electoral results. Such an indirect ap­
proach may be a legitimate exercise in the absence of 
a referendum; but given that party affiliation did not
necessarily correspond to a clear-cut stand on the question 
109of membership, what we are left with is little more 
than rough orders of magnitude. Within such an inter­
pretation, and treating the reliability of available opin­
ion polls with some skepticism, it would be reasonable 
to conlude that the majority of Greek public opinion was, 
at the time of the negotiations, in favour of accession-- 
although a serious qualifying factor was the increasingly 
large number of people with no opinion.110
The fact that public opinion remained serenely 
oblivious to the real issues surrounding accession is 
only partly explained by the above considerations. Undoubt­
edly, the Government’s enthusiasm and unconditional desire 
for membership rendered, in its eyes, superfluous any 
debate. But more significantly, the lack of a full-scale 
campaign to influence public opinion seems to have been 
an act of a conscious choice of policy that even led to 
secrecy, given the fears that any extended discussions, 
let alone a referendum, on the issue of membership would 
ultimately affect adversely the progress of the negotiations.111
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For the same reasons, the Government's dialogue with
112interest groups was not extensive. With signs of growing 
apprehensions over Greek entry in some parts of the Com­
munity, the Greek Government's approach was an understand­
able tactical move, though not without a negative by­
product: the wider aspects of membership, let alone the 
terms of entry, remained an essentially elite issue. On 
the other hand, such an approach was also a natural ex­
tension of Greek diplomatic thinking which is traditionally
formulated by an inner, small and often isolated, group
113of government officials. In contrast to the domestic 
experience, the fact that Greek membership was just one 
among many foreign-policy preoccupations of the member 
states obviously meant that the issue received relatively 
less attention in the Community countries. As already 
noted, its rising in and out of prominence followed closely 
internal electoral exigencies; and even then it tended 
to be subordinated to the wider problems raised by the 
prospect of Iberian enlargement.
The above analysis relates to the public debate 
on Greek membership in its broader, non-technical mani­
festations. However, the conclusions reached are also 
generally valid at the more technical level of the debate, 
involving studies which attempt to assess the likely impact 
of membership on the Greek economy. Most of the existing 
literature is polarized between the oversanguine expec­
tations of uncritical supporters and the overanxious appre­
hensions of skeptics.
135
As the Introduction makes clear, the effects of 
accession are examined in the present thesis only to the 
extent that they shed light on the bargaining argumentation 
of each side and on the general climate of the negoti­
ations. Studies with the effects of membership on the 
Greek economy or its individual sectors as their focal 
point were quite scarce at the time of the negotiations. 
However, the relevant point in the present context is 
whether there was any serious effort to solicit such 
studies and to take them into account in the formulation 
of specific negotiating proposals. The answer to this 
question is negative: apart from a few isolated exceptions, 
no such osmosis existed between the findings of detached 
investigation, whether independent or government-commis­
sioned, and the supporting argumentation of the Greek 
negotiating positions.
Looking at the overall conduct of the negotiations, 
the above point comes as a natural side-effect not only 
of the organizational weaknesses but also of the negoti­
ation strategies of the Greek side, as the previous dis­
cussion in this chapter has shown. There is no denying
that the need for detailed studies was recognized from
114an early stage of the negotiations. But the Greek 
Government saw them not so much as analytical tools for 
clarifying its negotiating options but rather as an ex 
post means of identifying problems of transition and for­
mulating policies of adaptation after the conclusion of
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the negotiations--i.e ., with the terms of entry finalized
and thus treated as a given parameter.
*
Following an analysis of Greece’s application 
for membership, the present chapter has attempted to a b ­
stract from the detailed and labyrinthic record of the 
accession negotiations in an effort to establish a ’’long 
view” of their evolution. The negotiating table, and by 
extension the corpus of documents recording the formal 
discussions, was not always a clear mirror of the real 
issues preoccupying the two sides; its reflection was 
often distorted by twisted tactics which made the problems 
in hand appear in disguise. A much clearer, though at 
times cynical, view could be obtained by recognizing that 
the formal negotiations were ”a ritual warrior dance behind
which the real decisions could be considered, postponed,
115and finally agreed." From this perspective, the present 
analysis has gone beyond the confines of the formal pro­
cedural framework and common negotiation principles; 
and in the same spirit, it has paid particular attention 
to Greece’s internal developments of the period under 
consideration.
Taken as a whole, this chapter provides a useful 
vantage point from which it is now possible to proceed 
with a detailed investigation of the individual negotiation 
dossiers, both horizontal and vertical; this is the object 
of the chapters that follow under Part Two.
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PART TWO
THE CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS: 
A SECTORAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER III
HORIZONTAL ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
A. General Issues
The detailed analysis of Part Two begins with 
an examination of certain general issues raised in the 
course of the negotiations and pertaining to their whole 
spectrum: the nature and duration of transitional arrange­
ments, the general reciprocal safeguard mechanism, and 
the consultations procedure.
1. The Nature of Transitional Arrangements 
and their Length of Application
As already noted, the establishment of transitional 
arrangements was regarded by both sides as the main mecha­
nism for resolving problems of adjustment that were iden­
tified in the negotiations. However, agreement on this 
principle--and on a "time-structured,** rather than a 
"target-structured,’’ approach to the transitional period1-- 
was not matched with agreement on exactly what, and within 
what time period, such transitional arrangements were 
meant to accomplish.
According to the Community view, transitional 
arrangements should be designed in such a way that an 
overall balance of reciprocal advantages is ensured, a 
balance that would take into account not only the adjust­




the enlarged Community. The Greek delegation, on the 
other hand, was against such an approach, maintaining 
that the Community stood to derive considerable advantages 
from accession itself and should not therefore seek to 
augment them through transitional measures and temporary
3
derogations established in its favour. In the Greek view, 
which was consistent with the approach adopted in the 
previous enlargement, the sole purpose of transitional 
arrangements was to meet the adjustment needs of the 
acceding state thereby facilitating the application of
4
the acquis communautaire. Any transitional arrangements 
that the Community might negotiate in its favour would 
have a cumulative negative impact on Greece by postponing 
the benefits expected to accrue from accession and by 
increasing Greece’s financial burden during the first
5
years of membership.
This latter point was especially relevant in the 
case of agriculture, and the Greek delegation emphasized 
it in that particular context. In fact, since the general 
question of transitional arrangements and the specific 
problems relating to agriculture were the two major sources 
of difficulties and complications in the course of the 
negotiations, the various issues relating to them were 
often linked in the actual negotiations--al1 the more so 
given that the debate on transitional measures in agri­
culture was inevitably linked in substance with the dis­
cussion on transitional measures in general.6 In line 
with this pattern, the general question of reciprocal
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advantages is further analyzed under the chapter devoted 
to agriculture.
The length of application of the transitional 
arrangements was an additional problem that had to be 
resolved--a problem which, as previously noted, became 
unnecessarily complex in its handling due mainly to the 
Community’s unwillingness to state explicitly its position 
at the appropriate time in the negotiations. Both sides 
agreed that, instead of being of equal duration in all 
cases, the time length of transitional arrangements could 
be adjusted to account for specific circumstances and 
needs--though, as a general rule, they would have to in­
corporate detailed timetables.7 Seen in this light, the 
debate on the length of the ’’overall” or ’’general" tran­
sitional period should more meaningfully be thought of 
as an attempt to establish a "central tendency" in its 
time duration with deviations on either side. Greece’s 
proposal, based on the experience of the previous accession 
negotiations, was a five-year "basic" transitional period
Q
and was enventually accepted by the Community.
The question of the general transitional period 
should, therefore, not be confused with the related but 
quite separate issue of the maximum length of the tran­
sitional period. Confronted with sensitive issues with 
respect to the free movement of workers and certain agri­
cultural products (olive oil, certain fruit & vegetables, 
and wine), the Community was oriented towards a maximum 
transitional period of eight years for these cases. This
151
was a serious matter for the Greek Government, which saw 
these deviations from the five-year rule as harmful, both 
economically and (given the attention that they had re­
ceived from the opposition at home) politically. Hence, 
a final compromise on this issue did not come easily.
The ministerial negotiations of 6 December 1978 led to 
an impasse and to the subsequent personal intervention 
of Prime Minister Karamanlis, who, in a letter addressed 
to the Heads of the Nine and the President of the Com­
mission, stressed that
the idea of certain deviations from the principle 
of the five-year transitional period is both unjust 
and politically inappropriate for Greece. Because, 
without serving substantial economic interests of 
the Community, it could havg disagreeable political 
consequences in my country.
In the final compromise reached at the ministerial meeting
of 20 December 1978, the length of the maximum transitional
period was reduced to seven years and the areas of its
application limited to peaches, tomatoes, and the free
movement of workers.10
Needless to say, the duration of the transitional 
arrangements was not an issue that was resolved in a vacuum. 
According, its more detailed aspects are discussed in 
the chapters that follow: the twists in the argumentation 
of the two sides can be appreciated when examined in the 
context of the specific negotiation dossiers which en­
veloped the wider ramifications of this debate.
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2. General Reciprocal Safeguard Mechanism 
As with the previous enlargement, Greece's Act 
of Accession had to provide for a mechanism to deal with 
difficulties that might arise on either side during the 
period of application of the various transitional mea­
sures.11 However, the Greek delegation was opposed to 
the idea of having sectors covered by the Association 
Agreement, and in particular customs union in industrial 
products, included within the scope of such a reciprocal 
safeguard clause: although such a clause was envisaged 
under the Agreement in the field of industrial customs 
union, it was a transitory one and no longer applicable;
its reintroduction would therefore be a retrograde step
12in relations between Greece and the Community. With
the Community objecting to such an approach, the Greek
delegation finally came around to agreeing to a safeguard
13clause embracing all sectors of Community activity 
a compromise that was seriously criticized at home.14 
It also agreed that the clause to be included in the in­
struments of accession would be similar to that of article
15135 of the 1972 Act of Accession. As for its duration,
this was to be five years--except in cases involving a
longer transitional period, in which the duration of the
safeguard clause was to be equal to that of the tran-
16sitional period. However, it is difficult to see how 
reciprocity could be ensured in these latter cases since, 
given their nature, it was the Community rather than Greece 
that was likely to invoke the safeguard clause during the 
two additional transitional years.17
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Within this framework, an emergency procedure 
was provided for in the event of serious economic diffi­
culties, allowing for a speedy decision by the Commission 
on the immediate application of safeguard measures by 
a member state. It should be noted that the safeguard 
clause adopted was similar to but not identical--as the 
Greek delegation would have preferred it to be--with the 
corresponding clause of the 1972 Act of Accession. While 
article 135 of the latter provides for an emergency pro­
cedure only in general terms, article 130 of the Greek 
Act specifies it in terms of detailed provisions:
In the agricultural sector, where trade between the 
Community as at present constituted and Greece causes 
or threatens to cause serious disturbances on the 
market of a Member State, the Commission shall act 
upon a request by a Member State for the application 
of appropriatjgmeasures within 24 hours of receiving 
such request.
These arrangements were received with skepticism at home,
seen by critics as a potential source of difficulties
for Greece, a Pandora’s box for her vulnerable agri- 
19culture.
3. Consultations Procedure 
In the initial stage of the negotiations, when 
references to the Association Agreement entered in one 
way or another into virtually all the Greek position state­
ments, the consultations procedure was thought of by the 
Greek delegation as an extension of the relevant arrange­
ments provided for in the Agreement and as a means of 
expressing its views on the future development of Community
154
policies; the initial request was for this procedure to
begin immediately and cover both the period of the negoti-
20ations and the interim period up to accession.
The Community made a clear distinction from the 
outset between the regular briefing of the Greek side 
on Community developments, an arrangement willingly pro­
vided, and Greece’s pre-accession participation in the
actual process of Community policy developments to which
21it was firmly opposed. (Greece was granted, however, 
an observer status for the interim period, which allowed 
Greek representatives to participate in the workings of
22the Community institutions but without any voting rights. )
Furthermore, the formal consultations procedure, which
was to apply equally to all sectors of Community policy,
would have to be limited to the interim period and follow
23along the lines of the previous enlargement.
The above framework, which was fully accepted
24by the Greek delegation, comprises the following specific 
25arrangements: (a) Greece would be informed of any Com­
mission proposal or communication which might lead to 
Council decisions; (b) following ’’reasoned” requests by 
Greece, consultations would take place within an Interim 
Committee at COREPER level composed of representatives 
of the Community and Greece; (c) any serious difficulties
that might remain after such consultations could be taken
26up at ministerial level. The above procedure would also
be initiated for any decisions to be taken by Greece which
27might affect her commitments as a future member state.
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In addition, an appropriately defined procedure was also
to apply in the case of agreements or conventions between
member states existing in draft form during the interim
period and expected to be concluded and finalized only
28after accession.
B. The Institutional Aspects 
Following the discussion of certain general issues, 
the analysis now turns to a detailed examination of two 
negotiation dossiers which, due to their ’’horizontal” 
nature, stand out quite separately from the rest; they 
concern the institutional and budgetary aspects of ac­
cession.
The negotiation dossier dealing with institutional 
matters was very different from the rest in that it in­
volved no temporary derogations or transitional measures 
but required instead permanent amendments to the Treaties 
to account for Greece’s accession and participation, as 
the tenth member, in the functioning of the Community 
institutions and bodies, entailing various ’’numerical” 
adjustments in their composition and operation. The basic 
principle underlying these adjustments was that every 
member state must be represented in every institution 
and body of the Communities--the implication being that 
Greece’s full participation was to be effective as from 
the date of accession and independently of any transitional
measures and temporary derogations agreed upon in other
29sectors in the course of the negotiations.
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The institutional dossier was negotiated in a 
fairly straightforward manner and created only a few minor 
complications--bypassing on the whole the internal Com­
munity debate on institutional reform to which enlargement 
had given rise, inspite of efforts by certain member states 
(such as Ireland) to make improvements in Community deci­
sion making a precondition for the conclusion of the Greek 
30negotiations. This was mainly due to the very nature 
of its subject matter which allowed little room for dif­
ferences of position; but it was also due to the existence 
of two simplifying factors--that the population of Greece 
is approximately equal to Belgium’s and that Norway’s 
abortive candidature during the previous enlargement had
already identified the institutional adjustments necessary
31for the accession of a tenth Community member. The de-
32tailed adjustments negotiated are examined below.
1. The Council and the Commission
In cases where the Council is required to act
by a qualified majority with weighted voting, the Greek
33vote would be weighted by a factor of five. Accordingly, 
adoption of Council acts would require at least (a) 45 
out of a total of 63 votes in cases where a Council act 
is adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal (without 
Greece, 41 out of 58 votes were required); and (b) 45 votes
Q /
in favour cast by at least six members, in other cases.
With respect to the ECSC Treaty, the existing requirement
of a special 8/9 majority in the case of certain adjust-
35ments to the Treaty was amended to a 9/10 majority.
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An additional issue that had to be resolved was 
the order of holding the Council Presidency. Following 
the Greek delegation's choice of "Ellas" as the country's 
name to be used in the alphabetical order, Greece was 
to hold the office of the Presidency after Deutschland
qc
and before France. Although understandable, Greece's 
choice for a Latin equivalent that "sounds" like the Greek 
"*EXXo.V was a rather unsatisfactory one. From a linguistic 
point of view, it introduced an unnecessary and awkward 
departure from the established "Hellas," whose time-
37honoured usage transcends mere transliteration practices. 
From a practical point of view, if Greece had opted for 
this latter version, she would have been placed after 
France and before Ireland in the order of holding the 
Council Presidency. For an old member, a six-month dif­
ference in the holding of this office would probably have 
been a trivial matter. But for a new member state, strug­
gling to come to grips with the awsome demands of the 
Community mechanisms and bureaucracy, this difference 
would have been a welcome breathing space. The record 
of the Greek Presidency during the second half of 1983 
lends support to the above view.
Regarding the Commission, the required numerical 
adjustment related to the number of its members: it was
38increased from 13 to 14 to include a Greek Commissioner.
2. The European Parliament 
On the assumption that Greek accession would take 
place after the first direct elections, i.e. after June 1979,
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it was agreed that twenty-four seats would be added to
the European Parliament for Greek representatives without
altering the existing allocation of seats of the old mem- 
39ber states.
On the further assumption that Greek accession 
would occur during the five-year term of the first di­
rectly elected Parliament, the Conference had to adopt 
transitional measures for Greek representation in it for 
the remainder of the five-year term, i.e. until June 1984. 
Two alternative solutions were open to the Greek dele­
gation to choose from: either (a) to hold an election 
for the remainder of the term, or (b) to fill the Greek 
quota until the second Direct Elections according to the 
original formula envisaged in the Treaty whereby delegates
would be designated by the Greek Parliament from among 
40its members. Greece opted for the first choice; the
elections for the European Parliament were in fact held
on 18 October 1981 simultaneously with the national 
41elections. The above arrangement was supplemented with 
the provision that during the transitory period, between 
1 January 1981 and the date of the elections, the twenty- 
four Greek representatives would be chosen according to
/ O
the second formula.
3. Other Community Institutions and Bodies 
The Conference also agreed on the numerical ad­
justment of the Treaty provisions relating to the other 
Community institutions and bodies, as follows.
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Court of Justice. Upon accession, a Greek Judge
A3
would be appointed to the Court of Justice. (The Council
decision on the necessary adjustments to the Treaties
corresponding to this increase in the number of judges
was postponed for immediately after accession, in view
of a Court memorandum requesting Treaty adjustments inde-
44 vpendently of enlargement. )
Court of Auditors. Its membership was to be in-
45creased from nine to ten, to allow for a Greek member.
Economic and Social Committee. Increased by twelve
46members, to be provided by Greece.
ECSC Consultative Committee. Greece was to have 
three members (one for each category--i.e ., producers, 
workers, and consumers & dealers), which would be accom­
modated within the existing numerical arrangement of a 
minimum of sixty and a maximum of eighty-four members
(the actual membership was eighty-one, twenty-seven from 
47each category). The number of Greek members was decided 
on the basis of certain common allocative criteria--namely, 
the relative national share of coal and steel production, 
the number of ECSC workers, and the number of consumers 
of ECSC products.48
EAEC Scientific and Technical Committee. The Com­
mittee was to be enlarged upon accession from twenty-seven 
to twenty-eight members with the appointment of one Greek 
member.49
European Investment Bank. Greece was to have one 
member in the Board of Governors of the Bank, whose member­
ship was to be accordingly increased from nine to ten.50
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Decisions taken by simple majority would require six
instead of five votes, representing in both cases at least
5140% of the subscribed capital. Membership of the Board 
of Directors was similarly raised from eighteen to nine­
teen, while the number of alternates was increased from 
ten to eleven--the additional alternate to be nominated
by common agreement by those member states without one
52(Denmark, Ireland, and Greece). No adjustment was re­
quired with respect to decisions by the Board of Directors 
requiring simple majority, it remaining at ten votes;
qualified-majority decisions, however, would require
53thirteen instead of twelve votes. Greek representation
in the Audit and Management Committees of the Bank was
54to be provided for by means of rota arrangements.
Regarding the financial aspects of Greece’s parti-
55cipation in the Bank’s operations, her contribution 
to the Bank's capital as well as to its various reserves 
and provisions was determined on the basis of the share 
of her GDP in the total GDP of the Community of Ten which 
in 1976 was 1.56%; using this coefficient, the amount 
of capital to be subscribed by Greece was set at 112.5 
million units of account, making the total capital of 
the Bank 7,200 million. The proportion of Greece’s sub­
scribed capital to be paid in would be approximately 
12.86%, determined on the basis of the Bank's statutory 
regulations. The negotiations also established the timing
and mode of Greece’s capital payments as well as of her
56contribution to the Bank’s reserves and provisions.
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A further point that had to be settled was Greece's 
transition from the Second Financial Protocol, giving 
access to ElB lending under the Association Agreement, 
to membership status. Arrangements for such a transition 
were agreed upon to allow for the enventuality of EIB 
funds under the Second Financial Protocol remaining un­
absorbed at the time of accession; and for the guaranteeing
and repayment after accession of loans granted by the
57Bank to Greece prior to accession.
Considering Greece’s overall participation as 
a full member in the operations of the Bank, it should 
be stressed that Greece accepted all of the Bank’s stat­
utory obligations and other commitments since these were 
not open to negotiation for the purposes of accession 
(apart from a number of technical adjustments as examined 
above).58
In addition to adjustments which involved perma­
nent amendments to the Treaties, certain substantive in­
stitutional issues were also identified in the course of 
the examination of the Community secondary legislation 
and resolved in the context of the substantive negoti­
ations, the arrangements adopted being in most cases 
similar to those provided in the previous enlargement.
These issues related to (a) the rules of procedure of
the institutions of the Communities and of Community 
59bodies; (b) the general problem of participation of 
Greek nationals or representatives in various committees
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6 0set up or governed by Community acts; (c) the special 
and authentic Greek edition of the Official Journal of 
the European Communities covering all acts of Community 
secondary legislation in force at the time of Greek ac-
c  I
cession; and <d) the statutes of the Euratom Supply 
62Agency.
C . The Budgetary Aspects
1. The Arrangements Negotiated
Accession entailed acceptance of the rules for 
financing the Community budget, applicable from 1 January 
1978 and known as the integral system of own resources. 
According to this system, the member states contributed 
to the Community budget all customs duties and agricul­
tural levies & duties as well as a maximum of 1% of the 
uniform basis for assessing VAT (known as the VAT rate 
and being the same for all member states). The Community 
rules specified that until the uniform basis for assessing 
VAT was applied in all member states, and provided that 
at least three of them had done so, those who had not 
yet applied it were to calculate their contributions on 
the basis of the relative share of their GNP to the sum 
total of the Community GNP.
It should be noted that in the previous enlargement 
the new member states were granted an additional transi­
tional period of two years in order to avoid a sudden move 
from a system founded on a basic scale and relative shares 
to the integral system of own resources. In the case of
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Greece, however, the Community had no intention of fol­
lowing the transitional arrangements that were adopted
64in the previous enlargement. Its insistence on this 
point did not only reflect the general principle of an 
own-merits approach; it was also based on the fact that 
while at the time of the previous enlargement the intro­
duction of the own-resources system was in a state of 
transition, Greece’s accession would occur at a time when 
the system would be in operation and would thus require 
the safeguard of the relevant acquis communautaire.65 
Accordingly, the transitional measures for the application 
of the own-resources system in Greece, though necessary, 
would have to be such that the system is neither distorted 
nor its full application by the existing member states 
delayed.66
It was against this general background of Community
thinking, which was eventually accepted by the Greek
side,67 that the detailed negotiations on the subject
were conducted. And it is not surprising, as the Community
side had in fact predicted at an early stage of the dis- 
68cussions, that, given its importance and special nature, 
the budgetary dossier was among the last ones to be settled 
in the negotiations.
In the initial formulation of its position, the 
Greek delegation considered the sum total of Greece’s 
contribution to the Community budget (derived from agri­
cultural levies, customs duties, and VAT), and requested 
for a gradually stepped-up contribution over a five-year
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transitional period with an additional system of brakes
69during the sixth and seventh years after accession.
This approach eventually gave way to one that examined 
each type of resource separately, identifying in each 
particular case the detailed transitional arrangements 
to be negotiated. What helps explain this development 
is the fact that many of the budgetary issues relating 
to levies and customs duties overlapped with material 
already negotiated under the agricultural, customs-union, 
and external-relations chapters; in fact, the duration 
and scope of the budgetary transitional measures being 
contemplated came to depend on related transitional mea­
sures already adopted under these chapters.70
a) Agricultural levies and other duties levied under the CAP 
The general point agreed upon was that the agri­
cultural levies actually collected by Greece under the 
CAP should be paid over in full to the Community from 
the date of accession.71 The detailed arrangements within 
this agreement derived from the application of the rele­
vant acquis communautaire, which, in conjunction with 
the concluded transitional arrangements for Greece’s
72adoption of the CAP, was accepted by the Greek side. 
Accordingly, (1) on the assumption that trade remained 
stable or increased, the gradual alignment of Greek to 
Community prices over the transitional period would take 
the form of a progressive increase in agricultural levies;
(2) the accession compensatory amounts levied as a result 
of differences between Community and Greek prices would
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be regarded as own resources; (3) monetary compensatory
amounts resulting from changes in the parity of the drachma
for agricultural prices and collected from third countries
73would also be regarded as own resources.
b) Customs duties
According to the agreement reached, Greece would
pay to the Community that revenue from customs duties
. . . 74still applying after the end of the transitional period.
The amount due would be paid in full (i.e. at the rate 
of 100%) from the date of accession and would be calcu­
lated, until 31 December 1985, as if Greece applied as 
from accession the rates of the common customs tariff 
on her imports from third countries, taking into account 
the reduced rates determined by Community tariff prefer­
ences; as from 1 January 1986, Greece would pay in its
75entirety the total amount of customs duties levied.
Given that customs duties had traditionally been 
a considerable source of revenue for Greece owing to the 
high import requirements of her industrial development, 
its loss was viewed with considerable concern by the Greek 
side.76 However, what contributed to the acceptance of 
the above arrangements was the fact that the loss involved 
would not be sudden but gradual, in line with the pro­
gressive solutions negotiated in the fields of customs 
union and external commercial relations.77
c) Value-added tax (VAT)
The introduction in Greece of the uniform basis 
for assessing VAT was set for the end of the third year
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*78following accession. (In practice, however, the tran­
sition from the existing complex system of indirect taxes 
to the common system of value-added tax proved a formi­
dable task which, given the delays in the preparatory 
work of the Greek administration, necessitated the sub­
sequent extension of the transitional period until 
1 January 1987.) During the transitional period Greece’s 
VAT contribution to the Community budget would be cal­
culated, following the relevant acquis communautaire,
on the basis of the relative share of her GNP to the total 
79Community GNP.
With respect to this Community resource, in either
form, a transitional refund mechanism was established
80in order to soften the impact of its application. Ac­
cording to this mechanism, the Greek VAT contribution 
would be paid in full to the Community budget as from 
accession; however, for a five-year transitional period 
Greece would receive a progressively decreasing percentage 
refund of 70%, 50%, 30%, 20%, and 10% annually during
the 1981-85 period, with a zero refund after the end of
8 1the transitional period.
2. The Magnitudes Involved 
The separate examination and negotiation of 
Greece's contribution with respect to each type of Com­
munity resource brought into sharper focus Greece’s tran­
sitional requirements. On the other hand, this approach 
diffused the issue of Greece’s overall contribution to 
the Community budget, subordinating it to the ultimate
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question as to whether Greece would be a net payer to 
or net beneficiary from the Community budget during the 
first and subsequent years of accession when account is 
taken of both her payments and receipts. (This point was 
also raised in connection with the agricultural negoti­
ations and is accordingly further examined in chapter VI.)
Looking at the terms of entry as negotiated until 
the end of December 1978 and allowing for inadequacies on 
the part of the Greek administration in absorbing effective­
ly the available Community funds, a situation aggravated
by the existence of procedural delays in payments on the
82part of the Community, the emergence of Greece as a net 
payer to the Community budget was a distinct possibility. 
Following the Greek delegations's calculations, based on 
an exchange of views with the Commission and reflecting 
the situation as it had evolved by the end of 1978, the 
overall financial balance with respect to the Community 
budget for the first year following accession was esti­
mated at a net contribution by Greece of 76 million EUA 
(table 3).83
This was in sharp contrast to the initial 1976 
estimates by the Commission which were included in its 
Opinion on the Greek application (see table 1) as well 
as to the 1978 estimates which were calculated in the 
context of its "Fresco" on enlargement; although of a hypo­
thetical and static nature, both exercises had nevertheless 
suggested that Greece as a member state would be a net bene­
ficiary rather than a net contributor. In the particular
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Table 3.--Estimate of Greece's financial balance 
to the Community budget for the first year after 
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BALANCE OF REVENUE/CONTRIBUTIONS -76
SOURCE: MEMO-GR/1/79, p. 10.
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case of the 1978 estimates--which were derived from a 
simulation exercise based on the hypothetical case of 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal being fully integrated members 
of the Community in 1978--it was shown that Greece would 
have required in 1978 a net transfer of Community resources 
in the magnitude of 400 million EUA; in percentage terms, 
this would have corresponded to 2.3% of Greece's GDP and 
to approximately 10%-15% of her annual volume of invest­
ment.8^
If the entry negotiations were to be concluded 
with the overall balance remaining negative, one could 
well imagine its serious political, let alone economic, 
repercussions for Greece. However, the transitional ar­
rangements agreed upon during the concluding stage of 
the negotiations, in particular the compromises reached 
with respect to Greece's contributions, did ensure that 
Greece would finally emerge from the negotiating table 
a net beneficiary with respect to the Community budget.
Generally speaking, the expected inflow of Com­
munity funds was much smaller than Greece had hoped for, 
considering the needs of her economy;85 it is also seen 
to be small when compared with the per capita benefits or, 
more specifically, with the agricultural budgetary trans- 
fers enjoyed by certain member states (e.g. Ireland).
On the other hand, Greece was generally expected to fare 
better in this respect than Portugal and Spain, given the
relative importance of tobacco and olive oil in her total
87agricultural production. The fact remains, however, that
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the negotiations, conducted in an environment of recession 
and high unemployment, could not settle in a satisfactory 
manner issues connected with income distribution and trans­
fer of resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that
ambitious proposals (such as those by the Commission's
88President Roy Jenkins and West Germany’s Social Demo- 
89cratic Party ) for the transfer of substantial funds 
to the applicant countries did not go very far, and that 
the final picture presented a much clearer assessment 
of the budgetary impact rather than of the wider financial 
implications of Greek accession; for the latter, one would 
also have to take into account balance-of-payments consid­
erations, the loss of revenue due to the reduction or 
abolition of customs duties, borrowing from various Com­
munity instruments, as well as additional Community flows
90falling outside the scope of the Community budget. Be that 
as it may, the final compromise was sealed with the recog­
nition that the transitional measures agreed upon resolved 
all budgetary problems raised by the Greek delegation in 
the course of the negotiations, with all nonbudgetary 
problems connected with them having been resolved under
the respective negotiation dossiers (i.e., customs union,
9 1external commercial relations, and agriculture).
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CHAPTER IV
CUSTOMS UNION AND FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
A. General Considerations 
The detailed analysis of the vertical negotiation 
sectors begins with the industrial customs union, since 
it was the first dossier to be opened and the first to 
enter the substantive phase of the negotiations; and as 
such it inevitably brought on the surface wider issues 
that transcended its subject matter.
Although the two parties decided to begin the 
negotiations with this field, their motives for so doing 
differred. For the Community it was an obvious first choice 
since it makes up the core of the Treaty of Rome.1 From 
Greece’s point of view, made explicit from the formal 
opening of the negotiations, it was to serve as the point 
of departure of her effort to establish the acquis d'as­
sociation as a precedent in the accession negotiations, 
since more progress had been made in the customs union 
than in any other field covered by the Association Agree­
ment; given this precedent, the process of integration 
in the field of customs union envisaged in the Agreement
was to be considered a minimum condition within the tran-
2sitional arrangements of accession.
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The Community hastened to establish a substantially 
different position, which was to remain more or less un­
altered throughout the negotiations. According to it, 
Greece’s accession involved a wholly new legal framework 
for her commitments, qualitatively different from that 
of her association; hence, any transitional measures should 
be considered on their own merits, in the light of existing
economic circumstances and not simply as extensions of
3
the association’s provisions. As the negotiations pro­
gressed, Greece softened her reaction to this position-- 
a move which, as already seen, coincided with changes 
in the Greek negotiating team at deputy level and with 
a more accommodating approach to the negotiations. The 
Greek side did reiterate on various occasions that the 
negotiations were not conducted in a legal vacuum; that 
work towards accession had already begun with association; 
that the acquis d ’association should not be ignored. But 
such statements gradually came to be seen as efforts to 
set Greece apart from the other applicant countries, and 
thus avoid globalization of the negotiations, rather than
as attempts to salvage specific association provisions
4within accession arrangements. Chapter VIII takes up this 
issue beyond the confines of the customs-union dossier and 
examines the ways in which the Association Agreement inter­
acted with the accession negotiations as a whole and the 
ways in which disagreements on this matter complicated 
their conduct. Quite apart from such considerations, both 
sides agreed that certain technical problems outstanding
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under the association--i.e ., problems that had arisen 
from its hitherto functioning--should be solved within 
the institutional framework of the association before 
the end of the accession negotiations; in practice, how­
ever, some of them surfaced, and were resolved, in the
5context of the accession negotiations.
As the substantive stage of the negotiations ap­
proached, the propelling role of the customs-union dossier 
(in contrast to the pivotal role of agriculture) became 
even more evident. In fact, the Community insisted, for 
reasons explained in chapter II, that it should be the 
first dossier to enter the substantive stage of the negoti­
ations even though more progress had been made elsewhere.6
Before analyzing in detail the present field, 
it is worth noting certain general points agreed upon 
by both sides on which the specific negotiations were 
based: (1) while transitional measures (to be kept as 
simple as possible) would be necessary for the elimination 
of tariff obstacles, nontariff obstacles should be 
abolished upon accession but without precluding the possi­
bility of certain specific exceptions within the time 
constraint of the above transitional measures;7 (2) the 
Act of Accession should include a mutual safeguard mecha­
nism to provide for any difficulties that might arise 
during the transitional period with respect to customs
g
union; (3) the customs-union and external-relations dos­
siers should be treated separately; (4) ECSC products, 
agricultural products, and processed agricultural products
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should be discussed under their respective headings rather
9
than under the present dossier. (The customs-union and 
ECSC dossiers were negotiated separately until a later 
stage when the principle of parallelism for many of their 
transitional arrangements was accepted, leading to identical 
or similar solutions.)
One point that failed to be established early 
in the discussions was the duration of the transitional 
period for the completion of customs union. From the 
opening of the negotiations Greece had repeatedly requested 
a five-year period.10 The Community, however, argued that 
this question could not be considered independently of 
the general transitional period and of the specific tran­
sitional periods to be envisaged in the other sectors: 
it was necessary to progress in the other sectors as well, 
so as to consider it in the context of the negotiations 
as a whole.11 As noted in chapter II, this proved a re­
current theme in the negotiations, to the resentment of
the Greek delegation, which saw the Community’s evasive
12attitude on this important issue as a delay tactic.
The specific transitional arrangements finally agreed 
are discussed below.
B. Elimination of Intra-Communitv 
Customs Duties
The issues negotiated under this heading fall into 
two categories: (1) the specific transitional arrangements 
to be followed for the removal of the residual import duties 
applied by Greece vis-^-vis the Community on products
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subject to a twenty-two-year transitional period under 
the Association Agreement (known as the "twenty-two-year 
list")1^; (2) the transitional adjustments to be followed 
for the products of certain Greek industries, which were 
created after the coming into force of the Agreement 
and granted additional protection (beyond the twelve-year 
transitional period) in the form of tariffs on goods simi­
lar to those produced by them (these products were covered 
by article 18 of the Agreement and formed the Marticle-18 
list”), together with the extension of this tariff regime 
to the accession transitional period and the possibility 
of taking into account in this respect certain new Greek 
industries.
According to the initial Greek position, the removal
of residual import duties on the twenty-two-year list
should be in accordance with the association timetable,
allowing for the possibility of shortening it, if necessary,
so as to align it to the accession transitional period,
if the end of the latter were to fall before the end of
15the association’s transitional period.
The Community, on the other hand, did not limit 
the issue to a discussion of the transitional arrangements 
to be followed but questioned the very content of the 
list, which the Greek delegation had assumed would be 
automatically subject in its entirety to transitional 
arrangements in the context of accession. According to 
the Community position, the products to be subject to 
transitional arrangements should be chosen from the list
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on the basis of economic criteria and in the light of
economic developments subsequent to the initial estab-
16lishment of the list. However, revision of the twenty-
two-year list was unacceptable to the Greek delegation,
since it meant tampering with the only provisions that
had functioned properly during the troubled history of
the association.17 It was finally agreed that the residual
customs duties of all industrial products on the list,
without any deletion, would be abolished progressively
18during the accession transitional period.
While the Greek delegation had maintained its 
initial position on the content of the twenty-two-year 
list, it modified it with respect to the timetable for 
tariff dismantling: it was no longer asking for the tran­
sitory arrangements envisaged under the Association Agree­
ment but for equal annual reductions of the residual
19customs duties over a five-year transitional period.
This change of position probably reflected Greece’s re­
orientation of her overall approach towards the association 
patrimony. But it also indicated a more realistic assess­
ment, as the negotiations progressed, of the projected
time of accession. Having decided that the rate of tariff
20dismantling should be smooth and even, both sides finally 
agreed on the following points: (l) the transitional pe ­
riod for the progressive abolition of residual import
duties applied by Greece towards the rest of the Community
21would be five years; (2) deviating slightly from the 
principle of smooth and even reductions, the first two
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intra-Community tariff reductions from the basic duty 
would be 10% each (to occur on 1 January 1981 and 1 Jan­
uary 1982), followed by four reductions of 20% each (to 
be made on 1 January 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986), with
full abolition of intra-Community tariffs to be thus com-
22pleted on 1 January 1986.
On the question of products already covered by 
article 18 of the Association Agreement, the Greek dele­
gation’s request was for the abolition of their residual
23duties in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.
The Community adopted in this case the same position as
for the twenty-two-year list, including the reexamination
24of the contents of the list itself. In the compromise 
finally reached, the special timetables of the existing 
article-18 list would be replaced with the general time­
table for the dismantling of residual customs duties as
25applied in respect of the twenty-two-year list.
Greece also requested the partial extention of 
the article-18 regime to cover certain new industries 
for a five-year transitional period following accession 
through the introduction of new customs duties or the in­
crease of existing ones by up to 20%--the intention being
26to use this facility sparingly. The Community remained
firmly opposed to such an option, regarding it as being
incompatible with customs union and with the principles
27of transitional arrangements. Greece finally withdrew 
this request but expressed the hope (hinting perhaps at 
the importance she attached to her industrial-aid system)
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that "the special needs of . . . Cher} industrial develop­
ment will be taken into account within the framework
28of the Community’s regional policy."
Turning now to the question of basic duties to 
which the successive reductions were to be applied, 
Greece’s initial position derived from her initial po­
sition on the timetable to be followed for the removal 
of residual import duties and amounted to the retainment
at the time of accession of the basic duties which were
29applicable under the Association Agreement. The Com­
munity, however, in line with its position on the time­
table, was determined to fix new basic duties both for
intra-Community tariff reductions and for the alignment
30with the Common Customs Tariff (CCT). Agreement was
reached on this point as well as on the provision that
their level should be the level actually applied by Greece
for each product at a given date (to be either 1 January
or 1 July, following Community practice) during the year
31prior to entry into force of the Treaty of Accession.
The reference date for basic duties was to be the same
in all the relevant sectors of the negotiations, equally
applicable as reference date for the abolition by the
32Community of customs duties on imports from Greece.
When towards the end of the negotiations the Community 
delegation proposed that l January 1981 be taken as the 
probable date of accession and hence the starting date 
for the application of the transitional measures for indus­
trial customs union, it also suggested that the relevant
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33reference date for the basic duties should be l July 1980.
In line with its general position on the matter, the Greek
delegation had reservations on these dates, proposing
34instead 1 July 1980 as the date of accession and 1 July
351979 as the reference date for basic duties. The Con­
ference of Deputies finally settled for l July 1980 as
the relevant reference date, but agreement was slightly
36complicated by the question of the accession date. This
was finally resolved when the Conference of Ministers
decided on 3 April 1979 that the date of entry into force
37of the instruments of accession would be 1 January 1981.
C. Alignment on the Common Customs Tariff (CCT)
Basing its position on the principle of parallelism 
between the rate of abolition of Greek duties towards 
the Community and the rate of alignment of Greek duties 
on the CCT (which pertains to the Community’s external 
trade with third countries), the Community maintained 
that alignment on the CCT should progress in a smooth 
and even manner by means of reductions at regular intervals 
in the differences between the Greek basic rates of duty 
and the CCT rates; and that the transitional period should 
be the same as in the abolition of residual customs duties
towards the Community so that both regimes are fully ap-
38plied by the same date. The Greek delegation yielded
39its agreement on the above points, no longer insisting 
on its initial view that alignment on the CCT should follow 
the association’s timetable.40
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Following article 20 (paragraph 3) of the Associ­
ation Agreement, Greece also asked for the possibility
of suspending alignment on the CCT for a small number
of sensitive products, thereby allowing their import duties 
at levels higher than those of the CCT for a period up
to five years after the end of the five-year transitional
41period. However, with the Community objecting to such
an arrangement, the Greek delegation withdrew its special
request and adjusted its position accordingly, finally
agreeing that Greece would progressively align her customs
duties on the CCT by the end of the transitional period
42and with respect to all industrial EEC products. Based
on a five-year transitional period, the following timetable
emerged from these negotiations: the first two annual
alignments of Greek customs duties on the CCT would be 
4310% each, to be effected on 1 January 1981 and 1 January
1982; the remaining four reductions of 20% each would
be made on 1 January 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986, with the
44CCT thus fully applied on 1 January 1986. Furthermore,
from 1 January 1982, in those cases where the basic duties
do not diverge from the corresponding CCT duties by more
than 15% in either direction, the CCT duties would be
45applied automatically.
A related problem that had to be tackled concerned 
Community suspensions of CCT duties. In the agreement 
finally reached, a basic distinction was made between 
products for which Greek rates would be fully aligned 
on the CCT upon accession and products in process of CCT
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alignment on the basis of the accession timetable: in
the first case, Greece would apply any Community tariff
suspensions in full upon accession; in the second case,
she would apply national duties, adjusted to the suspended
duties following the accession timetable. Greece would
also have the right, upon accession, to submit requests
for autonomous Community tariff suspensions on the basis
of article 28 of the Treaty of Rome; but she would no
longer be able to apply unilaterally her own tariff sus- 
46pensions.
An additional point that was considered and easily 
agreed upon was the possibility of accelerating both the 
abolition o f •intra-Community duties and the introduction 
of the CCT and the ECSC unified tariff. But this provision 
was based on two conditions: <l) on no account would the 
intra-Community residual duty for a given product be higher 
than that applied to third countries;47 and (2) Community 
preference should be maintained by a Council decision 
on a proposal by the Commission.48
D. Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
The general principle in this field was that quan­
titative restrictions between the Community and Greece
49must be abolished from accession. The Community was,
nevertheless, prepared to examine on a case-by-case basis
Greek requests for transitional quantitative restrictions 
50on imports. But before examining such requests and making 
concrete proposals, the Community insisted on prior agree­
ment on the following conditions and specific principles:
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(1> no restrictions should be placed on products already 
liberalized; (2) the quotas to be agreed should be ex­
pressed in terms of volume and not of value; (3) the size 
of the quotas to be opened by Greece in the first year 
after accession would have to be considerably larger than 
the corresponding ones during the last year of association;
(4) there should be a progressive and substantial increase 
of quotas from one year to the next, until full liberal­
ization is achieved by the end of the transitional period;
(5) if during two consecutive years the imports of a non­
liberalized Greek product have been less than 90% of
the quota opened, Greece should abolish the quota in line
51with article 33 (paragraph 4) of the Treaty of Rome.
The Greek delegation, which had already made known to 
the Community its specific requests for transitional quan­
titative restrictions, agreed on a product-by-product 
procedure and on the above conditions and principles (but 
with the qualification, which was accepted by the Com­
munity, that quotas could be expressed in terms of value
if it proved impossible, for technical reasons, to express
52them in terms of volume).
Although Greece had initially requested the retain- 
ment, within the transitional period, of all the quanti­
tative restrictions on imports from the Community that
53were allowed under the Association Agreement, in a sub­
sequent reformulation of her position she reduced signifi­
cantly the number of products for which she was requesting 
quantitative restrictions and proposed a transitional
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54period of five years. In the view of the Greek dele­
gation, the proposed quantitative restrictions would con­
stitute a minimum protection for certain sensitive sectors
55of Greek industry. It was finally agreed that Greece 
could apply after accession, as a transitional measure, 
quantitative restrictions vis-a-vis the rest of the Com­
munity on fourteen out of the seventeen products contained 
in her proposals--namely, fertilizers (three headings), 
central-heating boilers, parts for cement ovens, television 
sets & parts, cables for television aerials; and certain
steam boilers, motors, pumps, weighing machines, electric
56motors, buses & minibuses, and vehicle bodies. The Com­
munity could not accept quantitative restrictions on (1) 
heading ex 85.21 (cathode-ray tubes for television sets), 
because this product was already fully liberalized (it was 
in fact the only such product in the Greek list); and on 
(2) headings ex 73.15 and 73.18 (wire and steel tubes), 
because of the critical situation in the Community steel 
industry.57
In calculating its proposed quotas for 1981, the 
Community employed the following criteria: the association 
quota levels and the corresponding arrangements for their 
increase, the impact of inflation, actual trade patterns, 
and the move from association to accession (involving, as 
the Community held consistently during the negotiations, 
a qualitative change). After looking behind these cri­
teria for a closer examination of the exact Community
59method of calculating the proposed quotas, the Greek
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delegation accepted all of them .6 0 And with the establish­
ment of a five-year transitional period for their pro­
gressive abolition, agreement was also reached on the 
following schedule (although Greece had argued in favour 
of a different one with a lower rate of annual increase 
of the quotas): (1 ) quotas expressed in value would be 
increased by 25% per annum, each increase being added 
to the quota and the following increase being calculated 
on the total figure thus obtained; (2 ) quotas expressed 
in volume would be increased by 2 0 % per annum, applying 
the same method of calculation as above; (3) for quotas 
expressed both in volume and value, the volume quota would 
be increased by 20% and the value quota by 25% per annum, 
the quotas for each subsequent year being calculated on 
the basis of the preceding quota plus the increase.61
E. Abolition of Measures Having Equivalent 
Effect to Quantitative Restrictions
Deriving from the general principle agreed, the 
central point in this field was that measures having equi­
valent effect to quantitative restrictions should be 
abolished upon accession, with allowance for the possi­
bility of certain specific transitional exceptions. On 
the basis of the Community’s definition of such measures 
(covering ’’any regulations likely to hinder intra-Commu-
nity trade, whether directly or indirectly, now or poten- 
62tially” ), the following Greek measures were considered 
by the Community as falling into this category: (1) the 
system of validating bills, the systems of licences, and
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price regulations; (2 ) the cash-payments and import-deposit
systems; (3) public purchasing; and (4) exclusive import,
63export, and marketing rights.
1. The System of Validating Bills, the Systems 
of Licences, and Price Regulations
With respect to the system of validating bills,
Greece’s argument in support of its maintenance was that,
being a system of monitoring import and export prices,
it aimed at preventing overpricing on invoices for imports
and underpricing on invoices for exports .6 4  The Community,
however, wanted this system to be abolished, since it
involved a procedure to which only imported goods were
65subject, domestic goods being exempted.
On the question of import and export licences, 
Greece proposed to keep them in a modified regime (so 
as to eliminate upon accession any administrative bar­
riers to trade)— except for the system of automatic li­
cences granted by banks, used for monitoring statistics, 
which she wanted to maintain in its existing form .6 6  The 
Community insisted, however, that they should all be 
abolished upon accession.6 7
The Community also insisted on the abolition of 
price regulations to the extent that they restricted trade 
with the member states--particularly in those cases where 
prices were fixed at such a level so as to discourage 
the importation of a product by making it unprofitable.
Greece partly yielded to the Community positions, 
agreeing to revise the existing systems so as to eliminate
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by the time of accession what the Community considered
69obstacles to free trade. Later on, however, in a move 
to have another request accepted, she agreed to abolish 
upon accession without any transitional measures (in accor­
dance with articles 30-34 of the Treaty of Rome) the system 
of authenticating bills, the systems of "all licences 
granted" and statistical licences, and price regulations.7 0
2. The Systems of Cash Payments 
and Import Deposits
According to the initial Community position, 
Greece’s system of cash payments should be abolished upon 
accession as being discriminatory against imported goods, 
since credit to Greek wholesalers was available from do­
mestic producers but not from foreign suppliers .71 On 
the other hand, although in principle the system of import 
deposits should also be abolished upon accession, the 
Community did not exclude measures that might have to 
be taken, should such abolition lead to monetary diffi­
culties; but even in this case the Community reserved 
the right to determine, on the basis of detailed infor­
mation, whether the measures practiced by Greece repre­
sented in fact the best means of overcoming such diffi-
72cultles.
Greece emphasized from the beginning the inter­
relatedness of the two systems, since she employed both
73as tools of monetary and credit policy. Although she 
was prepared to gradually abolish the import-deposit 
system following the timetable of tariff reductions,7 4
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she did not regard cash payments as a measure of equi­
valent effect to quantitative restrictions, since locally
produced goods were subject to similar measures of credit 
75policy. At a later stage in the negotiations, however, 
she adopted the same position with respect to both systems 
and requested their progressive abolition over a five- 
year transitional period.7 6 Reiterating that the two 
systems were incompatible with the acquis communautaire, 
the Community could not accept such a long transitional 
period for their abolition but was nevertheless willing 
to agree to a compromise solution and accept a much shorter 
transitional period: the import-deposit system would be 
abolished during the first year after accession, the de­
posit rates existing on the date of accession being reduced 
to zero in four quarterly stages; the cash-payments system 
would be retained during the first year after accession 
and abolished during the second year in the same manner 
as import deposits above .7 7 Greece argued that this was 
contrary to the Community’s recognition that the problems 
facing Greek industry needed progressive adjustments; 
she could therefore not accept such a short transitional
period, which would leave no room for the practical bene-
78fits of progressivity. In her view, these measures had 
taken a role subsidiary to duties, providing certain pro­
tection to some branches of industry, and should therefore 
be given the same transitional arrangements as in the
79case of duties, i.e. a five-year transitional period.
With the Greek delegation following a rather strong 
bargaining line on these issues, the Community's subsequent
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offer for a two-year transitional period for both systems,
and a readiness to be flexible on the timetable for their
80abolition, proved unsuccessful. In the final compromise,
it was agreed that they would be progressively abolished
8 1over a three-year period following accession. The techni­
cal arrangements for their abolition provided for the 
reduction to zero of the levels of the two systems in 
four 25% installments--on the date of accession and at
the beginning of the second, third, and fourth years 
82successively. These provisions were to hold equally
for the progressive abolition of the two systems as applied
by Greece to imports of EEC industrial products from third
countries as well as to imports of ECSC products from the
83Community and third countries.
3. Public Purchasing 
At the outset of the negotiations Greece wanted 
to treat public purchasing as a point to be examined in 
the light of the technical discussions of Community sec­
ondary legislation; the Community, on the other hand, 
stressed that this point involved acceptance of article 
30 of the Treaty of Rome, prohibiting any provisions or 
practices which give preference to national industries
in public purchasing, and therefore had to be examined
84in the present context. The system in question was the 
8 % general-preference system: when undertakings established 
in Greece entered into competition with foreign tenderers, 
they were granted a general preference of 8 % regardless 
of their location within Greece, i.e. they were awarded
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a contract if their bid did not exceed by more than 8 % 
the lowest bid by a foreign tenderer. This system was 
to be distinguished, as the Community delegation empha­
sized, from the system of regional preferences in the 
case of bids open only to domestic tenderers; according 
to the latter (which was to be dealt with under a separate 
heading), a regional preference of 7% was granted to under­
takings located more than 50 km from Athens, increased
85to 10.5% when the tenderer was based in the islands.
With respect to the 8 % system, the Community delegation 
realized that its immediate abolition could affect ad­
versely certain sectors of the Greek economy dependent 
on public purchasing; it therefore made the proposal, 
which was finally accepted by the Greek side, that the 
system be progressively abolished within a five-year tran­
sitional period according to the timetable for the elimi- 
nation of residual customs duties.
Quite apart from the question of the preference 
systems existing in Greece, two further issues were also 
involved in the present context: the coordination of 
national procedures for the award of public supply con­
tracts (Directive 77/62/EEC); and the question of approved 
lists of suppliers (which is not covered in the above 
Directive but falls under the provisions of article 30 
of the Treaty of Rome). Although the Community delegation 
drew a distinction between the two issues and would have
preferred to have the first one discussed separately during
87the examination of Community secondary legislation, the
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Greek delegation brought both issues together in the nego­
tiations. This move may have, complicated somewhat the 
relevant discussions but it did help emphasize Greece's 
view that the opening of a p p r o v e d  lists in some sectors
had to be combined with internal administrative adaptations
88to Community law and practices.
On the first issue, the Greek delegation argued 
that adoption of the relevant Directive would require 
substantial administrative and legal adjustments and a c ­
cordingly requested a five-year transitional period for
89its application. The request was later reduced to three
years, but final agreement gave Greece only a two-year
90transitional period. On the question of approved lists,
the Community argued that they should be open to Community
suppliers upon accession under criteria for selection
comparable to those applied to national suppliers, whereas
Greece maintained that this should be delayed for three 
91years. In the final agreement reached, the opening up 
of Greek lists of approved suppliers to Community suppliers
92was to be delayed for two years from the date of accession.
A point that was underlined in the negotiations was that
these two temporary derogations were quite distinct from
one another--referring, as seen, to secondary Community
legislation and to article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, re- 
93spectively.
4. Exclusive Import, Export, and Marketing Rights 
With respect to exclusive rights of monopolies to 
import, the two sides agreed that, for products subject to
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such rights, gradual adaptation would be technically pos­
sible in the form of import quotas, along the lines of
94article 44 of the 1972 Act of Accession. The Community, 
however, reserved the right to ask for the immediate abo­
lition upon accession of such rights for certain monopolies
95if found incompatible with the acquis communautaire.
On the basis of this principle, the Greek delegation sub­
mitted a list of goods subject to monopoly and special 
trading arrangements at home; this was then examined during 
the negotiations to determine which products were compa­
tible with the acquis communautaire and which had to be 
abolished, either immediately or within a transitional 
peri o d .9 6
As the list showed, and was later confirmed in 
the negotiations, Greece was in effect requesting tran­
sitional measures with respect to exclusive import rights
for fertilizers, salt, matches, playing cards, and refined
97petroleum products (including lamp oil). Of these pro­
ducts, fertilizers were also included in the list for 
which Greece was requesting transitional quotas; it was 
accordingly agreed that in their case, transitional ar­
rangements for the abolition of exclusive import rights 
would be made in the context of abolition of their quanti­
tative restrictions, provided that the products in question 
were produced in Greece and that the quotas to be agreed 
would be open to all importers in Greece without being 
subject to exclusive marketing rights. Thus, the agreed 
quotas in the case of fertilizers also constituted
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transitional measures for the abolition of exclusive import
rights. For the other products, liberalization was to
involve transitional measures in the form of import quotas
to be opened upon accession and increased annually over
a five-year transitional period, provided that these quotas
would be open to any importer in Greece and be free from
99exclusive marketing rights.
Of the remaining products submitted, Greece was
allowed to retain after accession her import systems with
respect to emery, cigarette papers, and sulphur, since
they did not constitute an exclusive right and were found
to be compatible with article 37 of the Treaty of Rome;
but she would have to abolish from the date of accession
exclusive rights on imports of copper sulphate, saccharin,
and flimsy paper . 1 0 0 And since transitional measures
could be considered only in cases specifically requested
by Greece, the acquis communautaire was fully applicable
from the date of accession in the case of all products
with exclusive rights for which no such request was made ; 101
accordingly, all exclusive export rights would be abolished 
102from accession, together with all exclusive marketing 
rights. 1 0 3
As the negotiations on this issue drew to a close, 
the two sides agreed to incorporate the principles of 
article 37 of the Treaty of Rome, as interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice, in an article of the Act of 
Accession (similar to article 44 of the 1972 Act) which 
would emphasize the reciprocity of obligations between
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the Community and Greece in this field but would also
include a reference to those exclusive rights to be
104abolished by Greece upon accession.
F . A Common Theme: The Protection 
of Greek Industry
Considering the record of the negotiations in 
the industrial sector as a whole, the protection of Greek 
industry emerges as a common theme which underlies the 
general thinking of both sides and helps explain the moti­
vations behind weak and strong bargaining lines.
The fact that, owing to the implementation of 
the Association Agreement, approximately two-thirds of 
the Community’s industrial exports to Greece had been 
duty-free since 1 November 1974 revealed very little about 
the competitiveness of Greek industry since most of these 
products were not produced in Greece. Furthermore, Greece 
had managed in the past to counterbalance to a large extent 
the gradual reduction in tariff protection with an increase 
in non-tariff protection. This meant that during the in­
dustrial negotiations the main concern on both sides was 
not so much the elimination of Greece’s residual import 
duties vis-a-vis the Community (EEC import duties on Greek 
products had been eliminated since 1 July 1968) as the 
abolition of quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect; it was the latter that were primarily 
responsible for the often substantial, relative to Com­
munity levels, protection of Greek industry. The appli­
cation of Community rules left little room for Greece’s
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retaining this protection. Hence, the emphasis in the 
negotiations was on the working out of adequate and mutu­
ally acceptable measures that would ease the transition 
to a more liberal and competitive regime.
To be properly assessed, these issues which pertain 
to intra-Community trade should be seen in connection 
with the negotiations in the field of external commercial 
relations (examined in chapter V): Greece’s adoption of 
the Community’s preferential agreements and generalized- 
preferences scheme, quite apart from her alignment on 
the CCT, would further expose Greek industry to competitive 
forces both in domestic and Community markets. Two ad ­
ditional factors were also bound to have a cumulative 
effect in this direction: the alignment of the Greek 
system of industrial incentives with the Community rules 
of state aids and the adoption of the Community social 
policy, especially the legislation relating to the status 
of workers.
The above factors assume an even greater signifi­
cance when seen in the context of the persistent structural 
problems of Greek industry (made more pronounced by the 
unfavourable economic environment of the seventies)--the 
relatively small size of the average firm, the limited 
degree of vertical integration, the serious regional im­
balances, and the functional inadequacies of the credit 
system.
It is not always possible to discern, on the basis 
of the available evidence, the extent to which these
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considerations influenced the detailed thinking of the 
two parties with respect to specific negotiation issues. 
But they do form the backdrop against which negotiating 
attitudes in the present and related sectors may be inter­
preted and assessed in general terms. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that on the whole both delegations held a 
rather optimistic view of the ability of Greek industry 
to adapt to the new environment within which it would 
have to operate after accession; hence, the expected loss 
of protection, though important in determining the pattern
of the transitional arrangements concluded, did not give
105rise to any serious negotiating complications.
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102 CONF-GR/14/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/24/78, p. 1;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 1 & Corrigendum 1, p. 2;
Act of Accession, art. 40, par. 2. Such rights existed 
in the case of fertilizers, refined petroleum 
products, saccharin, flimsy paper, and opium (see 
CONF-GR/14/78, p. 3; and CONF-GR/15/78, p. 2). An 
exception was made, however, in the case of opium,
for which Greece was to retain exclusive export as 
well as import and marketing rights after accession. 
See MEMO-GR/l/78, pp. 1-2; CONF-GR/2/78, p. 15; 
CONF-GR/14/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/15/78, p. 2;
CONF-GR/67/78, pp. 1-2; CONF-GR/71/78, p. 1; 
CONF-GR/2/79, p. 13; CONF-GR/3/79, p. 5.
103 CONF-GR/14/78, p. 3. They existed for all the products 
in the Greek list (in MEMO-GR/1/78) except crude 
petroleum (see CONF-GR/14/78, p. 3, and CONF-GR/15/78, 
p. 2). Seen in conjuntion with the transitional ar­
rangements agreed, such abolition meant that exclusive 
marketing rights could be retained during the tran­
sitional period for those quantities of the products 
under transitional measures for which restrictions 
would not have been lifted until the end of the tran­
sitional period (CONF-GR/15/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/23/78,
p. 1). For certain qualifications in the case of 
crude petroleum see CONF-GR/15/78, p. 2, and 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 1.
104 Such a reference in the relevant article of the Act 
of Accession was a compromise between the initial 
Community proposal to have a special protocol on 
the adjustments to be made by Greece upon accession 
and the Greek position that article 44 of the 1972 
Act of Accession would be adequate without any further 
provisions. See CONF-GR/3/78, pp. 8-9; CONF-GR/23/78, 
p. 2; CONF-GR/24/78, pp. 1-2; C0NF-GR/30/78, Annex I, 
p. 2; CONF-GR/67/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/71/78, p. 1; Act
of Accession, arts. 40, pars. 1-2.
105 On the question of the protection of Greek industry 
as it relates to Community membership see Yannopoulos, 
"Effects on Manufacturing Industries," pp. 53-56, and 
"Sensitivity of Industrial Sectors," pp. 84-87;
Hassid, Hell£nike Biomechania kai E O K . pp. 218-22;
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Mitsos, "Hel lada-EOK,’’ pp. 40-41, ’’Industrial Sector,’’ 
pp. 105-7, and ”Hell£nik£ Biom§chania kai EOK,” 
pp. 41-42; Mitsos et al . , Prosch6 r§s£ stis Europai'kes 
Koinotetes. pp. 133-42; and Katsos & Spanak§s, Biome- 
chanike Prostasia kai Entax£.
CHAPTER V
EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
A . Scope of the Negotiating Field 
and General Principles
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the initial 
negotiating positions of the Greek delegation in the field 
of external commercial relations were entangled with its 
positions in the field of customs union in the industrial 
sector. Though understandable, such an approach created 
in the beginning a certain confusion in a dossier admit­
tedly heterogeneous in nature, vast in coverage, and tech­
nically complicated. 1 This was further aggravated by the 
fact that the initial position papers presented by the 
Greek delegation were rather clumsy in their conception 
and hazy in their argumentation. The situation improved 
as the Greek side, in formulating its negotiating positions, 
gradually adjusted the analytical framework of its papers 
to that of the Community’s.
Following the pattern thus established, the ar ­
rangements to be concluded in the field of external com­
mercial relations were linked to relevant provisions es­
tablished in the field of customs union; in this manner, 
progress in the customs-union chapter was a prerequisite
2for progress in the field of external commercial relations. 
Furthermore, on the question of the scope of the negoti­
ating field, the chapter on external commercial relations
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was to cover commercial policy between the Community and 
third countries in EEC industrial products, thereby leaving 
certain areas (such as trade covered by the ECSC Treaty 
and trade in fresh or processed agricultural products) 
to be more appropriately examined in the context of other
3
negotiation chapters.
On the question of transitional measures, the 
central theme established was that, though necessary, 
transitional measures in the field of external commercial 
relations should be kept simple in their conception; and, 
in the particular case of quantitative restrictions on 
imports, they should be envisaged only in exceptional 
cases .4 Within this broad framework, agreement was reached 
on the following principles: (1 ) in the case of products 
with transitional measures in the customs-union chapter, 
transitional measures for a given product with respect 
to third coujfries must be at least as long as the tran­
sitional measures of the same type for the same product 
established in the customs-union dossier; (2 ) in cases 
where there are no transitional measures under customs 
union, the duration of such transitional measures with 
respect to third countries should be determined on the 
basis of their economic justification; (3) with respect 
to preferential agreements, the duration of transitional 
measures would have to be negotiated with the third 
countries concerned; (4) the duration of the various tran­
sitional measures need not be identical but should in 
principle be identical for all countries within a given
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group (e.g. Maghreb countries) for a given transitional 
measure; (5) transitional measures for quantitative re­
strictions on imports should not be automatically extended 
throughout the overall period of application of tran­
sitional measures in the field of external commercial 
relations, unless justified and subject to "progressivity” 
(i.e., to a progressive schedule for their elimination);
(6 ) before the end of the negotiations, a final date would 
have to be determined for Greece’s full application of
5
the present chapter.
Agreement on these principles was reached without 
much difficulty, but the subsequent debate on concrete 
transitional arrangements proved complicated--though at 
times the difficulties encountered were a reflection of 
inefficient bargaining rather than of the complexity of 
the subject matter. A case in point concerns the Commu­
nity's financial cooperation with third countries. Having 
agreed on the immediate application, upon accession, of 
the acquis communautaire with respect to certain related 
areas, Greece proceeded to question in a rather obscure 
manner the applicability to her case of the Community 
financial obligations relating to some of the existing 
Community agreements with third countries.6 However, it 
became clear from the Community's reactions that Greece 
would be required to apply the acquis communautaire re­
lating to this point immediately upon accession, unless 
transitional measures or adjustments were to be negoti­
ated .7 In the spirit of this position, the Greek delegation
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specified that its request was not for permanent dero-
o
gations but simply for transitional measures. In this
Q
and other instances during the negotiations, the Greek 
delegation argued that its requests related only to tran­
sitional measures and did not question the external- 
relations policy of the Community which was to be fully 
applied after expiry of the transitional period. Such 
statements added very little to the specific bargaining 
strength of the Greek side, since they related to one 
of the central principles already agreed in the opening 
of the accession negotiations and common to all negotiation 
chapters. It is interesting to note that at the same time 
that Greece was contemplating requests for such transi­
tional measures she was effectively abandoning them by 
accepting that she would participate upon accession within 
the Community budget mechanisms in the financing towards 
third countries. In fact, without any further substantive 
negotiations, the Greek delegation fully accepted to apply 
from accession the acquis communautaire with respect to 
the financial cooperation between the Community and third 
countri e s . 10
B. Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
from Third Countries
A central and delicate issue that had to be re­
solved under the present negotiation dossier was the de­
termination of Greece’s transitional arrangements with 
respect to her quantitative restrictions on imports from 
third countries; as noted, they were to apply only in
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exceptional cases and under further limits regarding the 
period of their application. In the initial formulations 
of its negotiating position, the Greek delegation seemed 
to be suggesting that the Community regime of import ar­
rangements to third countries would be applied by Greece
12only at the end of a five-year transitional period. This
position was later abandoned, with Greece agreeing in
principle that the relevant acquis communautaire would
apply upon accession, with transitional arrangements to
be provided only in specific and limited cases of products
and countries. A further basic condition that had to be
satisfied by all transitional quantitative restrictions
was that Greece should not grant more favourable treatment
13to third countries than to Community member states.
Within this constrained framework, Greece submitted
her requests for transitional quantitative restrictions,
maintaining that her proposed measures would provide for
a minimum protection of certain sensitive sectors of her
economy which would be subjected to stiffer competition
from third countries after accession, due to the latter’s
low production costs and the dismantling by Greece of
14tariffs and of indirect protection measures.
In examining the present topic, three main cases 
are distinguished according to the group of countries 
involved and in line with the major divisions of the 
subject matter followed during the negotiations: non- 
preferential GATT countries, state-trading countries, and 
preferential countries. However, since most of the issues
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raised during the negotiations in respect of the non- 
preferential GATT countries and the state-trading 
countries were resolved in a similar and parallel manner, 
it would be desirable to include both groups of countries 
under the same subheading, thereby eliminating unnecessary 
repetitions of negotiating points with an almost identical 
pattern of development and eventual solution.
The sections that follow examine the proposals 
for specific products (within categories of origin) for 
which Greece wanted to maintain quantitative restrictions 
during the transitional period, the Community counterpro­
posals, the evolution of the respective negotiating po­
sitions, and the eventual compromises reached in the final 
agreement.
1. Non-Preferential GATT Countries 
and State-Trading Countries
The basic Community position in this case was 
that Greece should apply from accession the common liber­
alization lists on imports from nonpreferential GATT 
countries and state-trading countries; a few exceptions, 
however, could be envisaged for certain very sensitive 
products contained in these lists for which Greece could 
be allowed to apply transitional measures. In this respect, 
adoption of the two common liberalization lists was to be 
coordinated so as to avoid Greece’s granting more favour­
able transitional measures to state-trading countries
1 5than to nonpreferential GATT countries.
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While agreeing with the above position in principle
(though its initial request was for the application of
the Community liberalization schemes at the end of the
16five-year transitional period ), the Greek delegation 
linked its final acceptance with an agreement on its speci­
fic proposals for the application, over a five-year tran­
sitional period, of quantitative restrictions on certain 
sensitive products. 17 The Greek proposals were eventually 
broken down into four categories, according to the state 
of liberalization of the products involved: (a) products 
liberalized by the Community (i.e., products included 
in the common liberalization lists) and by Greece, or 
subject to an "al1-1icences-granted" (TLA) regime in Greece 
(i.e., a regime in which import licences are issued without 
quantitative restrictions); (b) products liberalized by 
the Community and restricted by Greece; (c) products not 
liberalized by the Community (i.e., not included in the 
common liberalization lists) but liberalized by Greece;
(d) products not liberalized by either the Community or 
1 8Greece. As seen below, each category of products posed 
its own peculiar difficulties during the negotiations 
and called for different compromises and solutions.
a) Products liberalized by the Community and bv Greece 
(or subject simply to a TLA regime in Greece)
Most of the products for which Greece requested
transitional quotas for the application of the two common
liberalization lists .could be imported into Greece free
of restrictions (tyres, wood & wood products, paper &
221
paperboard, leather footwear, tubes & pipes, screws & 
nuts, and furniture) or merely subject to automatic li­
cencing (TLA). As on similar occasions in the course of 
the negotiations, the Community delegation stood firmly 
against such "deliberalization” (i.e., a retrograde move 
away from liberalized trade through the imposition of 
restrictions), regarding it as running counter to customs
union and the basic principles of transitional arrange- 
19ments.
In opposing the Greek requests, the Community
did not raise only its own principles but also those of
GATT, to which the Greek requests concerning nonprefer-
ential GATT countries would be (in the Community’s view)
20difficult to justify. The Greek delegation, on the other 
hand, maintained that GATT rules (article XVIII, in partic­
ular) did not exclude the introduction, before accession, 
of transitional quantitative restrictions on liberalized 
products towards GATT countries; in justifying to GATT 
such an action, the transitional nature of these re­
strictions would be emphasized, together with Greece’s 
undertaking to make, through accession, a more effective 
and permanent contribution in the development of inter­
national commerce.21
As the negotiations progressed, the emphasis 
shifted from the technical aspects of the Greek position to 
problems of substance. And following an unsuccessful attempt
for a compromise, whereby Greece would have limited to a min-
22imum the number of products proposed for deliberalization,
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the Greek delegation conceded that the application of 
the specific GATT provision on which it had based its 
argument did not fall within the scope of the accession 
negotiations; in this manner it eventually accepted the 
application of the Community principle of nondeliberal­
ization, thereby abandoning in the present case its re-
23quests for transitional quantitative restrictions.
Another issue that had to be clarified was the 
case of products liberalized by the Community and subject 
solely to a TLA regime in Greece. The Greek delegation 
argued that TLA products should not be placed together 
with liberalized products, since the former were included 
in the Greek lists of restricted products and the control 
thus exercised on their imports could be changed into
Q /
quantitative restrictions. Clearly, what the Greek dele­
gation was in effect suggesting was the replacement, in 
a number of cases, of the TLA regime with transitional 
quota restrictions upon accession. This, however, was 
considered by the Community as being equivalent to deliber­
alization and could not therefore be accepted, as a matter 
of principle. Instead, it was agreed to follow the Com­
munity practice under GATT, whereby Greece would abolish
25upon accession the TLA regime, with allowance for some 
exceptions with respect to specific products. In the agree­
ment reached, which corresponded to acceptance of the 
Greek proposals, these products were silver, gold, and 
platinum; the transitional arrangements negotiated in 
their case included the condition that the Greek TLA system
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was a genuine one, i.e. a regime employed only for sta-
26tistical checks.
b) Products liberalized by the Community and restricted 
by Greece
Having agreed that the transitional measures to 
be arrived at with respect to the Community common liberal­
ization lists should not be more favourable to third 
countries than to the Community in its present composition, 
and that they should not be more favourable to state- 
trading countries than to nonpreferential GATT countries, 
it was decided to examine case by case the Greek requests 
falling under the present category on the basis of rules 
derived from the agreed principles on transitional measures
and of certain rules relating to the determination of the
27basic quotas and the rate of liberalization.
The Community finally agreed that Greece could 
retain transitional quantitative restrictions with respect 
to imports from nonpreferential GATT countries and state- 
trading countries on the products contained in the Greek 
proposals. These products were central-heating radiators, 
refrigerator cabinets, machines for working marble, band 
saws for working wood, and fountain pens & parts (re­
stricted for both GATT and state-trade imports); tubes 
& pipes (restricted only for GATT imports); and fuel wood, 
roofing tiles, and central-heating boilers (restricted 
only for state-trade imports). But given the above prin­
ciples, the agreement implied that Greece was granted
in effect a larger number of temporary derogations from
28
the application of the common liberalization lists.
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The next step in the agreement concerned the
details for implementing these quantitative restrictions,
following similar criteria as under the customs-union 
29dossier: (l) if, for a given restricted product, imports
into Greece in two consecutive years are less than 90% 
of the annual quota, the existing quantitative restrictions 
should be abolished, assuming that the product has been 
liberalized vis-a-vis the Community; (2) volume quotas es­
tablished in the customs-union chapter would also be ex­
pressed as volume quotas in the commercial-relations chap­
ter; (3) value quotas in the customs-union chapter would 
also be expressed as value quotas in the commercial- 
relations chapter; (4) for products not subject to quotas 
in the customs-union chapter, their quotas in the com­
mercial -relations chapter would be expressed in value for 
technical reasons; (5) for products already with Greek 
quotas vis-a-vis third countries, the same method of calcu­
lation would be used as that applied for the majority of 
quotas vis-a-vis the Community in the customs-union chapter;
(6 ) in the case of products whose imports were completely 
banned in Greece, the basic quota would be fixed at 3%
30of the average Greek production during the period 1975-77;
(7) the overall amount of the quotas thus established
would be broken down between the GATT countries and the
31state-trading countries in a 4:1 ratio; (8 ) the basic 
global quota for state-trading countries thus established 
would subsequently be allocated on a country-by-country 
basis according to the existing acquis communautaire.
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On the basis of the above rules, the Conference
32established the basic quotas for 1981, while the rules 
for their increase remained identical to those agreed 
in the customs-union chapter, with full liberalization
33envisaged at the end of the five-year transitional period.
c) Products not liberalized by the Community but 
liberalized bv Greece
According to the Community position, the principle 
of nondeliberalization that was established under the 
first subheading was to apply in this case as well, de­
riving from the same argumentation; in this respect, the 
member states (and hence Greece after accession) could 
resort to deliberalization vis-^-vis third countries only 
in cases of emergency and in accordance with the relevant 
acquis communautaire.
The Greek delegation disagreed with this approach 
and asked for an exemption from this principle during 
the transitional period and for a minimun number of pro­
ducts falling under the present subheading (tyres, certain 
wood products, paper & paperboard, footwear, tubes & pipes, 
bolts & nuts, television cathode-ray tubes, furniture, 
and toys), arguing for the necessity of the temporary 
protection that such transitional measures would provide 
for Greece. Greece’s proposals did not fare well on the 
negotiating table, despite efforts to show that, if they 
were rejected, Greece would find herself after accession 
following a broader liberalization than the Community. 
Agreement was finally reached on the Community position--
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the implication being that the principle of nondeliberal­
ization was to apply with respect to products liberalized
by Greece, regardless of their state of liberalization
35at Community level.
d) Products not liberalized bv either the Community 
or Greece
In the case of these products, the Greek requests
were in effect hypothetical requests for transitional
measures in the event that the products in question were
liberalized by the Community and included in its common
3 6liberalization lists during the interim period. In the 
Community’s view, however, one could not envisage hypo­
thetical transitional measures in the accession instru­
ments; instead, should such cases arise, they could easily 
be handled within the consultations procedure of the in­
terim period .3 7
Following modifications of the Greek position, 
agreement was finally reached on a simple arrangement: 
any additions to the common liberalization lists before 
the signature of the instruments of accession would be 
handled in the course of the negotiations; if, on the 
other hand, such additions were to be considered during
the interim period, then Greece would handle them in the
38context of the consultations procedure. It is thus seen 
that the submission of hypothetical lists was in effect 
an unnecessary and roundabout negotiating manoeuvre, which 
resulted in a simple and obvious arrangement that should 
have required no negotiation to start with.
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A particular case under the present category was 
that of products not liberalized by the Community vis- 
a-vis nonpreferent ial GATT countries or state-trading 
countries and included in the list of fourteen products 
(noted in chapter IV above) for which Greece had been 
allowed, within the customs-union negotiations, to maintain 
transitional quantitative restrictions vis-a-vis the Com­
munity. These products were tubes & pipes, certain motors, 
certain electric motors & transformers, television sets 
& parts, cables for television aerials, certain buses & 
minibuses, and certain vehicle bodies. It was agreed that 
in their case, and for a five-year period, Greece should
also maintain quantitative restrictions vis-a-vis these 
39countries. With respect to the quotas in question, there 
was no obligation for Greece to increase them during the 
transitional period or to liberalize them at the end of 
the period, unless in the meantime there was a change 
in the acquis communautaire; should, however, Greece want 
to do so, she would have to follow the agreed provisions 
as well as the relevant Community rules .4 0
2. Preferential Countries 
There were two basic premises on which the negoti­
ations on matters relating to the Community preferential 
agreements were based: (a) Greece should not give any ad­
vantage to preferential countries over the Community (this 
premise derived from a more general condition applying to 
all third countries for the maintenance of Community pref­
erence);4 * (b) the liberalization vis-a-vis preferential
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partners should be at least as favourable to them as the 
general liberalization system vis-a-vis other third 
countries (in particular, transitional quantitative re­
strictions could not be envisaged for preferential partners 
with respect to products which would be free of such re­
strictions by Greece in its imports from other third
i O
countries after the date of accession). It should be
noted that these conditions did not apply only to matters
relating to quantitative restrictions but were extended
to apply to all transitional measures applicable to the
43preferential countries. Thus, they are relevant not 
only for the present discussion, dealing with the specific 
question of quantitative restrictions as related to the 
Community preferential agreements, but also for the exami­
nation below of the broader aspects of the preferential 
agreements.
It was initially established that Greece should
apply the provisions of the preferential agreements that
relate to quantitative restrictions--without excluding,
in principle, the possibility of establishing transitional 
44arrangements. Later on, by distinguishing between imports 
from preferential countries liberalized by Greece and im­
ports restricted by Greece, the respective position of the 
two sides was differentiated accordingly.
a) Products liberalized by Greece
Raising once more questions of principle, the
4C>Community maintained that this category of products 
could not be subject to quantitative restrictions, unless
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such restrictions were already envisaged under the prefer­
ential agreements in question; any difficulties encountered 
by Greece due to liberalization should be handled through
tariff regimes (i.e. through indicative ceilings or tariff
46quotas) and not by deliberalization.
The Greek delegation disagreed with the above
position, arguing that tariff regimes could not provide
for adequate protection, all the more so given that many
47of the preferential countries were low-cost producers.
These reservations were finally left aside, and agreement 
was established on the above point subject to agreement
48on the products to be included under the tariff regimes.
At this stage the Community delegation introduced
a new element in its argument, linking its acceptance
of the list of specific products for which Greece was
49requesting a transitional tariff regime with Greece’s 
acceptance of the Community position on the twelve-year- 
list products as related to the Community preferential 
agreements (the twelve-year list comprised products which, 
under the association provisions, were entering Greece 
duty-free from the Community, and aligned on the CCT from 
third countries). According to this Community position 
(which, together with the related issues that were raised, 
is examined in greater detail further below), Greece should 
apply, with respect to the twelve-year-1 ist products, 
the tariff provisions of the Community’s preferential 
agreements in full from the date of accession. This was 
an essential condition for the Community: without it,
230
she would not be in a position to negotiate the measures 
proposed by Greece with the preferential partners con­
cerned. Subject to Greece’s acceptance of this condition 
and a detailed examination of the economic justification
of each specific case, the Community was prepared to accept
50the Greek proposals.
While the Greek delegation had no objection to
submitting its specific proposals to a detailed exami-
51nation of their economic justification, it initially
52disagreed with the establishment of the above link.
Eventually, however, the Community condition with respect
53to the twelve-year list was accepted, leading thereby 
to acceptance of most of the Greek specific proposals 
with respect to tariff regimes vis-a-vis preferential 
countries; the products concerned were wood & wood prod­
ucts, paper & paperboard, electric wire, furniture, and 
54toys.
b) Products not liberalized bv Greece
With respect to this category of products, it was
agreed that all transitional quantitative restrictions
vis-a-vis the Community, i.e. the fourteen-product list,
were to be extended to apply, for an identical transitional
55period, vis-a-vis the Community preferential partners.
The Community also attempted to go beyond this principle
and establish the additional constraint that transitional
quantitative restrictions by Greece vis-a-vis preferential
countries could be considered only for the above fourteen 
56products. Following objections by the Greek side, the
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Community did not insist but was willing instead to examine
whether, in exceptional cases, transitional quantitative
restrictions could be proposed to certain preferential
partners for specific products with existing restrictions
by Greece vis-a-vis the third countries concerned, in
addition to the fourteen products restricted vis-a-vis
57the rest of the Community.
The above compromise was considered a positive
r q
step towards reaching an agreement on this issue. How­
ever, the Greek proposals which were subsequently submitted
59to the Conference were faced by the Community with the 
same conditional acceptance as the previous proposals 
with respect to products liberalized by Greece .6 0  Thus, 
it was only after Greece had registered her acceptance 
of the Community position with respect to the twelve-year- 
list products that the Community agreed with Greece's 
retaining transitional quantitative restrictions for the 
three products contained in her proposals (certain tubes & 
pipes, refrigerator cabinets, and certain electric motors & 
transformers) in addition to the fourteen products with 
transitional restrictions vis-^-vis the rest of the Com­
munity .61 These transitional measures would be in the 
form of import quotas; for each product, the negotiation 
of the relevant transition and adaptation protocols be­
tween the Community and the preferential countries con­
cerned would have to establish the basic volume quota, 
the annual percentage increase, and the date for full 
1 iberali zati on.
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C. Measures Having Equivalent Effect 
to Quantitative Restrictions
Broadly considered, the issues raised on this 
subject and the agreements reached are largely extensions 
of the corresponding points examined under the customs- 
union chapter. With respect to import deposits and cash 
payments, in particular, the positions of the two sides 
and the agreement reached were the same as under the cus- 
toms-union dossier. The discussion that follows is ac­
cordingly limited to those negotiating points which ap­
plied specifically to third countries.
With respect to public purchasing, it was agreed
that Greece would conform to the international Community
obligations on third countries to emerge from the multi-
64lateral trade negotiations. Making reference to similar 
transitional measures agreed under the customs-union 
chapter, the Greek delegation requested a two-year tran­
sitional period for the application of the relevant acquis 
communautaire but settled for a generally phrased agree­
ment: the Community would offer a grace period for the
implementation by Greece of the acquis communautaire to 
65emerge.
Finally, in the case of monopolies, given Greece’s 
intention to abolish exlusive import rights in the same 
way as vis-a-vis the Community, it was agreed that if 
she were to abolish them progressively, she should do 
so in such a way as not to give third countries an ef­
fective preference over the Community during the tran­
sitional period .6 6
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D. Community Preferential Agreements 
With Third Countries
A problem that had to be disentangled from the 
issues raised in connection with the Community preferential 
agreements concerned Greece’s own trade relations with 
third countries. Even though the two issues were examined 
more or less concurrently, agreement on the Community’s 
preferential system could not be easily reached if the 
issues connected with Greece’s trade relations were not 
settled.
l. Greece’s Trade Relations
a) Preferences granted to Greece under Generalized- 
Preference Arrangements
Such preferences had been accorded to Greece by 
Austria and Switzerland (EFTA countries); and by Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. With respect to pref­
erences accorded to Greece by Austria and Switzerland,
Greece was prepared to adjust to the Community’s bilateral 
agreements with them. With respect to the remaining 
countries, the Community maintained that Greece would 
not be able to enjoy after accession the preferences ac ­
corded by them, since they were not enjoyed by the other 
member states. This position was also accepted by the 
Greek side .6 7 It is worth noting in this respect that 
whereas the EFTA group as a whole accounted for only 6.1% 
of Greece’s total trade deficit in 1979, the corresponding 
share of the other countries (together with USA) was 21.3%-- 
the second highest next to the Community’s. Japan, in
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particular, appeared in Greek trade statistics with both
the highest percentage country share in total Greek imports
and one of the lowest shares in total exports (15.1% and
680.8%, respectively, in 1977 figures).
b) Reciprocal preferences between Greece and some 
developing countries
The negotiations established that Greece should
renounce these preferences in such a way so as to ensure
that there was no time gap as she switched to the Community
generalized-preferences scheme .6 9
c ) Commercial agreements with state-trading countries
In the initial formulation of her position, Greece 
wanted to retain these agreements until their expiration 
or renunciation, reserving the right to renew those still 
in force at the time of accession for a three-year period 
after accession .7 0 The reasoning behind this request was 
that Greek exports to state-trading countries were domi­
nated by sensitive products (primarily agricultural ones) 
dependent on these markets; hence the need for a transi­
tional period to reorient these exports without disturbing 
the Greek economy .71 The Community, however, could not see 
the pertinence of this argument: while member states were
in a similar situation, their trade with the state-trading
72
countries was developing normally. But quite apart from 
such reservations, the Community was in principle opposed 
to the Greek request, maintaining that Greece could not 
prolong these agreements for a transitional period but
73should instead ensure that they terminate upon accession.
235
Greece’s request for a prolongation of these
agreements was eventually abandoned; and as the tentative
date of accession was beginning to emerge, the Community
position was accepted, given that none of these agreements
74expired later than 31 December 1980. Although Greece’s 
concession was largely the outcome of the constraints 
imposed by the acquis communautaire, a further consider­
ation which contributed to her generally lukewarm approach 
in this respect was the declining relative importance 
of state-trading countries in Greece's foreign trade: 
their share in total Greek exports had fallen from 24.2% 
in 1966 to 14.7% in 1976.75
d) Commercial agreements with other third countries
Although initially Greece wanted to retain the 
right to extend existing or conclude new commercial agree­
ments after accession, 7 6 in the agreement finally reached 
it became clear that she could not herself decide after 
accession whether to prolong existing or conclude new 
bilateral commercial agreements;7 7 and if she should wish 
to conclude new agreements prior to accession, she had
to ensure that a denunciation clause was included to take
78account of her future obligations as a member state.
2. General Aspects of the Coiriguni ty 
Preferential Agreements
Although a legal distinction could be made between
’’pure" Community agreements and "mixed" agreements, it
was established that the same approach would be adopted
for both of them in the negotiations. With respect to "pure"
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Community agreements (i.e., those signed by the Community 
alone as in the case of the EFTA agreements), there was 
no need from a strictly legal point of view for any ad ­
ditional protocols: both Greece and the co-contracting 
parties should automatically apply the provisions of the 
respective agreements in the context of an enlarged Com­
munity from the date of Greece’s accession; given, however, 
the changed circumstances, protocols could be negotiated 
to take account of necessary transitional measures and 
adjustments. In the case of ’’mixed” agreements (i.e., those 
signed jointly by the Community and its member states as 
in the case of the Lom£ Convention), Greece should accede 
to them and apply them from the date of accession, though 
in this instance protocols were required and had to be
negotiated to take account of transitional measures and 
80adjustments. Thus, Greece had to apply both categories 
of preferential agreements from accession but with allow­
ance for transitional measures and adjustments in the
81form of protocols; this implied in practice that such
82protocols should be concluded during the interim period.
Allowance was made, however, for an extension of the time
constraint beyond accession, if the protocols could not
be concluded within the prescribed time for reasons outside
83the control of the Community or Greece. In any case,
Greece would have to ensure that, as from the date of
accession, other third countries are not granted more
favourable treatment than the Community preferential or
84associated partners.
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Turning now to the procedure to be followed in
negotiating these protocols, it was established that this
would involve three successive stages: (a) during the
accession negotiations the Commission would hold explora-
85tory talks with the preferential countries; (b) on the 
basis of the Commission recommendations, and before Greek 
accession, the Council should finalize the negotiating 
directives to the Commission, covering every aspect of 
the preferential agreements for which transitional measures 
were envisaged (at a later stage it would have to be de­
termined whether the transitional measures proposed to 
each country were reasonably balanced); (c) negotiations 
proper between the Community and each of the countries
concerned could then commence, culminating in the con-
, _ , 86 elusion of protocols.
Two related issues should be noted. The first 
one concerned Greece’s status during the above procedures. 
In the Community’s view, Greece would be associated with 
the internal work in the above stages, while Greek repre­
sentatives would be present as observers during the negoti-
87ations with the third countries concerned. The Greek 
side, however, although agreeing in all other respects, 
had objections with respect to the second stage, arguing 
that in so far as the Community's negotiating instructions 
to the Commission were concerned, there should be prior
oo
agreement between Greece and the Community. These re­
servations were eventually abandoned, following the Com­
munity’s firm stand on the principle that the consultations
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procedure during the interim period could not question
89its "autonomy of decision making."
The second issue related to the preferential Com­
munity agreements with Portugal and Spain. They were to 
he submitted to the same procedures that were established 
for the other preferential agreements; but after accession 
of the two candidates the agreements between them and 
the Community, together with the protocols providing for 
transitional measures between them and Greece, would cease 
to apply. On the other hand, special measures might have 
to be arranged between Greece and each of the two countries 
for a transitional period after their accession. Clearly, 
two different problems were involved and, as agreed, had 
to be kept separate: the transitional measures to be in­
cluded in the respective protocols between each of the 
two countries and Greece to take account of the latter’s 
accession should not in any way prejudge the transitional 
measures that may be necessary to adopt for Greece in 
order to take account of the accession of Portugal and 
Spain. As an extension of the above considerations, it 
was also decided that any transitional measures between 
Greece and the applicant countries relating to the period 
between the accession of the latter and the end of Greece’s 
transitional period were to be settled in the context
90of the accession negotiations with each of these countries.
3. Provisions with respect to Import Duties 
on Industrial Products
Following the examination of the general aspects 
of the Community preferential agreements, the analysis now
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turns to the specific question of Greece’s duties on in­
dustrial imports from countries with Community preferential 
91agreements.
In the initial formulations of its position, the 
Greek delegation made a distinction between its imports 
from EFTA countries on the one hand, and from Mediterranean 
and Lom6 countries on the other, further distinguishing 
within each category between non-sensitive and sensitive 
products. (Included among the sensitive products were 
certain meat and fish imports, flowers, certain chemicals 
and plastics, tyres, leather goods, wood & wood products, 
paper & paperboard, textiles, and toys. Many of these 
product categories were listed as sensitive with respect 
to both EFTA and Mediterranean & Lom£ imports--the main 
exception being agricultural products, whose sensitivity 
derived only from the latter but which were outside the 
negotiating scope of the commercial-relations chapter.)
The essence of its position with respect to these catego­
ries of products was that Greek import duties should be 
reduced progressively over a transitional period which, 
in the case of sensitive products from EFTA countries,
should extend for three years beyond the ’’overall” tran-
92sitional period.
The Community delegation, on the other hand, main­
tained that in establishing a transitional period, the 
two groups of countries should be accorded equal treatment; 
and that it was not possible to have transitional measures 
for some products that go beyond the overall transitional
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period for the full application of the commercial-relations
chapter (eventually agreed to be five years), given that
at the end of this transitional period the CCT should
93be applied in full vis-a-vis all third countries. The 
negotiations on this point were thus closely related to the 
corresponding negotiations on the customs-union dossier: 
given the above constraint and having abandoned its request 
for an additional transitional period with respect to 
alignment on the CCT, the Greek delegation no longer in­
sisted on its request for an extended transitional period
with respect to import duties of certain sensitive EFTA 
94products.
Deriving from the above position of principle, 
the Community altered the framework of analysis by avoiding 
Greece's differentiation of the proposed transitional 
measures between the two groups of countries. Instead, 
it formulated its position on the basis of the distinction 
made in the context of the Association Agreement (with 
respect to products imported from the Community into 
Greece) between products on the twenty-two-year list and 
products on the twelve-year list.
With respect to the products on the twenty-two- 
year list, the Community maintained that Greece should 
apply the tariff provisions of the preferential agreements, 
subject to the same transitional period (five years) and 
the same rate of tariff dismantling as envisaged for 
the progressive abolition of Greek residual import duties 
vis-a-vis the Community and the progressive alignment on
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the CCT; furthermore, the process of dismantling from the
level of the duties effectively applied vis-a-vis third
countries should start on the same date as for customs 
95union.
With respect to products on the twelve-year list, 
the Community could not, in principle, accept any tran­
sitional measures; hence, Greece should apply in their 
case the tariff provisions of the Community's preferential 
agreements in full from the date of accession. An exception 
could be made, however, for a limited number of these
products which, if considered sensitive for Greece, could
96be tranferred to the regime of the twenty-two-year list.
Although the Greek delegation readily agreed with
97the Community proposals on the twenty-two-year list, 
it could not accept the Community position with respect 
to the twelve-year list, arguing that all these products 
should follow the same progressive abolition of import
duties as envisaged for the products on the twenty-two-
98 . . . .year list. In arguing against the Community position,
Greece maintained that (a) she would lose a considerable
source of government revenue in the form of tariff receipts
(the loss of revenue for the whole transitional period was
estimated at 27 million EUA); (b) without the prospect of
any substantial reciprocity of benefits from similar trade
advantages on the markets of the preferential countries
concerned, her commercial balance, which was negative
with respect to most of the preferential countries, was
expected to worsen; and (c) the principle of progressivity,
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followed by the Community in other parts of the negoti­
ations to ease the impact of accession, was given up 
99he r e .
This difference of views elicited little or no 
debate and was resolved with Greece’s acceptance of the 
Community position with respect to the products on the 
twelve-year list. 1 0 0 Curiously enough, the Greek dele­
gation made no use of the Community suggestion to identify 
only certain sensitive products from the twelve-year list 
and accord them the treatment reserved for twenty-two- 
year -1 ist products; the available evidence suggests that 
it chose instead an all-or-nothing approach, agreeing 
to apply fully from the date of accession the tariff provi­
sions of the Community’s preferential agreements with 
respect to the twelve-year-1 ist products . 101
E . Textiles
Following the procedure adopted in the negoti­
ations, what is examined under the separate subheading 
on textiles is only those cases falling under the common 
commercial policy in the textiles sector--i.e ., the Multi­
fibre Arrangement (MFA> together with the Community bi­
lateral agreements concluded under it, and the existing 
Community autonomous arrangements. Since the Community 
commercial policy in the textile sector applied to imports 
from countries considered to be low-cost producers, it 
was agreed that all other issues (relating to transitional 
measures with respect to non-MFA textile products or 
countries regarded as not low-cost producers) would be
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covered under the previous framework and examined in the
102same way together with all other industrial products.
With respect to the Multi fibre Arrangement, it
was agreed (with little substantive discussion) that Greece
103would apply it upon accession. On the further question 
of bilateral MFA agreements concluded by the Community 
under this Arrangement, it was agreed that they would 
also be applied from accession, and that the Community 
would negotiate protocols with the third countries con­
cerned on the basis of the procedure adopted for prefer-
104ential agreements; they would provide for voluntary
restraint on exports to Greece in the case of products
and origins having restrictions on exports to the Com- 
105munity. The Community would accordingly raise its levels 
to take account of Greece’s accession--on the basis of 
existing trade flows between Greece and the countries 
concerned (in the case of existing flows) and according 
to the sensitivity of the products (in other cases)-- 
leaving unaltered member states’ shares which had already 
been negotiated . 1 0 6
Within the above framework, the Community accepted 
specific Greek requests for transitional measures with 
respect to associated and preferential countries and MFA 
products liberalized by Greece and under Community bi­
lateral agreements, following agreement on two conditions 
which were previously established in the context of the 
preferential agreements: the use of tariff regimes rather 
than deliberalization; and acceptance of the Community
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position with respect to the twelve-year-1 ist products.
The list on which agreement was finally reached was 
shorter, in terms of both products and countries, than 
Greece’s proposed list (which had already been the object 
of revisions); it included yarn and woven fabrics (both 
cotton and man-made), synthetic textile fibres, carpets, 
and outer garments. 1 0 7
Finally, on the question of the Community's ex­
isting unilateral quota restrictions on textile imports
108from state-trading countries, it was agreed that Greece
would apply them in accordance with the relevant Community
rules (twenty-four categories of products were involved
109at the time agreement was reached). These products 
together with the textile products on the common liberal­
ization list delineated the relevant acquis communautaire. 
In all remaining cases of quantitative restrictions that 
Greece imposed on textile imports from state-trading 
countries, she was not required to alter her own existing 
system; she could retain it but without recourse to any 
deliberalization measures . 1 1 0
F . A General View of the Commercial- 
Relations Dossier
Although immersed in highly technical discussions
concerning transitional arrangements for Greece's adoption
of the acquis communautaire in this field, the negotiations
were shaped by certain wider considerations which were
ultimately responsible for the conduct of the bargaining
process.
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From a Community perspective, the entry of Greece 
was bound to affect the Community’s commercial relations 
with third countries through its impact on the trade in­
terests of the latter. Two opposite forces were at play 
in this instance, magnified by the prospective entry of 
the Iberian candidates: enlargement would extend the 
preference area for the exports of developing countries 
but would also lead to an erosion of their preferences 
in Community markets due to greater competition from Greece 
and the other entrants. Regardless of the relative strength 
of these forces, which in any case would apply differently 
to different groups of countries and products , 1 1 1 the 
fact remained that enlargement would inevitably lead to 
compensatory demands by the third countries concerned 
and to substantive revisions of Community contractual 
arrangements. Seen in this light, the Greek negotiations 
may have been conducted on the basis of the existing acquis 
communautaire, but the Community approach to them was 
also influenced by such dynamic considerations.
From a Greek perspective, accession was expected 
to reduce the protection of the domestic market from third- 
country imports. This effect of accession was quite se­
parate from that of the association: the liberalization 
of Greece’s trade would now go beyond alignment on the 
CCT and involve the adoption of the whole spectrum of 
Community preferences, reducing even further the protection 
enjoyed by the Greek economy, and adding new strains on 
a trade balance persistently in deficit; and while the
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conclusion of Community preferential agreements by other 
countries had eroded in the past Greece’s association 
preferences, it was the application of these agreements 
by Greece in the context of her accession that would now 
expose her economy to further competition from third 
countri e s . 1 1 2
The above considerations apply to the trade-1iber- 
alization aspects of the Community’s external commercial 
relations; but they may have to be qualified in the case 
of protected Community sectors such as textiles (and agri­
culture), where Community commercial policy operates in 
the opposite direction. On the other hand, while the two 
sides shared the same overall policy outlook vis-a-vis 
third-country textile imports, it was not clear to what 
extent the adoption of the Community regime would lead 
to greater protection for the Greek textile industry. 
Furthermore, given that her textile exports were primarily 
directed towards the Community, Greece was more concerned 
with the possibility that the general safeguard clause
allowed for the imposition of intra-Community restrictions
113during her transitional period.
Looking at the dossier of external commercial 
relations as a whole, the conflict between protection 
and liberalization (and between more or less protection) 
might have affected the conduct of the negotiations to 
a lesser extent than that suggested by the above analysis. 
Given the essentially political motivation behind the 
Community’s external policy, it seems reasonable to argue
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that Greece’s prospective change of status from an as­
sociate to a full member altered her perception of pro­
tection: quite apart from economic considerations, pro­
tection involved a higher political cost than before, 
with repercussions on her future relations with third 
countries. It was this implicit convergence of views that 
probably reduced the negotiating gap separating the two 
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as the value and quantity of imports and exports 
of Greece (1976) broken down by country and group 
of countries. Furthermore, two additional lists 
(Annexes I Id and 11 Id of MEMO-GR/4/78) contained 
production and employment data on the products listed, 
respectively, in Annexes Ila, lib, lie and Ilia,
Illb, IIIc (see MEMO-GR/4/78, p. 1). The above lists 
were subsequently replaced by a series of tables 
annexed to MEMO-GR/5/78, thereby distinguishing, 
apart from state-trading-countries' imports, between 
imports from nonpreferential GATT countries and im­
ports from preferential countries. With respect to 
nonpreferential GATT countries, the Greek delegation 
submitted table A.I.l (products liberalized by the 
Community and Greece), table A.1.2 (products liberal­
ized by the Community and restricted by Greece), 
table A.II (products not liberalized by the Community 
and liberalized by Greece), and table A.Ill (products 
not liberalized by the Community or by Greece). 
Following the same breakdown, the Greek delegation 
submitted tables B.I.l, B.I.2, B.II, and B.III with 
respect to state-trading countries. With respect 
to preferential countries, the Greek delegation 
submitted table C.l (products liberalized by Greece) 
and table C.2 (products not liberalized by Greece). 
Thus, the previous list of Annex Ila was replaced 
by tables A.I.l, A.I.2 and C.l, C.2, while the previ­
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wanted to retain for a transitional period (see also 
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trading countries, principle (1 ) was extended so 
that products with transitional quantitative re­
strictions vis-^-vis GATT members but not vis-3-vis 
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tative restrictions of at least equal length vis- 
a-vis state-trading countries, even if liberalized 
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CONF-GR/26/78, p. 13; CQ.NF-GR/27/78, p. 11;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 10. Principle (5) in 
section A was reformulated to state that the annual 
rate of liberalization should proceed in a progressive 
and substantial manner towards full liberalization 
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transitional period (CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 10, 13). 
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CONF-GR/72/78) and to product 85.01 (this was on 
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that Greece could retain quantitative restrictions 
with respect to imports from preferential countries; 
the other two products of this list are already 
among the six products of Annex III above). Some 
of the fourteen products of Annex II were also in­
cluded in the Community common liberalization list; 
thus, for these products, together with the six 
products of Annex III above, there was a need to 
provide for temporary exclusion from the application 
of the Community common liberalization list with 
respect to nonpreferential GATT countries. See 
CONF-GR/72/78, p. 2; MEMO-GR/13/78, pp. 1-2;
CONF-GR/18/79, Annex I, p. 17. In the agreement 
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listed in Annex II of the same document (’’the Com­
munity list”), the six products listed in Annex III 
of the same document (”the GATT list”), and product 
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which also appeared in the common liberalization 
list. See CONF-GR/72/78, pp. 2-3; MEMO-GR/13/78, 
p. 2; CONF-GR/18/79, Annex I, p. 17. (The textile 
product ex 58.01, which was in the common liberal­
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cluded in these temporary derogations. See 
CONF-GR/73/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/78/78, Annex I;
MEMO-GR/14/78, p. 1.) It was agreed that these tempo­
rary derogations, listed in annex 2 of Annex I of 
CONF-GR/24/79, would be for a transitional period 
of five years (CONF-GR/97/78, p. 9; MEMO-GR/18/78, 
p. 6 ; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 5).
29 CONF-GR/11/79, p. 4; CONF-GR/18/79, Annex I, p. 17.
For the criteria that follow see CONF-GR/26/78,
pp. 10, 13; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 9, 11; CONF-GR/30/78,
Annex I, pp. 8-10 & Corrigendum 1, p. l; CONF-GR/24/79, 
Annex I, pp. 19-20, 25; Act of Accession, art. 115, 
par. 1 .
30 This was derived from the more general, previously 
agreed criterion that for products for which no quotas 
for imports into Greece existed at that point in
the negotiations the basic quotas could be calulated
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as a percentage of Greek production. See MEMO-GR/8/77, 
p. 6 ; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 10; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 9, 11;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, pp. 8 , 10.
31 With the exception of fertilizers.
32 These are listed in annex 1 of Annex I of CONF-GR/24/79 
with respect to products in the common liberalization 
list vis-a-vis nonpreferential GATT counries, and
in annex 2 , ibid., with respect to products in the 
common liberalization list vis-a-vis state-trading 
countries (they are also listed in annex V of the 
Act of Accession). See also CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
p. 2 1 .
33 Act of Accession, art. 115, par. 1. See also 
MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, pp. 21-22.
34 MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 11, 14;
CONF-GR/32/78, p. 7.
35 MEMO-GR/4/78, p. 1; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 10-11;
CONF-GR/47/78, p. 1; CONF-GR/48/78, Annex I, p. 4.
36 MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/16/78, p. 6 .
37 CONF-GR/16/78, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 19;
CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10.
38 CONF-GR/17/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/21/78, Annex I, p. 5; 
CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 11, 14; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, 
pp. 9, 11. Strangely enough, in spite of final 
agreement on this point at ministerial level, the 
Greek delegation returned to the cumbersome idea 
of a hypothetical list by submitting table A.Ill 
annexed to MEMO-GR/5/78 (see also ibid., p. 2), only 
to be confronted once more with what was already 
agreed. See CONF-GR/32/78, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/33/78, p. 7; 
CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 3.
39 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 11, 14; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 10, 11;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, pp. 9, 11; Act of Accession,
art. 115, pars. 2, 3. Agreement thus ensured that 
two previously agreed conditions were respected:
(a) Greece should not grant more favourable treat­
ment to third countries, in the form of transi­
tional measures, than to Community member states;
(b) adoption of the common liberalization list with 
respect to state-trading countries should be coordi­
nated with adoption of the common liberalization 
list with respect to nonpreferential GATT countries, 
so as to avoid Greece’s granting more favourable 
transitional measures to state-trading countries 
than to nonpreferential GATT countries. See 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, p. 23. The products in
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question and their respective basic quotas are listed 
in annex 3 of Annex I of CONF-GR/24/79 (product 
ex 73.18,tubes & pipes, was liberalized by the Com­
munity vis-a-vis GATT but not vis-a-vis state-trading 
countries); see also ibid., Annex I, p. 21. The basic 
quotas established follow a 4:1 ratio between GATT 
countries and state-trading countries. Annex 3 above 
appears in the Act of Accession as annex VI.
40 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 11, 14; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 10;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, PP. 9, 11; CONF-GR/24/79,
Annex I, pp. 23-24; Act of Accession, art. 115, 
par. 2 .
41 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 14;
CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10; Act of Accession, art. 118,
par. 3.
42 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 3; MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/26/78, 
pp. 7, 19; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10; Act of Accession,
art. 118, par. 4.
43 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 7; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 5;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 5; Act of Accession, 
art. 118, pars. 3, 4.
44 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 3; MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 4.
45 This category included TLA products.
46 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10.
47 CONF-GR/27/78, p. 15.
48 CONF-GR/33/78, pp. 8-9; CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 4.
49 Following various modifications, the Greek proposals 
related to thirteen products. See MEMO-GR/8/78 
(table II lists these products).
50 CONF-GR/72/78, pp. 3-4 & Annex V; CONF-GR/11/79, 
p. 3.
51 MEMO-GR/13/78, p. 3.
52 Ibid., p. 4. This point applies equally to the Greek 
proposals below with respect to products not liber­
alized by Greece.
53 CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, pp. 11-12.
54 CONF-GR/11/79, p. 3; CONF-GR/12/79, p. 3;
CONF-GR/18/79, Annex I, p. 16. The agreed list of 
products and countries appears in Annex II of 
CONF-GR/11/79 (it reappeared as annex VI of Annex I 
of CONF-GR/18/79). A technical point related to the
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above issue should be noted. Three of the products 
included in the Greek proposals benefitted or had 
benefitted, vis-a-vis the Community, from the facility 
of article 18 of the Association Agreement relating 
to infant-industry products (namely, insecticides, 
polystyrene & polyvinyl chloride, and tyres). For 
these products (which, as negotiated, would follow 
the twenty-two-year-1 ist timetable vis-&-vis the 
Community) it was agreed to apply the twenty-two- 
year-list timetable,instead of indicative tariff 
ceilings, vis-^-vis the preferential countries. (These 
products were accordingly excluded from Annex II 
Of CONF-GR/11/79.) See CONF-GR/11/79, p. 3;
CONF-GR/12/79, p. 3; CONF-GR/18/79, Annex I, p. 16.
55 MEMO-GR/l/77, pp. 7, 9; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 18; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 14; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10;
Act of Accession, art. 118, par. 3.
56 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 19; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10.
57 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 11; MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 7;
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 14; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10.
58 The Greek delegation agreed with the Community’s 
cautiously worded compromise proposal (CONF-GR/33/78, 
pp. 8-9; CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 4); but in re­
iterating its agreement at a later point in the ne­
gotiations, it gave a different interpretation to 
the Community statement--that Greece ’’should” main­
tain quantitative restrictions beyond those relating 
to the fourteen-product list (see CONF-GR/47/78, 
Addendum 1>.
59 MEMO-GR/8/78 (table III lists the Greek proposals).
60 CONF-GR/72/78, p. 1.
61 CONF-GR/72/78, p. 1 & Annex I. Agreement was later
extended to cover also the specific preferential 
countries included in the Greek proposals. See annex IV 
of Annex I of CONF-GR/18/79, and ibid., Annex I,
p. 16.
62 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 19; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 14;
CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10.
63 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 15; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 11;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 12; Act of Accession, 
art. 116. This point applies equally to EEC and ECSC 
products (CONF-GR/28/78, p. 19; CONF-GR/29/78, p. 13).
64 CONF-GR/1 1/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 15;
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 11; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 12.
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65 CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 11-12; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex II,
p. 7; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/33/78, pp. 7-8;
CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 4.
6 6  MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 7; CONF-GR/11/ll, p. 4; CONF-GR/16/77, 
p. 5; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 15; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 12; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 12 & Corrigendum 1, p. 1.
67 MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/4/77, p. 2; CONF-GR/11/77, 
p. 5; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 15;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 15.
6 8  These estimates are calculated on the basis of OECD 
statistics; they are taken from Tsoukalis, European 
Community and Mediterranean Enlargement, p. 37, and 
Mitsos et a l ., Prosch6 r§sfe stis Europaikes Koinot£tes. 
P. 161.
69 MEMO-GR/l/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/4/77, p. 2;
CONF-GR/11/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2.
70 MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 5; MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 2.
71 MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 3.
72 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 7.
73 Ibid.; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 17. Greece's cooperation 
agreements with state-trading countries posed no 
problems; but Greece had to ensure that any new 
such agreement signed prior to accession excluded 
any commercial-policy provisions. See CONF-GR/11/ll, 
p. 8 ; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2.
74 CONF-GR/16/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 15;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 15.
75 Economic and Social Committee, Relations between 
the Community and Greece, p. 35.
76 MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/4/77, p. 3.
77 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2.
78 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2. As in the 
case of state-trading countries, it was noted that 
cooperation agreements with other third countries 
would raise no difficulties as long as they did not 
include any provisions of commercial policy
(CONF-GR/11/77, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 2).
79 Following a parallel treatment in the negotiations, 
the analysis of the present section applies equally 
to EEC and ECSC agreements. For the particular case 
of ECSC agreements see CONF-GR/17/77, pp. 5-6;
257
CONF-GR/25/77, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/58/77, p. 7;
CONF-GR/28/78, pp. 3-4; CONF-GR/29/78, pp. 2-4; 
CONF-GR/34/78, p. 10; CONF-GR/35/78, p. 7;
CONF-GR/89/78, p. 3.
80 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 9; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 4;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, pp. 3-4. In the case of the 
Lom£ Convention, what was to be examined was Greece's 
application of the new Convention to be concluded 
before accession and not of the existing Convention 
(signed on 28 February 1975), since it was to expire 
on 1 March 1980. (The new Convention was to apply 
also in the case of agricultural products with the 
exception of sugar, for which protocol 3 of the 
existing Convention u?ould apply. Similarly, it was 
the new Agreement on products within the province 
of the ECSC that had to be considered. See 
CONF-GR/28/78, p. 4; CONF-GR/29/78, p. 3; Act of 
Accession, art. 121.) This examination would establish 
negotiation directives for a transitional protocol 
between Greece and the ACP countries in the framework 
of the new Convention. See CONF-GR/16/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/21/78, Annex I, p. 3; CONF-GR/26/78, p. 8 ;
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 7;
CONF-GR/89/78, p. 3; Act of Accession, arts. 121, 122.
81 For the initial negotiating position of the Greek 
side on this point, see CONF-GR/6/76, p. 3; 
MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 7; CONF-GR/4/77, p. 3; CONF-GR/20/77, 
P. 4.
82 CONF-GR/11/77, p. 9; CONF-GR/16/77, p. 4; 
CONF-GR/26/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/27/78, p. 4; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, pp. 3-5. Apart from the Lom6 
Convention, there is a total of nineteen preferential 
agreements which are listed in article 1 2 0 of the 
Act of Accession. Article 120 provides that the 
arrangements under consideration (specified in arts. 
118 and 119) should also apply to Community prefer­
ential agreements with other Mediterranean countries 
concluded before accession.
83 For an analysis of the legal aspects of this situation 
see Yataganas, "Legal Problems," pp. 353-55.
84 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 5-6; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I,
pp. 4-5; Act of Accession, arts. 118, par. 4, and 119.
85 With the exception of the ACP states, given that 
the transitional protocol would be negotiated in 
the framework of the new Convention.
8 6 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 5-7; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 4-5;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, pp. 4-5; Act of Accession, 
art. 118, par. 2; Final Act, joint declaration
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concerning protocols to be concluded with certain 
thiird countries according to article 118. Separate 
negotiating directives would have to be established 
for protocols with respect to ECSC agreements with 
third countries. It was within this procedure that 
specific arrangements relating to ECSC products 
would have to be concluded--as, for example, the 
progressive abolition of customs duties and equivalent 
measures on ECSC imports and the immediate abolition 
of the EFTA countries’ quantitative restrictions 
on their ECSC imports from Greece (on the last point 
see CONF-GR/17/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/25/77, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/58/77, pp. 7-8; CONF-GR/28/78, p. 19;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 25).
87 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 5.
8 8  CONF-GR/27/78, p. 4; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, 
pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/33/78, pp. 4, 8-9.
89 CONF-GR/32/78, p. 4; CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 2;
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, p. 13. See also Final Act,
joint declaration concerning protocols to be concluded 
with certain third countries according to article 118; 
and information and consultation procedure for the 
adoption of certain decisions.
90 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 7-8; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 5-6; ,
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 6 ; Final Act, in 1979
Documents of Accession, p. 186. In connection with 
this point, the Greek delegation had requested, but 
without success, the provision in the accession 
instruments of a special consultations procedure 
between the Community and Greece in order to determine 
the new transitional arrangements between Greece
and, respectively, Portugal and Spain, should their 
accession take place during Greece’s interim period.
The Community rejected this request, establishing 
that the consultations procedure between Greece and 
the Community envisaged for the interim period would 
equally apply to questions related to the accession 
negotiations with Portugal and Spain. See CONF-GR/27/78, 
p. 6 ; CONF-GR/29/78, pp. 3-4; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, 
p. 6 ; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/33/78, pp. 4-5; 
CONF-GR/34/78, p. 10; CONF-GR/35/78, p. 7;
CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 2.
91 The question of Greek customs duties and equvalent 
measures on ECSC imports from preferential countries 
was resolved in a manner that parallelled the solution 
agreed with respect to EEC twenty-two-year-1ist 
products. The Greek delegation made an initial dis­
tinction between EFTA countries and all other prefer­
ential countries (Maghreb, Mashreq, Israel, Turkey, 
and the Lome Convention). It was willing to have 
Greek customs duties on ECSC imports from EFTA
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abolished gradually with the same transitional period 
(five years) and the same rate and timetable of tariff 
dismantling as in the case of the progressive abo­
lition of Greek residual import duties vis-&-vis 
the EEC; but in the case of all other preferential 
countries, it wanted to have the Greek duties 
abolished at one stroke at the end of the five-year 
transitional period (at a later stage in the negoti­
ations, it proposed to abolish them within the last 
two years of the five-year transitional period).
As in the case of EEC products, the Community objected 
to such a distinction, insisting that all preferential 
countries should be accorded the same progressive 
treatment, i.e. that which Greece had initially re­
served for EFTA countries only. This position was 
finally accepted by the Greek delegation. At the 
same time it was recognized that countries whose 
preferential agreements involved reciprocal con­
cessions (i.e., Israel and the EFTA countries, except 
Iceland) would have to abolish customs duties and 
equivalent measures vis-a-vis Greece along the same 
terms. (In the case of Israel, however, the reciprocal 
arrangements had to ensure in addition that Greece 
does not end up being treated more favourably than 
the rest of the Community.) See CONF-GR/17/77, p. 6 ; 
CONF-GR/25/77, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/58/77, pp. 7-8;
CONF-GR/28/78, pp. 3, 18-19; CONF-GR/29/78, p. 12;
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 25; CONF-GR/34/78, p. 9; 
CONF-GR/35/78, p. 7; CONF-GR/37/78, Annex I, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/42/78, p. 3.
92 MEMO-GR/l/77, pp. 8-9; CONF-GR/11/77, pp. 10-11; 
CONF-GR/16/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/17/78, p. 2. The 
initial list of the Greek proposals with respect 
to imports of sensitive products from the EFTA and 
Mediterranean & Lom£ countries appears in MEMO-GR/l/77, 
pp. 10-12. With certain changes in the products listed, 
the Greek proposals with respect to the EFTA countries 
reappear in Annexes IVa, IVb, IVc of MEMO-GR/8/77 
together with relevant data. (See also MEMO-GR/l/77, 
pp. 8-9; MEMO-GR/8/77, p. 7.)
93 CONF-GR/11/77, pp. 2, 10-11; CONF-GR/16/78, p. 4.
94 CONF-GR/20/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/47/78, p. 3; Act of 
Accession, art. 118, par. 2. See also the discussion 
concerning the alignment on the CCT in chapter IV, 
section C, above.
95 CONF-GR/26/78, pp. 16-17; CONF-GR/97/78, p. 9.
96 CONF-GR/26/78, p. 17; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 9. The 
question of the duties imposed by the preferential 
partners on their imports from Greece did not pose 
any difficulties: on the basis of reciprocity, the 







provisions of the respective agreements in full from 
the date of accession (see CONF-GR/26/78, p. 17; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 13 & Corrigendum 1, p. 1).
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 13; MEMO-GR/18/78, p. 6 ; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 13; CONF-GR/111/78, 
Annex I, p. 5.
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 13; CONF-GR/33/78, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/12/79, pp. 1-2; MEMO-GR/1/79, p. 4.
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 13; CONF-GR/33/78, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/47/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/12/79, p. 1; 
MEMO-GR/1/79, pp. 4, 8 .
CONF-GR/32/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/33/78, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, pp. 11-12.
The agreement reached with respect to the tariff 
provisions of the Community’s preferential agreements 
generally parallels the agreement reached in con­
nection with the application of the Community system 
of generalized preferences. Greece initially wanted 
to apply the Community general-preferences system 
from the beginning of the third year after accession 
(in the case of ECSC products, the initial request 
was for a three-year transitional period, later 
synchronized to coincide with the proposal on EEC 
products). In the Community’s view, however, this 
would raise problems if accepted, since for two years 
after accession imports into Greece from the countries 
benefitting from the Community generalized-preferences 
scheme would have been subject to import duties higher 
than those applicable to imports into Greece from 
countries in a comparable economic situation having 
preferential agreements with the Community. In the 
agreement finally reached, following an unsuccessful 
counterargument by the Greek delegation, Greece 
was to apply the Community system of generalized 
preferences with respect to industrial products 
from the date of accession, except for the twenty-two 
year-1ist EEC products and ECSC products (as listed 
in annex VII, section II, of the Act of Accession), 
which would follow the transitional measures es­
tablished for them in connection with the Community’s 
preferential agreements. (Agreement thus required 
that Greece fully applied from the date of accession 
the tariff provisions of the Community’s general- 
preferences scheme with respect to the twelve-year- 
list products.) On the other hand, technical adap­
tations relating to quotas and ceilings would be 
made in the last year before Greek accession and 
would be based on the Community's generalized-prefer­
ences scheme to be worked out at that time. The as ­
sumption behind the agreement on the application
261
102
of the Community generalized-preferences scheme was 
that the scheme to emerge after 1980 would be in 
general lines similar to the existing one. See 
MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 9; CONF-GR/11/ll, pp. 11-12;
CONF-GR/17/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/25/77, p. 8 ; 
CONF-GR/26/78, p. 20; CONF-GR/27/78, pp. 13-15; 
CONF-GR/28/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/29/78, p. 12; 
CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 15; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 10; 
CONF-GR/33/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/35/78, p. 7;
CONF-GR/41/78, p. 4; CONF-GR/72/78, p. 4; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, p. 12; Act of Accession, 
art. 117, par. 1.
MEMO-GR/4/78, pp. 3-4; CONF-GR/32/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/58/78, pp. 2-4; CONF-GR/59/78, pp. 1-2; 
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 1. As already noted in 
connection with the development of the Greek pro­
posals for transitional quantitative restrictions 
on imports from third countries, the non-MFA textile 
products and non-low-cost countries were initially 
included in the Greek proposals in Annexes Ila, lib, 
and Ilia, Illb of MEMO-GR/8/77 together with all 
other industrial products. They were then presented 
separately in Annex la of MEMO-GR/4/78, which includes 
statistical data on the import regime of EEC and 
Greece and on imports and exports of Greece in 1976; 
an additional Annex, lb, is also included in 
MEMO-GR/4/78, containing corresponding economic data 
on production and employment. Annexes la, lb cover 
the initial Greek proposals on textiles with respect 
to all categories distinguished under section B of 
the present chapter. The conclusions reached in the 
negotiations are as follows: (a) the principle of 
nondeliberalization would apply to textile products 
and clothing liberalized or subject to TLA by Greece, 
together with the other conclusions reached with 
respect to TLA products in general (CONF-GR/32/78, 
p. 3; CONF-GR/58/78, pp. 3-4; CONF-GR/59/78, p. 2; 
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 1); (b) with respect to
the Greek proposals dealing specifically with textile 
products subject to TLA by Greece, it was agreed 
that these products could be retained under a TLA 
system for a transitional period, provided that the 
system was genuine (CONF-GR/59/78, p. 2 & table I; 
CONF-GR/73/78, p. 1; CONF-GR/78/78, Annex I;
MEMO-GR/14/78, p. 1); (c) with respect to textile
products and clothing included in the two common 
liberalization lists and restricted by Greece, it 
was agreed that they should be liberalized upon 
accession (CONF-GR/58/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/59/78, p. 1; 
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 1); (d) with respect to
textile & clothing products under Community prefer­
ential agreements, the argumentation applied in re­
lation to industrial products in general was extended 









MEMO-GR/l/77, p. 9; CONF-GR/4/77, p. 4;
CONF-GR/11/77, p. 12; MEMO-GR/4/78, p. 3; 
CONF-GR/27/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/30/78, Annex I, p. 3; 
CONF-GR/59/78, p. 2; Act of Accession, art. 123, 
par. l. Since the Multi fibre Arrangement was concluded 
by the Community as such, Greece would not herself 
accede to it as a contracting party (CONF-GR/27/78, 
p. 3; CONF-GR/58/78, p. 4; CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, 
p. 2 ) .
CONF-GR/11/77, p. 12; MEMO-GR/4/78, p. 3; 
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 2; Act of Accession, 
art. 123, par. 1. There were twenty-three bilateral 
MFA agreements at the time of the negotiations, con­
cluded for a period of five years and terminating at 
the end of 1982.
CONF-GR/11/77, p. 12; CONF-GR/58/78, p. 5; 
CONF-GR/59/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, 
pp. 2-3; Act of Accession, art. 123.
CONF-GR/58/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/59/78, p. 2; 






pp. 11-12. The 
in list II annexed 
was considered too






I, p. 3; CONF-GR/72/78, p. 4; 
MEMO-GR/13/78, pp. 3-4;
CONF-GR/12/79, p. 3;
I, p. 16; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
specific Greek proposals were presented 
to CONF-GR/59/78. The Greek list 
long, containing high-cost products
from high-cost countries; it was accordingly agreed 
that Greece should limit it, on the basis of a techni­
cal examination by Greek and Commission experts, 
to low-cost categories (CONF-GR/72/78, p. 4;
CONF-GR/78/78, p. 2; MEMO-GR/13/78, p. 3>. The revised 
list of Greek proposals appears in a table annexed 
to CONF-GR/92/78. The list on which agreement was 
finally reached appears as Annex I of CONF-GR/11/79 
and again as annex V of Annex I of CONF-GR/18/79.
And Taiwan. Excluded from this group of countries 
were those state-trading countries which had concluded 
bilateral MFA agreements with the Community--Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania (at the time agreement was reached 
in the negotiations). See CONF-GR/58/78, p. 6 ; 
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 3; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
p. 26.
CONF-GR/11/77, p. 12; MEMO-GR/4/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/16/78, p. 7; CONF-GR/58/78, p. 6 ;
CONF-GR/59/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 3;
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, p. 26. The categories of 
products involved appear in annex A of Annex I of 
CONF-GR/24/79.
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110 CONF-GR/58/78, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/59/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/68/78, Annex I, p. 3.
111 For an attempt at a provisional assessment see
G. N. Yannopoulos, "The Second Enlargement of the 
EEC and the Trade Interests of the Developing 
Countries," Revue d * integration europfeenne 4 
(Winter 1981):167-86. In the Commission’s view, the 
adverse effects of enlargement would mainly be ex­
perienced by the Mediterranean associates, while 
the positive effects would tend to predominate in 
the ACP countries. However, the Commission’s optimism 
in the latter case does not seem to be justified; 
on this point see Brian Bayliss, "African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Countries (ACP)," in Second Enlargement 
of the EEC, ed. Seers and Vaitsos, pp. 216-24.
112 This last point is further examined by Mitsos, 
"Hell£nik£ Biomechania kai E O K ," p. 41.
113 Community restrictions had been imposed on Greek 
textile exports in the context of the association. 
Within the new framework of membership, it was France 
that made use of the general safeguard clause for 
the first time, obtaining in October 1981 permission 
to restrict certain textile imports from Greece.
CHAPTER VI
AGRICULTURE
A . General Considerations
1. The Importance of Agriculture 
The subject of agriculture held unquestionably a 
central position in the conduct of the negotiations--a 
reflection, in the first instance, of the importance of 
agriculture in the Greek economy. An overall assessment 
of this importance is thus indispensable as a background 
of the analysis of the negotiations that follows.
An examination of the situation as it stood at 
the time of the negotiations reveals that the agricultural 
sector was relatively more important in the Greek economy 
than in the Community of Nine . 1 Greece had a larger share 
of the labour force employed in agriculture (28.8% vs.
8.7% for the Community), a greater percentage contribution 
of agriculture to GNP (17.2% vs. 4.4%), a larger share 
of agricultural products in total exports (34.0% vs. 7.7%), 
and a smaller share in total imports (1 0 .0 % vs. 2 0 .8 %).
The share of Greek labour employed in agriculture 
was perhaps the most sensitive among these figures, a 
vivid indication of the morphological gap separating the 
Greek from the Community economy. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Greek efforts to examine more critically 
the reliability of the relevant statistics coincided with
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the accession negotiations and received considerable
publicity in the press, in Conference proceedings, and
2
in academic works. Based on data from the 1971 Census, 
the previously held estimate for the size of Greece's 
active agricultural labour force was in the neighborhood 
of 35%, placing Greece in quite a separate category from 
the rest of the Community. However, the national statistics 
from which this figure was derived depended on a definition 
of active agricultural employment with a much lower thresh­
old level of activity than that employed by the Community 
to calculate the corresponding member-states' shares.
By correcting this overestimation, the actual Greek share
3
was reduced to 28.8% for the 1977-78 period. The revised 
figure may have not changed the essential nature of the 
problem but brought Greece much closer to the range of 
existing member-state variations (Ireland’s share, 24.5%, 
was the highest).
In spite of recent improvements in structures and 
gains in productivity (with a narrowing of the productivity 
gap vis-a-vis the Community), Greek agriculture was, and 
to a large extent still is, characterized by certain weak­
nesses, aggravated by unfavourable physical conditions-- 
farm fragmentation, aged farming population, and factor 
inflexibility in adapting to changing market conditions.
The characteristics of Greek agricultural pro­
duction which served as the starting point of the debate 
were its complementarity with respect to Community agri­
culture, with vegetable products being relatively more
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important in the case of Greece as opposed to animal pro­
duce for the Community, and its Mediterranean profile-- 
with products such as fruit & vegetables, wine, tobacco, 
olive oil, cotton, sheepmeat, and goatmeat accounting 
at the time of the negotiations for 47% of total Greek 
agricultural production as opposed to the Community average 
of 18%. In a number of products (barley, sugar, potatoes, 
pigmeat, eggs, poultrymeat, and fish) Greece was almost 
self-sufficient, while in others (such as fodder grains, 
milk, beef, and veal, which accounted for a large share of 
her imports) the opposite held. On the other hand, certain 
Mediterranean products (cotton, tobacco, wine, wheat, and 
certain fruit & vegetables such as tomatoes and peaches) 
were in excess of domestic demand and, together with 
processed fruit & vegetables, accounted for the bulk 
of Greece's agricultural exports, which were primarily 
absorbed by the Community markets (exports to the Community 
amounted to approximately half of her total agricultural 
exports in 1977; the corresponding figure for imports was 
one-fourth of the total). Among these products, problems 
of competition were expected to arise in those cases where 
Community production was also in surplus--especially wine 
and certain fruit & vegetables, such as peaches and tomatoes.
In addition to the above considerations, the pro­
minence of agriculture derived also from the fact that 
its negotiating dossier corresponded to the most developed 
sector of Community policy (approximately half of the 
texts published in the Official Journal deal with the CAP).
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On the other hand, the limited implementation of the As­
sociation Agreement in the field of agriculture magnified 
further Greece’s task of adopting the relevant acquis 
communautaire and modifying accordingly her existing po­
licies. But apart from these intrinsic complexities, the 
pivotal negotiating role of agriculture rested on its 
connecting links with broader issues that transcended 
the confines of its subject matter--such as the overall 
length of the transitional period, the overall balance 
and reciprocity of advantages between the two parties, 
and the budgetary implications of accession.
The awareness of the consequences that the terms 
negotiated would have for both Greek and Community regions 
made agriculture a highly politicized chapter in the nego­
tiations. It is this political sensitivity that could ex­
plain why highly technical agricultural questions of sec­
ondary Community legislation, which otherwise would have 
been expected to be resolved at expert or at the most at 
deputy level, were ’’upgraded” and surfaced at the min­
isterial level. In this sense, the examination of second­
ary Community legislation in the field of agriculture was, 
perhaps more than in any other sector, crucial in identi­
fying substantive problems whose solution required the po­
litical will for a consensus at ministerial level.
Although there was clearly a consensus on the 
central importance of agriculture as a negotiating dossier, 
the views of the two sides diverged when it came to the 
question of the size of the problems associated with Greek
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agriculture in a Community context. This divergence re­
flected not only differences of position between the Greek 
and Community delegations but also changes in negotiating 
tactics within the Greek position.
On the Greek side, an attempt was made to present
the small size of the Greek agricultural sector as an
argument in support of the position that the problem of
Greek agriculture was small in magnitude when seen in
a Community context, and hence the Greek requests would
create only minor difficulties to the Community (using
1974 figures, Greece’s agricultural GDP was seen to be
only 6 % approximately of the Community's agricultural
GDP). It is interesting to note that this argument was
initially put forth by Foreign Minister Papaligouras in
a
the opening stage of the negotiations but had to be taken 
up and reiterated by his successor, George Rail is, at 
an advanced stage in the negotiations to counter as un-
5justified the "fears being expressed” by member states.
Not surprisingly, as the negotiations approached their 
conclusion, the imminence of Greek accession and the re­
lated apprehension of increased Greek competition in Com­
munity agricultural markets placed Greece’s argument 
on the size of her agricultural problem in a different 
perspective.
On the Community side, there were obvious economic 
and political reasons in underlining as much as possible 
the "profound" and "all-embracing" consequences that Greek 
accession would have for the Community’s agriculture,
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especially for its existing Mediterranean regions:6 the 
initial magnitudes involved might be small, but the appli­
cation of the CAP mechanisms to Greece could increase 
production of sensitive products (such as certain fruit & 
vegetables, olive oil, and wine) and lead to even greater 
competition in Community markets ;7 on the other hand, 
problems that might be deemed marginal in the isolated 
case of Greece were bound to assume considerable pro­
portions in a Community of Twelve.
The divergence of views on Greece's agricultural 
problem was not limited to questions of magnitude but 
extended to matters involving the quality and adequacy 
of the existing agricultural infrastructure. While the 
Community maintained that Greece was faced with a number 
of structural weaknesses in the agricultural sector, Greece 
argued that there were practically no such functional
O
problems of mechanisms and infrastructures. However, 
what clearly emerged as the negotiations advanced was 
the superficial nature of this disagreement. For what 
was really at stake at the time it surfaced was the length 
of the transitional period in the agricultural sector; 
and in this connection, Greece’s assessment of its struc­
tural weaknesses was to a large extent a tactical move 
to secure shorter transitional periods in the agricultural
9
sector. As the particular negotiating issue of the length 
of the transitional period was resolved towards the end 
of the negotiations, the Greek side was quick to reverse 
its argument and align it with its request for special
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Community measures to deal with the very real problem
of Greek regions suffering from acute structural weak- 
10nesses.
The ease with which the Greek delegation was ready 
to adjust and even reverse its line of argumentation re­
veals that its overriding criterion was the speed of con­
duct of the negotiations. It is difficult to imagine, 
however, how the Government could have exercised such 
a high degree of freedom if it were not for the fact that 
the biggest and most important organization of farmers, 
the Panhellenic Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives 
(PASEGES), was consistently in favour of membership. More 
than in any other sector, such concern with speed was 
justified in the present case. For the agricultural sector 
was the linchpin of the negotiations, and progress in 
it affected decisively the advance of the negotiations 
as a whole. Following the presentation of the initial 
positions and preliminary remarks by both sides, it gradu­
ally became evident that progress in the agricultural 
sector would develop into a thorny affair. More than a 
year and a half after the formal opening of the negoti­
ations no real progress was registered, the agricultural 
dossier remaining effectively closed, with each side 
waiting for the other side’s elaborations of its initial 
position in order to further develop its own . 11 This situ­
ation was not being helped by the slow rate of progress 
in the technical examination of Community secondary legis- 
lati on.
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Two general issues exerted inertia on the pace 
of the negotiations: an attempt by the Community, following 
pressures from France and Italy, to make progress in the 
agricultural dossier conditional to the discussions on 
the developement of the Mediterranean dimension of the 
Community’s agricultural policy; and the prolonged debate 
on whether or not precedence should be given to a general 
discussion of the broader problems raised in the agricul­
tural dossier over a detailed product-by-product analysis.
Stemming from French and Italian fears that enlarge­
ment would hurt farmers of Mediterranean products at home, 
the Community's attempt to link progress in the agri­
cultural dossier with developments in the CAP could have 
easily resulted in the prolongation of the negotiations 
and the subordination of Greek agricultural problems under 
the much broader issue of Mediterranean agricultural po­
licy. In steering the negotiations towards this direction, 
the Community delegation made use of Papaligouras’ opening 
statement that Greece's acceptance of the acquis commu- 
nautaire covered its developments up to the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Accession. With this negotiating 
principle as its basic premise, the Community brought 
into play the prospective developments in its policies,
pointing out that some of them could be finalized before
^  . 1 2  Greek accession.
The potential danger of such an approach for the 
ultimate fate of the Greek requests in the agricultural 
sector could hardly be overestimated. By transforming
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accession into a moving target, it could eventually have
resulted in the removal of the substantive aspects of
many Greek requests from the negotiating table and their
referral to the consultations procedure of the interim
period. In countering the Community position, the Greek
side, in line with its general position on this matter,
insisted that there should be a consultations procedure
in respect of the proposed changes prior to the signing
of the instruments of Accession, arguing that the reforms
contemplated went beyond the confines of limited amendments
of the acquis communautaire and amounted to a virtual
overhaul of an entire field of Community policy affecting
13sensitive Greek products; such a consultations procedure 
would enable Greece to have a voice and participate to 
some extent in the development of these policies. It is 
hardly surprising that the Community rejected this request, 
specifying that the consultations procedure would become 
effective only after the signing of the instruments of 
accession: a similar demand during the negotiations of 
the previous enlargement had the same fate, the argument 
being that it would compromise the Community’s freedom 
of decision. This, of course, did not mean that Greece 
would not be regularly briefed on Community developments 
and that she would not be free to make observations. At 
the same time the Greek delegation was assured that during 
the reshaping of the Mediterranean agricultural policy, 
and for that matter of any other Community policy, the 
position of Greece and her interests as a future member 
state would be taken into consideration.1^
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Thus, the questions raised by the Greek delegation 
with respect to the consultations procedure in the field of 
agriculture were resolved in a manner consistent with the 
general provisions on the matter, applying equally to all 
sectors of Community policy (they have been examined in 
chapter III). At the same time the attempts to link in 
a formal manner the discussion of Greek agriculture with 
that of the Mediterranean agricultural policy were aban­
doned. What began in June 1977 as a short-lived French 
veto to an internal Commission paper addressed to the 
Greek delegation, and an insistence on CAP reforms for 
certain Mediterranean products as a precondition to pro­
gress in the Greek negotiations, eventually gave way to an 
arrangement whereby French and Italian demands for changes 
in Community agricultural policy would be accommodated in 
a parallel manner with the Greek negotiations. However, 
although formal preconditions had been cleared away from 
the negotiating table, the internal debate on the reform 
of Community policies--as they related in particular to 
olive oil, wine, and fruit & vegetables--continued as 
an undercurrent to affect the Greek negotiations, with 
member states using the latter as an arena for establishing 
positions of advantage in intra-Community bargaining. 
Following the adoption in May 1978 of a series of Community 
measures intended to meet these demands to a certain ex­
tent, the linkage between the Greek negotiations and Medi-
15terranean agriculture was finally diffused.
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On the question of precedence as between a general 
and a detailed examination of the agricultural dossier, 
the Greek delegation maintained that a detailed sector- 
by-sector or product-by-product analysis should precede 
the acceptance of abstract and general principles and 
could begin with those products that posed no special 
difficulties. 16 The Community delegation, on the other 
hand, argued that a more thorough understanding of the 
general problems raised in this dossier was necessary 
before a detailed product-by-product examination could 
begin .17 Besides serving the purpose of delay tactics, this 
debate turned out to be a smokescreen for the real issue, 
i.e. the length of the transitional period in the agricul­
tural sector.
2. The Question of Transitional Measures 
In arguing in favour of a general approach, what 
the Community had in mind was the problem of establishing 
a balance among the various aspects of the negotiations, 
and the relation of this to the question of transitional 
measures.
To start with, there was no disagreement on the 
necessity to establish transitional measures in the agri­
cultural sector, on the understanding that apart from 
the requests submitted for such measures Greece would
apply in full from the date of accession the relevant
18acquis communautaire. What caused a divergence of views 
was the Community’s insistence that transitional measures
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in the agricultural sector should be such so as to ensure
a balance within it, while taking account at the same
time of the need for an overall balance of reciprocal
advantages with respect to transitional measures in the
19negotiations as a whole.
The Greek side reacted negatively to this notion,
arguing, with some justice, that if it were difficult to
establish an overall balance in the negotiations, it would
become almost impossible to seek at the same time a balance
within the agricultural sector; the concept of balance
might be appropriate in commercial negotiations but not
in the context of the present accession negotiations which,
as the Community had stressed in various instances, were
20not commercial in nature. As Papaligouras character­
istically stated,
An attempt to strike too many balances at once . . .
is likely to make the task extremely complicated by 
introducing a commercial factor which seems to me 
incompatible with the primary purpose of an accession 
Treaty. After all, the aim of such a Treaty is rather 
to establish ways in which the integration of the 
new member--a manifestly political act--can be brought 
about with maximum efficiency and minimum disturbance.
It should be noted that there was no disagreement 
on the main purpose of transitional measures, with both 
sides agreeing, following along similar lines with the 
previous enlargement, that the purpose of transitional 
measures was to ease the adjustment of the new member 
state and to allow for the smooth and progressive inte­
gration of Greek agriculture into Community agriculture
through the granting of transitional derogations from
22the acquis communautaire to the acceding state.
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Disagreement arose when it came to translating this prin­
ciple into concrete terms: Greece’s position was that the 
nature and length of transitional measures should reflect
her actual needs rather than an overall balance of reci-
23procal advantages, as the Community was maintaining.
But even this divergence of views proved rather superficial 
and disappeared as the negotiations progressed and the 
positions of the two sides became more concrete.
What the Greek delegation was attempting to es­
tablish was a more pragmatic approach, one in which the 
areas of applying a balance should be determined by prac­
tical rather than abstract considerations; otherwise, 
the more general and important balance in the trade re­
lations between Greece and the Community might be over­
looked.2^ However, bringing into the foreground the issue 
of trade relations had apparently the reverse effect: 
instead of bypassing the question of reciprocal advantages, 
it brought it into even greater prominence, making it 
the central theme behind the Greek position.
Considering the trade balance and current-account
25balance between Greece and the Community, the Greek 
delegation argued that their past deficits, roughly at 
annual levels of $1,500 and $1,000 million respectively 
during the period 1973-76, were accentuated by the unbal­
anced fifteen-year record of the Association Agreement, 
with the advantages derived from it weighing constantly 
against Greece and in favour of the Community. Further­
more, the situation was expected to be aggravated by the
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prospect of a further widening in the trade gap after
accession, due to the terms negotiated in other sectors--
27customs union, ECSC, capital movements, etc. This latter 
statement, coming from the Greek delegation in the full 
swing of the negotiations, may seem a curious admission 
at first sight. But its exact import becomes evident if 
seen in connection with Greece's attempt to secure an ad­
vantageous agreement with respect to agriculture by 
bringing into contrast the transitional measures already 
adopted in other sectors with the transitional measures 
under negotiation in the agricultural sector. By playing 
down the benefits accruing from the former, the Greek 
delegation was attempting to establish a tactical negoti­
ating position, based on the notion of overall reciprocal 
advantages, which would enable it to support its requests
for more beneficial transitional measures in the agri-
28cultural sector.
Looking beyond such considerations of mere tactics, 
the more basic question that remains to be answered is 
the extent to which Greece gave up some of her requests 
in other negotiating sectors, yielding to member states' 
demands, in exchange for, or with a view to, having her 
requests in the agricultural sector at least partly ac­
cepted. Although there was no formal agreement committing 
the two sides to such a package deal, the possibility 
of a gentlemen's agreement to this effect should not be 
ruled out, especially if one takes into account the ease 
with which Greece watered down or even abandoned many
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of her initial requests in other sectors. The wording
of the following Conference statement by Rail is points
to such a possibility:
Having in the course of the negotiations agreed, at 
the request of its future partners, to shorten or 
even forgo completely a whole series of transitional 
measures necessary to it in other sectors, such as 
customs union, external relations, capital movements, 
coal and steel, etc., Greece expects to be granted 
free access to the Community market for its agricul­
tural produce, with the minimum of barriers.
3. Delimitation of the Subject Matter
In addition to the mechanisms of the CAP, the
present dossier encompassed those aspects of customs union
and external commercial relations dealing with agricultural 
30 . . .products. Within this scope, the agricultural negoti­
ations covered such a vast and complex field, that to 
analyze it exhaustively down to its technical ramifications 
would take the discussion outside the limits of the present 
research and would distort the balance in the analysis 
of the various negotiating chapters. Thus, apart from 
the technical aspects of Community secondary legislation 
that are accordingly excluded from the analysis that 
follows, a discussion of the detailed arrangements negoti­
ated for specific agricultural products and their market 
organization will be introduced only to the extent that 
such arrangements are directly related to the broader issues
of the agricultural negotiations, on which this research
31primarily focuses. The task of sustaining a uniform 
level of abstraction in this context proved difficult; 
and is complicated even further by the fact, mentioned
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earlier;, that the technical discussions of the Community 
secondary legislation on agriculture penetrated in many 
instances into the deputy and ministerial levels of the 
negotiatt ions.
A note should be made on the subject of fisheries, 
a subject on which there is little to be said in the analy­
sis that; follows, partly as a result of the limited extent 
to which it was discussed in the negotiations--limited by 
the fact that at that time this sector of Community policy 
was in a state of flux and still in the process of being 
formulated. Furthermore, Greece had little difficulty in 
accepting the existing acquis communautaire: she was willing 
to apply it without transitional measures in the case of
provisions relating to the conservation and management of
32 33resources, the common organization of markets, and
34structures; and subject to transitional measures in the
35case of customs union and external commercial relations.
B. Customs Union and the Free Movement of Goods 
in the Agricultural Sector
Most of the discussion on customs union as it
relates to agricultural products derives from principles
negotiated with respect to industrial products. The prin-
3 6ciples that were also to apply to the agricultural sector
are the following: (1 ) after Greek accession the two
parties cannot introduce new or raise existing customs
37duties on agricultural products; (2) both Greece and 
the Community may speed up the abolition of intra-Community 
duties, provided that this does not result in disturbances
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38or deflections of trade; (3) Greece would apply the
Community tariff suspensions in the same manner as in
the case of industrial products, and would not be allowed
to introduce after accession national tariff suspensions
39on agricultural products vis-a-vis third countries;
(4) all charges applied by Greece in the agricultural
sector having an equivalent effect to customs duties or
to quantitative restrictions--import deposits, system
of cash payments, etc.--should in general be abolished
upon accession vis-S-vis both the Community and third
countries;4 0  (5) all quantitative restrictions should
be abolished by Greece upon accession vis-3-vis the Com- 
41munity.
Certain other general principles were also appli­
cable in the present case but were elaborated in greater 
detail to suit the special circumstances of the agricul­
tural dossier. In the discussion that follows these prin­
ciples are briefly reviewed, while the analysis concen­
trates on those points which, being peculiar to the agri­
cultural sector, gave rise to a debate and resulted in 
the establishment of specific derogatory arrangements 
for Greek agriculture.
1. Intra-Community Customs Duties 
The central theme adopted was that the abolition 
of intra-Community customs duties applied to trade in 
agricultural products between Greece and the Community 
should be smooth, balanced and progressive, and should
follow the same timetable and the same formula for the 
determination of basic duties as laid down for industrial
* O
products. This progressive abolition was to apply to
all products subject to a Community customs duty at the
. 4 3  common frontier.
In the case of products for which Greece was to
replace upon accession her existing duties vis-a-vis third
countries with the CCT, the gradual abolition of intra-
Community customs duties would begin at the CCT level
unless the basic duty was lower than the CCT level; in
the latter case abolition would begin at the basic-duty
A A
level. An exception to this arrangement was the case 
of oil seeds and seed oils. Given that Greece applied 
strict import controls from all countries to protect olive 
oil from the competition of cheaper substitutes, it was 
agreed to follow a different harmonization arrangment 
in the case of these products in order to avoid disturb­
ances in the market for olive oil when Greece would abolish 
her import controls upon accession; this arrangement re­
lated both to abolition of intra-Community duties and
alignment on the CCT, and involved a different starting
45level of duties. In the particular case of Greek wines 
(the only Greek agricultural product subject to a Community 
tariff quota), the Community proposed that within the 
existing limits of the Community tariff quota under the 
Association Agreement, the basic duty would be the actual 
residual duty applied under the Community tariff quota; 
beyond this limit, the basic duty would be the actual
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46duties levied vis-&-vis third countries. The Greek dele­
gation was initially opposed to such a double tariff ar­
rangement, arguing that it would create difficulties for 
the supervision and implementation of a tariff quota.
It proposed instead that the actual residual duty applied 
under the Community tariff quota should be the basic duty 
for all Greek wines; and that any risks of disturbance 
in the Community wine market--unlikely in the first in­
stance, given the low level of Greek wine exports to the
Community--could be averted by the application of accession
47compensatory amounts. This proposal was not acceptable
to the Community; the agreement reached towards the end
of the accession negotiations was based on the Community 
48position.
2. The Common Customs Tariff 
Following the agreement reached with respect to 
industrial products, it was established that alignment 
of the Greek customs duties on the CCT with respect to 
agricultural products should be smooth, balanced and pro­
gressive, and should proceed under the conditions and time-
49table laid down for industrial products. However, in 
the case of products whose imports into the Community 
were subject not only to a duty but also to a price mecha­
nism, the CCT was to apply immediately upon accession (this 
case covered milk and milk products, fruit & vegetables, 
wine, and fishery products); and in the case of products 
subject to a Community levy in addition to a customs duty
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when imported from third countries, the tariff movement
(vis-^-vis both the Community and the CCT) would take
place at the beginning of each marketing year, the first
such movement occurring at the beginning of the marketing
50year after accession.
At this point certain issues common to the elimi­
nation of customs duties and the alignment on the CCT, 
on which agreement was reached, should be noted: (a) in 
those cases where the customs duties were incompatible 
with the provisions of the common organization of the 
market, the customs duties should be replaced upon ac­
cession by the system envisaged under the common organi­
zation of the market; (b) in cases where the alignment 
on the CCT involved duties different in kind (i.e., align­
ment of a specific duty on an "ad valorem" duty or vice 
versa), the "mixed method" should be applied, whereby 
the components of the two duties (i.e., the basic duty 
and the target duty) are added at each stage of the align­
ment process; (c) in cases where the Community levy with 
respect to a given product was made up of a variable agri­
cultural component (i.e., based on the import levies 
applied to the basic agricultural product used in the 
manufacture of the processed good) and a fixed industrial 
component, it would be that part of the corresponding 
Greek duty relating to the processing industry (that is, 
the fixed component) which would have to be isolated and 
gradually eliminated vis-^-vis the Community, while gradu­
ally aligned on the C C T .51
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C. External Commercial Relations
1. Quantitative Restrictions and Measures 
Having Equivalent Effect
Following the general provisions negotiated under
the commercial-relations dossier, and taking into account
the special provisions established for the organization
of the various agricultural markets, it was agreed that,
in principle, quantitative restrictions and measures having
an equivalent effect applied by Greece towards third
52countries should be abolished upon accession. This was 
the general approach adopted for both industrial and agri­
cultural products, with no differentiation between them.
It was initially contested by Greece, which had requested
for the retention of these restrictions for both groups
53of products over a five-year transitional period. But
faced with a question of principle, she quickly settled
on a scheme of specific transitional exceptions; such
exceptions could be justified if the sector-by-sector
examination were to reveal that they were necessary for
54the solution of certain specific problems.
In line with the above procedure, the Greek dele­
gation submitted a list of products--certain types of 
cheese, chick peas and beans, lentils, fresh bananas, 
and hazelnuts--for which it requested transitional quanti­
tative restrictions on imports from third countries for
55a five-year period. These proposals were accepted by 
55the Community --although a subsequent attempt by the 
Greek delegation to expand this list with the addition 
of cattle, beef & veal, and milk proved unsuccessful.
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The transitional measures to be established with 
respect to this list of products had to satisfy certain 
rules, in line with similar rules established in the case 
of industrial products. Accordingly, (a) the basic quotas 
would be expressed in volumes wherever possible; (b) they 
would be progressively and substantially increased over 
the transitional period so as to achieve full liberal­
ization by the end of the period; and (c) if imports 
in two consecutive years were less than 90% of the quota
opened, Greece would have to abolish the quantitative re-
58strictions in question. These general rules were combined
with certain implementing arrangements establishing the
level and rate of increase of the relevant quotas in the
case of nonpreferential GATT countries and state-trading
countries (as noted below, implementing rules were also
59established for preferential countries).
2. Community Preferential Agreements
with Third Countries
In the initial formulation of its position, the 
Greek delegation was willing to accept the Community pref­
erential concessions to third countries but wanted to 
defer their application to the end of the five-year tran­
sitional period .6 0 On the Community side, such a deferral 
was seen as creating more problems than it tried to solve, 
given the sudden and intensive efforts that Greece would 
be forced to make afterwards.6 * The Community suggested in­
stead a different procedure, distinguishing between tariff 
and nontariff preferential arrangements, and reiterating
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the general principle that Greek imports from third 
countries should in no case be treated more favourably 
than imports from the Community.
In the case of preferential tariff arrangements 
between the Community and third countries, Greece would 
have to apply them progressively and smoothly within the 
transitional period, following the same timing as that 
applied for the progressive abolition of Greek duties 
in trade between Greece and the rest of the Community; 
this procedure would apply both in the case of products 
to which Greece applied customs duties upon importation 
from the Community and in the case of products (contained 
in annex III of the Association Agreement) for which Greek 
customs duties had been abolished on imports from the 
Community. In return to the above arrangement, the pref­
erential partners whose agreements provided for tariff 
preferences in favour of agricultural imports from the 
Community would have to reciprocate and apply these prefer­
ential tariff provisions on their imports from Greece
64in a progressive manner equivalent to that proposed above.
These Community proposals were accepted by Greece, together
with two related points concerning her own system of com-
6 5mercial relations: (a) by the date of accession Greece
was to abolish the tariff preferences that she granted 
on a few agricultural imports from certain third countries; 
(b) after accession Greece would not be able to continue 
benefitting from tariff preferences accorded to her exports 
of agricultural products by third countries in the context 
of her preaccession trade relations. 6 6
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In the case of preferential nontariff arrangements, 
and in particular reductions in levies, the Community pro­
posal was that Greece should apply them fully from the date 
of accession, the argument being that these arrangements 
usually perform an economic rather than a commercial 
function and have no appreciable effect on import prices .6 7  
Reacting negatively, the Greek delegation suggested that 
instead of an immediate application upon accession, the 
preferential nontariff arrangements should be applied 
progressively in such a manner so that their full appli­
cation would coincide with the alignment of Greek and 
Community prices and the full implementation of the Com­
munity intervention and aid arrangements for the products 
6 8concerned. This suggestion, however, was not taken up
in the negotiations, with Greece finally agreeing with
69the Community position on this point.
With respect to tariff quotas or similar con­
cessions granted by the Community to third countries or 
vice versa, the Community proposed that transitional ad ­
justment protocols would have to be concluded during the 
interim period between the enlarged Community and the 
third countries concerned in order to take account of 
Greece’s accession .7 0  In the particular case of agricul­
tural products with transitional quantitative restrictions 
vis-a-vis third countries which were also subject to Com­
munity contractual tariff concessions, the Community pro­
posal provided for the establishment, under the prefer­
ential agreements, of specific quantities of these products
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which would be exempt from any quantitative restrictions 
by Greece and would gradually increase over the tran­
sitional period ."^1 In agreeing with the above Community 
proposals, the Greek delegation made the further point, 
not contested by the Community, that, for the purpose 
of adjusting the tariff quotas within the necessary tran­
sitional arrangements, consideration should be given to
the preaccession trade record between Greece and the
72countries concerned.
The above analysis which examines the question 
of Greece’s application of the Community preferential 
concessions to third countries reveals a point common 
to all the issues negotiated: in almost every case the 
debate focused on the problem of transitional arrangements, 
without questioning the essential elements of the Community 
preferential regime towards third countries. It was only in 
the context of autonomous tariff concessions on agricul­
tural products granted by EFTA countries to the Community 
that the debate involved a modification of the existing 
regime. What Greece was attempting to secure in this case 
was the extension of these concessions in a way that would 
take into account her interests. In other words, her re­
quests were not limited to the existing EFTA concessions 
which were included in the Exchanges of Letters between 
the EFTA countries and the Community and which would in 
any case apply to Greece upon accession; they also involved 
the enlargement of existing concessions and the granting 
of new ones, focusing on products of particular interest
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to the Greek economy (such as peaches, fresh grapes,
certain citrus fruit, etc.) which could penetrate further 
73these markets.
From the Community’s point of view, however, there
seemed to be little scope for such trade expansion, given
that Greece's exports to the EFTA countries of the products
in question were often only of marginal importance in
relation to her total exports of each product and that
Greek accession was expected to have only a limited effect
on the structure of agricultural exports of the enlarged
74Community to the EFTA countries. But the Greek demands 
were also faced with the constraint that, like the agree­
ments themselves, the Exchanges of Letters between the 
EFTA countries and the Community were not open to renegoti­
ation, though technical adjustments were possible; and 
this affected even those Greek requests which involved
75products already covered in these Exchanges of Letters. 
Faced with a situation that apparently left no room for 
further negotiation, the Greek side decided not to insist 
any more on this point .7 6
D. Mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
The basic question that had to be settled under 
this topic was whether the various Community mechanisms 
and arrangements of the common organization of markets 
should be adopted by Greece as an integral whole in order 
to avoid problems of implementation, as the Community 
argued; 77 or whether, following the Greek point of view,
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each product should be examined individually in detail,
with a view to reaching conclusions for the measures to
78be taken in each case.
This issue, which is related to the general debate 
on agriculture examined earlier, might seem rather super­
ficial at first sight, since the two approaches tend to
complement each other, and, in any case, Greece readily
79accepted the principles and objectives of the CAP. But, 
as already noted, such general and hazy issues often re­
flected negotiating tactics behind which lay hiding issues 
of substance. In the present instance, one could perhaps 
discern a particular case of the trade-off, analyzed in 
general terms in chapter II, between the rate of progress 
of the negotiations and the expected benefits to be derived 
from a detailed and meticulous negotiation of individual 
points--although, with the position of the two delegations 
having changed in the course of the negotiations, it is 
not easy to identify with certainty exactly where each 
party stood in this respect. It could be argued, for 
example--and the debate on the above issue points to this 
direction--that the Community agricultural interests, 
in contrast to the Greek ones, could best be served by 
a summary approach to the agricultural dossier which would 
envelope the Greek particularities within the existing 
acquis communautaire without compromising the political 
commitment for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. 
Later in the negotiations the Community apparently went 
along with the Greek approach, giving priority to a
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detailed product-by-product examination that would high­
light the Greek difficulties and the corresponding de­
mands; but at the same time it hardened its attitude on 
the rate of progress of the negotiations, which helps 
explain its insistence that the length of the transitional 
period in each agricultural sector would be established 
only after the completion of the sector-by-sector analysis 
as a whole .8 0
When seen in this light, the debate on the tran­
sitional period was not only related to considerations 
of adjustment and economic benefits but was also used 
by the Community as a strategic pawn in manipulating the 
rate of progress of the agricultural negotiations and, 
by extension, of the negotiations as a whole. Thus, dif­
ferences in positions between the two sides with respect 
to the length of the transitional period cannot be ex­
plained fully without taking into account the interplay 
of these factors and without assessing the relative weight 
of each one of them.
The essential Community position was that, within 
Greece’s integral acceptance of the overall mechanisms 
of common organization of markets, it would be natural 
and necessary to establish transitional measures for the 
gradual alignment of prices and aid levels between Greece 
and the Community; however, the duration of transitional 
measures should be such that a balance is maintained in 
the rate of progress of this alignment among the various 
agricultural products so as to avoid distortions on both
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sides. Within this framework, the transitional period
had to be "sufficiently long" to allow for the smooth
and progressive integration of Greek agriculture into
Community agriculture--as it relates to market and price
mechanisms and the necessary infrastructure for their
proper functioning, as well as to the handling of any
82adaptation problems that may arise on either side. Along
these lines, and on the basis of the results of the sector-
by-sector examination, the length and coverage of the
transitional measures proposed by the Community were as
follows: (1 ) the transitional measures should in principle
cover all agricultural products in order to preserve an
overall balance; (2 ) the basic transitional period would
be five years, except for certain sectors where there
existed difficulties either for the Community or for
Greece, in which case the transitional period would be
set at a maximum length of eight years (these sectors,
according to the Community position, covered olive oil
and other oleaginous products, certain fresh and processed
83fruit & vegetables, and wine).
The inevitably hazy concept of a "sufficiently 
long" transitional period was strongly criticized by Greece, 
which saw in it an attempt to camouflage and protect Com­
munity agricultural interests by emphasizing and often 
exaggerating the adaptation needs of her agriculture, 
and to limit Community budgetary flows towards her .8 *4 The 
proposed transitional period was accordingly considered 
too long: as the Greek delegation maintained, there were
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practically no functional problems of mechanisms or prob­
lems of infrastructures; hence, the problem of transition 
could be reduced to one of price alignment, which in turn 
could be reduced even further in a number of cases where
the price differences between the Community and Greece
i i 85 were smal 1 .
In Greece’s view, a five-year transitional period 
should be considered a maximum, with allowance for vari­
ations within it according to the specific circumstances 
and needs of particular products or sectors (e.g., three
years for eggs, two years for flowers) and immediate appli-
8 6cation upon accession in the case of all other sectors.
In many cases where Greece was requesting no transitional 
period Greek prices did in fact differ from Community 
prices; but, as the Greek delegation argued, the magnitude 
of such differences was relatively small, and prices could 
therefore be harmonized prior to accession. It is inter­
esting to note that among the products for which Greece 
had initially requested the immediate application of the 
relevant Community regulations were fresh and processed 
fruit & vegetables, wine, and olive oil--i.e., products
for which the Community had requested an eight-year tran-
87sitional period. These products were considered so im­
portant by Greece that, by casting their shadow over the 
whole agricultural sector, they were seen as transforming
in essence the effective transitional period in agriculture
88from five years to eight. From the Greek point of view, 
the real, and quite unacceptable, criterion for the
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Community’s distinction between normal (five-year) and 
maximum (eight-year) transitional arrangements was not 
the adaptation and adjustment needs of Greek agriculture 
but the protection of the Community’s own interests. Thus, 
the Community had included under the five-year category 
the essential products exported by most member states 
to Greece while proposing an eight-year transitional period 
for products which were essential to the Greek economy 
and her export sector .8 9
The debate on the length of the transitional period 
finally resulted in Greece’s acceptance of most of the 
Community proposals, with a compromise on the maximum- 
period products. Accordingly, it was agreed that the tran­
sitional measures should in principle cover all agricul­
tural products, the basic transitional period being fixed 
uniformly at five years, except for certain cases where 
it was set at the maximum length of seven years; these
cases were limited to fresh & processed tomatoes and
90fresh & preserved peaches.
Once the issues connected with the transitional 
period were resolved, the seriousness of the structural 
problems facing Greek agriculture stood out in relief, 
stripped of negotiating intentions and tactical arguments. 
However, when it came to facing up to these difficulties, 
the Community agreed only in an oblique way with Greece’s 
request for the adoption of special corrective measures.
The objective was to deal with problems of marketing infra­
structure and other structural difficulties facing Greek
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agriculture by accelerating the necessary procedures, 
using for this purpose the interim period; but this was 
to be accommodated within the existing Community rules. 
Accordingly, the Community was willing to use the interim 
period to help Greece prepare programmes within which 
individual projects could qualify for Community financial 
assistance upon accession; but it was not considered 
necessary to adopt for this purpose any special Community 
legislation.
The analysis now turns to an examination of spe­
cific CAP mechanisms--in particular, the problems that 
arose in the negotiations with respect to the harmonization 
of prices, compensation mechanisms, and harmonization 
of aid systems. Following the examination of these issues, 
the analysis focuses on the Greek requests for the es­
tablishment of common organization of markets for certain 
sensitive products not organized at Community level.
It should be noted in this respect that, given the 
differences in agricultural profiles, the relative weight 
assigned to the various types of common market organization 
also differed between Greece and the Community of Nine: 
deficiency payments (durum wheat, olive oil, oil seeds, 
tobacco) and direct aids (seeds, cotton) covered products 
that were relatively more important for Greece; on the 
other hand, support-price arrangements (milk, cereals, 
sugar, beef & veal, pigmeat) covered typically northern 
products that were of lesser importance for Greece.
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921. Adoption of the CAP Mechanisms
a) Harmonization of prices
The basis for the alignment of the Greek prices
on the corresponding Community prices was to be their
difference, calculated according to a representative ref-
93erence period for each product. In calculating Greek
price levels, the retaining or removal of national aids
had also to be taken into account, the overall objective
being that the price levels for Greece should be determined
in such a way that the income level of the Greek producer
can be equally maintained under Community as under Greek
94market conditions.
In the agreement reached it was furthermore pro­
vided that, for each product, alignment would be pro­
gressive, extend over the whole transitional period, and 
be subject to adjustment with respect to any changes in 
Community prices. This latter provision meant that the 
level attained at each annual stage of the alignment pro­
cess would be adapted to any movements in Community prices, 
the first harmonization stage being made to coincide for
each product with the beginning of the first marketing
95year following accession. In the case of most products,
harmonization would involve an increase in Greek prices.
Within the above framework, allowance was made
for an immediate price alignment in those cases where
the price difference between Greece and the Community 
96was minimal. On the other hand, whether or not a price
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difference was to be considered minimal would depend on
the specific product concerned and the economic circum- 
97stances. This criterion was not immediately accepted 
by the Greek delegation: its sugeestion, later abandoned, 
was that in deciding on the minimality of price differ­
ences, all products should be treated equally and solely
98on the basis of the existing price differentials.
An additional point that was established was that,
in line with the CAP provisions, the drachma exchange
rate on the date of accession should reflect the market
rate of exchange at that time. Given the need for the
establishment of a relationship between the drachma and
the unit of account for the purposes of price comparisons
between Greece and the Community in the context of the
CAP, the above requirement implied that it would be
necessary to create in Athens a real exchange-rate market
and to introduce official quotations for the drachma on
Community exchange markets (more specifically, on at least
one of them). Agreement was easily reached on this point,
the intention on the Greek side being to make such a market
99operational before accession. This was an important 
issue with wider repercussions and as such it was further 
discussed under the dossier of economic and financial 
affairs (it is accordingly examined in chapter VII).
b) Compensation mechanisms
The negotiations established that there must be 
provision of compensation mechanisms in trade between 
Greece and the Community and between Greece and third
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countries during the transitional period, in order to 
avoid distortions or disturbances on the markets of the 
two sides that may arise due to disparities in price levels 
between Greece and the Community .1 0 0  In the system derived 
from this principle, which was to apply not only to basic 
products but also to raw materials incorporated in pro­
cessed goods, the differences in price levels of traded 
products would be compensated by accession compensatory 
amounts, gradually diminishing over the transitional period 
as the prices are progressively harmonized. 101 Such tech­
nical arrangements apparently implied that there would 
be no discrimination against Greek products, ensuring
that they would compete on equal terms with products from
102other member states in the Community markets; the as­
sumption in this respect, as the Greek delegation pointed
out, was that the accession compensatory amounts would
103be applied on the basis of reciprocity. Furthermore,
as the negotiations eventually established, the accession
compensatory amounts for any given product should not
exceed the total amount levied on its imports from third
countries benefitting from the most-favoured-nation (MFN)
104clause under GATT.
In the particular case of fresh fruit and vegetables
with reference prices, this compensation system had to be
1 05adapted to their special characteristics so as to ensure 
that prices on the Community market would be held firm, 
while Greek products would not be placed at a disadvantage 
vis-^-vis Community products . 1 0 6 In the view of the Greek
299
delegation, this latter condition was extremely delicate 
and evasive; for even though the Community was the first 
one to recognise it as a vital element in the compensation 
mechanism to be worked out, the system of compensatory 
amounts that initially emerged from the Community proposals 
paid only lip service to it, applying only to Greece and 
hence discriminating against her . 1 0 7
Greece’s request that the proposed system should 
equally apply to similar Community products entering Greece 
was given special emphasis in the particular case of table 
grapes: Greece wanted the application of accession compen­
satory amounts for the purpose of protecting her own table
grapes, whose high prices were due to high internal trans-
108port costs, from lower-priced Community imports. How­
ever, the introduction of compensatory amounts into the 
Greek market of table grapes was considered unjustifiable, 
since their aim was not, as it should be, the prevention 
of market distortions but rather the handling only of 
exceptional difficulties: Community exports of fresh grapes 
to Greece were at that time virtually nonexistent with
1 D9no prospects for their future growth. in contrast, 
exports of Greek table grapes had nearly doubled between 
1971 and 1975, 6 6 % of which were absorbed by the Community.
Despite the rejection of Greece’s specific request 
with respect to table grapes, the Community agreed easily 
on the reciprocity of the compensation mechanism for fresh 
fruit and vegetables with reference prices. Thus, the 
system that finally emerged, after a detailed and critical
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examination in the course of the negotiations, was to 
be applicable not only by the Community vis-a-vis Greece 
but also, by extension, by Greece vis-a-vis the Commu- 
nit y . 1 1 0
Before examining the issues relating to the har­
monization of aid systems, it is worth noting that the 
question of transport costs was not raised solely in con­
nection with lower-priced Community imports of table grapes 
but also in connection with higher-priced Greek exports 
of certain agricultural products, such as wines and fruit & 
vegetables. What the Greek delegation was maintaining 
in this respect was that, when calculating accession com­
pensatory amounts, allowance had to be made for the higher 
transport costs incurred by Greek producers due to the 
geographical location of Greece vis-a-vis the main Com­
munity markets (this was subsequently specified to mean 
that, for the products under consideration, the accession 
compensatory amounts should be reduced by the amount of 
transport costs ) . 111 The Community did not accept Greece’s 
request, arguing that it run counter to the spirit of Com­
munity practice: the same problem existed for other member
states, but the Community had not resorted to subsidization
112of transport costs.
c) Harmonization of aid systems
Leaving aside the relatively simple case of prod­
ucts subject to Community aid with no corresponding Greek 
aid, for which the Community aid was to be introduced at
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the beginning of each marketing year in equal stages during
113 .the transitional period, the central issue that was
negotiated under the present topic was the abolition of 
Greek national aids to the extent that they were incom­
patible with Community rules. Given their widespread in­
cidence throughout Greek agriculture, their abolition 
would involve considerable problems of internal adjustments 
and a significant reorientation of domestic policies. The 
principle adopted in this respect was that incompatible 
national aids should be abolished upon accession, except
in those instances where temporary derogations or tran-
114sitional measures were to be negotiated. In this latter
case, a distinction was made between Greek aids with no
Community equivalent and those with a Community equivalent.
The Community requested the immediate abolition
of Greek aid upon accession only in the case of national 
115export aids. Although Greece’s initial reaction on 
this point was negative, insisting on the transitional 
need for this aid, she eventually came to accept the Com­
munity point of view but made its acceptance conditional 
to an exception in the case of table grapes: given that 
the Greek problem of table grapes was structural (and 
a difficult one), to be solved within the framework of 
the Community’s sociostructural agricultural policy, na­
tional export aid should be maintained for intra-Community 
trade and abolished gradually until the restructuring 
of table-grape production.1 1 6 In the final compromise 
reached, the Greek condition was only partially satisfied:
302
while the existing export subsidy of table grapes would 
have to be abolished upon accession, a national production 
aid for table grapes could be granted instead as a tran­
sitional measure, based on Greece’s average production 
over the last three years . 1 1 7
This agreement on production aid for table grapes 
was part of a broader agreement allowing for the possi­
bility of transitional arrangements for the gradual ab­
olition of Greek national aids with no Community equiv­
alent, in accordance with rules and criteria established
1 1 8in the negotiations. An exception, however, was made
for dried grapes & dried figs, table olives, tobacco,
and cotton; in their case, instead of these criteria,
special provisions would be applicable allowing for the
119maintenance of national aid.
The same procedure of a gradual abolition of na­
tional aid over the transitional period was also estab­
lished in the case of Greek aids to which corresponded 
similar Community aids; in such instances only the cost of 
the aid in excess of the amount granted by the Community 
would be borne by Greece and maintained as a transitional 
measure, to be abolished gradually by the end ot the tran­
sitional period in order to avoid a sharp drop in the in-
120come of the producers concerned. The Community aid would
be inroduced at the beginning of each marketing year and
would increase in equal stages over the transitional period
until it reached the level granted to the other member
121states--a level which in no case should be exceeded.
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Within the above general framework, special arrange­
ments were established for processed fruit & vegetables, 
according to which the amount of Community aid granted 
to Greece would be calculated on the basis of the differ­
ence of ex-factory prices between Greece (taking account 
of the respective aids) and the Community; however, if 
during the transitional period the relevant Community 
regulations were amended and the existing Community system 
modified, then the transitional measures applicable to
Greece for the maximum remaining transitional period would
122have to be adjusted accordingly. This provision was 
included in the agreement reached, since the Council was 
expected to review before 1 October 1982 the operation 
of the Community aid system for certain products of this 
sector.
A central theme that emerges from the examination 
of the issues relating to the abolition of Greek national 
aids is that the agreements reached in the negotiations 
were not fully in tune with the demands of the Greek side, 
especially in respect of their budgetary aspects. This 
is vividly seen in Greece's unsuccessful attempts to have 
her position accepted with respect to certain crucial 
products--such as tobacco, olive oil, and sugar, which 
received particular attention in the negotiations.
In the case of tobacco, as in other cases, the 
basic issue centered on the question as to whether the 
premiums and refunds related to the income of the Greek 
producer would be borne by the Community budget immediately
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after accession, following the Greek position, or gradually 
over the transitional period, as the Community insisted. 
Greece’s request was not accepted--though in the compromise 
finally reached during the concluding stage of the budget­
ary negotiations she was granted certain concessions that
123increased her financial benefits in this respect. Al­
though tobacco was a relatively insignificant item in the 
Community budget (with less than 0.2% of the Community’s 
support expenditure spent on it in 1976), the difficulties 
encountered in the negotiations stemmed from the fact that 
Greek production was 70% of Community production (in 1977): 
an immediate extension of the Community support system to 
Greece would have entailed an additional burden on the 
Community budget which the Community was not prepared to 
shoulder, despite efforts by the Greek delegation to show 
that this burden would be small.
Similarly in the case of olive oil, Greece had
initially requested the immediate alignment of Community
aid upon accession but was forced to water down her request
to a two-year and later to a four-year transitional period,
as against the Community position that the general five-
1 0 /
year rule should also apply in the present case. The 
Community’s position was once more dictated by budgetary 
considerations: the burden on Community expenditure for 
olive oil resulting from Greece’s entry would have been 
aggravated by her immediate integration into the Community 
aid regime. (Greek production of olive oil was on the 
average slightly less than 50% of Community production;
305
together with Portuguese and Spanish production, the cor­
responding 1977 percentage rose to 168%.) In the final 
agreement, the Community remained firm on her initial
position, offering Greece only minor concessions as a der-
125ogation from the general rule. Accordingly, (1) in the 
first alignment stage Community aid would be introduced 
not at the beginning of the marketing year following ac­
cession but on the actual date of accession, the impli­
cation being that the first stage of Community aid to 
Greece would be calculated on the basis of the Community 
aid fixed for the beginning of the marketing year prior 
to accession (i.e., 1 November 1980); (2) the second align­
ment stage would begin at the start of the second marketing 
year after accession; (3) full application of Community 
aid would begin from the fifth marketing year after ac-
cession--that is, at the end of the five-year transitional
■ ^ 126 perlod.
Finally, Greece found the Community arrangements 
with respect to sugar unacceptable; according to them 
she would have to establish a basic quota for her sugar 
production which would lead to a reduction of the supported 
quantity produced domestically and a diversion of some 
sugar-beet producers to other crops (Greek production 
rose from 52,000 tons in 1961 to 2.7 million tons in 1979; 
the Community, on the other hand, was running a sugar sur­
plus). The Greek delegation was highly skeptical about the 
efficacy of such a reorientation of her agricultural pro­
duction, since for almost all her traditional agricultural
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products the Community was in effect attempting to limit 
127their growth. According to the Greek counterproposal,
the Greek sugar quotas should be calculated on a different
basis, one that would allow Greece to maintain at least
the present production potential of her sugar-beet industry
128which just covered the needs of domestic demand. The
Greek request had the same, by now almost predictable,
fate as many of her other demands: it was not accepted;
instead, it was decided that the same Community criteria
applied to the rest of the Community should be used for
129establishing the maximum Greek sugar quota.
2. Greek Requests for the Establishment 
of Common Organization of Markets 
for Certain Products
Quite separate from the previous issues are those 
requests of the Greek side relating to the establishment 
of common organization of markets for certain products 
important to the Greek economy for which no such arrange­
ments existed in the Community at the time of the negoti­
ations, at least in a concrete and finalized form that 
met the Greek needs; under this category fall specific 
proposals elaborated by the Greek delegation with respect
to cotton (not carded or combed), dried figs & dried
130grapes, pine resin, and sheepmeat & sheep. Greece’s
negotiating objective was the acceptance of the relevant
principles, leaving the detailed Community rules to be
131worked out after accession.
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The analysis that follows concentrates on the 
problems encountered with respect to cotton and dried 
figs & grapes, since the Greek demands raised with respect 
to the other two product categories were handled rather 
hastily, with little or no substantial debate on either 
side.
a) Cotton
Cotton was scarcely produced in the Community 
of Nine, whereas it was a significant product for Greece, 
providing a substantial source of employment and contrib­
uting approximately 5% to the total agricultural production 
of the country.
The basic premise of the Greek position was that
the existing Community arrangements were not suited to
the specific Greek requirements and circumstances; what
was needed was the characterization of cotton (not carded
or combed) as a Community agricultural product and the
establishment of a common organization of the market that
would secure for the cotton producers an income comparable
to that enjoyed in other Community sectors and supported
132by the Community rather than the national budget. In 
the agreement finally reached, the Community was prepared 
to regard cotton as an agricultural product and to adopt 
special Community measures for it, within the framework 
of a protocol to be annexed to the Act of Accession. The 
special protocol (no. A) on cotton laid down guidelines 
for the establishment of new Community arrangements,
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including provisions relating to Community financing, 
to replace the existing ones. The new system would begin 
to apply from the first marketing year after accession; 
until its implementation Greece could maintain her national 
preaccession system of production support for cotton, 
while transitional arrangements could also be provided 
for the smooth passage from the existing Greek and Com­
munity systems to that envisaged in the protocol. (This 
implied that Community aid for cotton-seed producers would 
be granted progressively over the transitional period
133rather than immediately, as the Greek side had requested.)
b) Dried figs and dried grapes
Two alternative solutions were proposed with 
respect to these products: introduction of a common organ­
ization of the market created specifically for dried figs 
and grapes (favoured by Greece); or extension of the basic 
Community regulations concerning processed fruit & veg­
etables to cover the case of dried figs and grapes (fa-
13^ ivoured by the Community). In the course of the negoti­
ations, it became evident that although neither solution 
was acceptable as such by both sides, a compromise could 
be found on the basis of the second alternative, expanded 
to meet certain Greek demands. Specifically, while Greece 
was initially opposed to the Community solution, arguing 
that it involved unsatisfactory marketing arrangements 
and tid not provide for an inervention-price system to 
support the income of Greek producers, she eventually
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agreed to it but only after it was made clear that the
granting of Community production aid for dried figs and
+ 135grapes was acceptable.
In the compromise finally reached, the production-
aid scheme for dried figs and grapes was to be worked
out in time to apply in the first instance to the crop
136of the accession year. Furthermore, until all the 
necessary adjustments to the Community rules were made, 
Greece would be allowed to retain as a transitional measure 
the main elements of her existing system, including quanti­
tative restrictions on imports from third countries, pro­
vided that these were limited to its essential aspects
necessary to safeguard the income of the Greek producer
137and were defined prior to accession.
c ) Pine resin
The Greek delegation eventually withdrew its re­
quest for the establishment of a common organization of 
the market for pine resin, following Community objections 
to treat pine resin as a Community agricultural product
138within the meaning of article 38 of the Treaty of Rome.
d) Sheepmeat and sheep
On the question of sheepmeat and sheep (an im­
portant sector, given that per capita consumption in Greece 
is almost five times higher that the Community average), 
it was agreed that if the Community’s own proposals for 
a common organization of the market (under way at the 
time of the negotiations) were not adopted by the time
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of accession, Greece would be allowed to retain its own
system until the introduction of common rules but not
beyond the five-year transitional period; in doing so,
however, she should abolish all quantitative restrictions
and equivalent measures vis-a-vis member states, with
an allowance only for those measures strictly necessary
139for the maintenance of her system.
E. The Substance of the Agricultural 
Negotiations
The issues relating to agricultural products in 
the fields of customs union and external commercial re­
lations can be usefully seen as conceptual extensions of 
related issues resolved under the corresponding dossiers 
for industrial products. In this sense, what gave a new 
negotiating dimension to the present field were the pro­
blems raised in connection with the Community’s CAP. And 
given that the latter’s structural policies left little 
scope for negotiating the relevant acquis communautaire, 
the main area of contention was largely confined to agri­
cultural market mechanisms. However, such a delimitation 
of the subject matter in terms of negotiating sensitivities 
should not be taken as a guide of the relative significance 
of the issues involved.
As already discussed in the review of the litera­
ture, accession was expected to have a number of important 
implications for Greek agriculture involving the pattern 
of production, the volume and pattern of trade, the income 
of farmers, agricultural structures, and budgetary flows.
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But when one considers the extent to which these factors 
entered into the negotiating thinking of each party, it is 
seen that budgetary considerations tended to overshadow 
all others, distorting their relative weight along the way.
a s  the agricultural negotiations entered their 
final and critical stage, it was becoming increasingly 
evident that what was at stake was not only the immediately 
discernible Greek requests as they related to Community 
market mechanisms for specific products. Looming above 
them were the broader budgetary implications of the issues 
on hand and the fear that the transitional arrangements 
offered could tilt the financial balance against Greece 
in such a way that the burden of aid during the transi­
tional period would largely fall on the Greek rather than 
on the Community budget--a situation that could easily 
make Greece a potential net payer to the Community budget
at least for the first year after accession, if not for
140the whole transitional period.
The central question raised within the above frame­
work is the extent to which the final agreement reached was 
in tune with Greece’s negotiating objectives. Seen in the 
context of the negotiations as a whole, the very conclusion 
of the agricultural dossier was in itself a remarkable 
achievement--the achievement of a journey into the bowels 
of a labyrinth. And although the length of transitional 
arrangements was a source of disappointment at home, es­
pecially the deviations from the five-year rule, the pro­
vision for the full integration of Greek agriculture as a
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whole into the Community system within the general transi­
tional period was not a mean result. At a different level, 
Greece’s overall and largely political objective was at­
tained: the final compromises did ensure that she would be 
a net beneficiary with respect to the Community budget. But 
when attention is focused on the specific transitional ar­
rangements concluded, the general impression obtained is 
that they fell short of Greece’s objectives with respect to 
the size of her budgetary benefits: her attempts to secure 
a greater participation of the Community budget immediately 
after accession were frustrated--though certain final Com­
munity concessions helped take the edge off this problem.
The above considerations do not exhaust the sub­
stance of the agricultural dossier: as the preceding analy­
sis has shown, its negotiation involved a number of issues 
that proved both difficult and significant--not only be­
cause of agriculture's inherent technical complexities 
and intrinsic importance but also because of its linkages 
with other dossiers, the budgetary linkage being perhaps 
the most crucial, and with the negotiations as a whole. It 
is on this basis that the overall balance in the analysis 
of the present chapter has been established: the study 
of the agricultural sector does not only shed light on 
the specific issues that surfaced on the negotiating 
table but also, and perhaps more significantly, paves 
the way for a comprehensive assessment of the broader 
economic and political factors that influenced the course 
and outcome of the accession negotiations.
313
NOTES
1 The data in the discussion that follows are taken from 
the following sources: J. Marsh, "The Impact of En­
largement on the Common Agricultural Policy," in Com­
munity of Twelve, ed. Wallace and Herreman, pp. 179-210; 
Ries, "Economie agricole de la Grece"; Adrien Ries and 
Christa Haebler, "The Agricultural Aspects of Enlarge­
ment of the European Community: Greece," Green Europe, 
no. 173 (1980); Pepelasis, "Structure of Greek Agri­
culture," "Greek Agriculture in the EEC," and "Agri­
cultural Sector." The same sources have been used in 
other sections of the present chapter, in connection 
with data on specific products.
2 Pepelasis, "Structure of Greek Agriculture," p. 156, 
and "Greek Agriculture in the EEC," pp. 11-12, 23-24;
He Kath§merine. 12-13 February 1978, p. 13; Mitsos,
"Hellada-EOK," p. 37. Cf. Ries, "Economie agricole
de la Grece," in La Gr£ce et la Communaut£. pp. 181-82, 
and expose oral, in ibid., p. 196.
3 This estimate was based on a sample survey conducted 
by the National Statistical Service of Greece. An 
earlier sample survey carried out by the Agricultural 
Bank of Greece in 1977 had reached an even lower
est imate.
4 CONF-GR/20/77, pp. 5-6.
5 CONF-GR/81/78, p. 3.
6 CONF-GR/21/77, p. 2; CONF-GR/40/77, p. 7.
7 Commission, "Opinion on Greek Application," p. 14,
and General Considerations on Enlargement, p. 7.
8 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/81/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 4; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 4.
9 CONF-GR/81/78, p. 3; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 4.
10 CONF-GR/14/79, Addendum.
11 See CONF-GR/34/77, p. 7; CONF-GR/39/77, p. 7; 
CONF-GR/47/77, p. 2; C0NF-GR/50/77, p. 4; 
CONF-GR/54/77, pp. 6-7; CONF-GR/60/77, p. 2; 
CONF-GR/65/77, p. 2; CONF-GR/70/77, p. 4.
12 CONF-GR/34/77, pp. 1-2.
13 CONF-GR/37/77, Annex, p. 2.,


















For further details on this point see Leigh, ’’Nine 
EEC Attitudes to Enlargement," pp. 50-53, and 
Tsoukalis, European Community and Mediterranean En­
largement . pp. 137-41, 235-37.
CONF-GR/60/77, p. 3; CONF-GR/66/77, p. 6 ;
CONF-GR/70/77, p. 5. From the Greek point of view
such products were, among others, cereals, rice, 
sugar, meat, and tobacco. See CONF-GR/70/77, p. 4.
CONF-GR/65/77, p. 2; CONF-GR/66/77, p. 7.
CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 3-4; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 4;
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 8 .
CONF-GR/34/77, p. 3.
CONF-GR/37/77, Annex, p. 2.
CONF-GR/39/77, p. 5.
CONF-GR/37/77, Annex, p. 3; CONF-GR/55/78, p. 5; 
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 4; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 4;
CONF-GR/101/78, p. 1. Agreement was also reached 
on the provision for mutual safeguard mechanisms, 
in accordance with Community procedures, to meet 
any difficulties that may arise in the agricultural 
sector during the transitional period. See 
CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 6 , 10.
CONF-GR/37/77, Annex, p. 3. Cf. MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 4.
CONF-GR/39/77, pp. 6-7; CONF-GR/70/77, p. 4.
The Greek delegation noted in this respect that the 
Community’s exports to Greece were of an order of 
magnitude comparable to that of its exports to Canada, 
Japan or Brazil. See CONF-GR/70/77, p. 5.
Cf. CONF-GR/50/77, p. 7.
CONF-GR/39/77, pp. 6-7 & Annex; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 8 . 
CONF-GR/101/78, pp. 6-7; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 8 .
CONF-GR/101/78, pp. 6-7.
CONF-GR/81/78, p. 4.
CONF-GR/55/78, p. 2. The products covered under the 
heading of agriculture were those listed in annex II 
of the Treaty of Rome, together with processed agri­
cultural products not listed in it. To these should 
be added the products which Greece requested to be 
included in the above annex--cotton (not carded or 
combed) and pine resin.
315
31 Similarly, the analysis does not cover processed 
agricultural products. The negotiations with respect 
to these products were mainly conducted at a lower, 
technical level under the examination of Community 
secondary legislation. For the specific transitional 
arrangements negotiated in their case see 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, pp. 54-68, and Act of Ac ­
cession, art. 43.
32 Given the state of resources, and since Greece had 
no traditional fishing activities in the North 
Atlantic, the Community suggestion was that this 
should be reflected on the allocation of fishing 
quotas among member states. Greece went along with 
this proposal, aquesting no fishing quotas in the 
North Atlantic at the time of the negotiations. How­
ever, she "reserved the right to make such a request 
if compensation for losses suffered as a result of 
the establishment by third countries of new zones
of up to 2 0 0  miles was adopted as a principle in 
similar cases.” See CONF-GR/24/79, p. 5.
33 A point that was clarified in the negotiations was 
the problem of Greek vessels flying third-country 
flags. It was agreed that upon accession such vessels 
would not be eligible for Community measures in favour 
of vessels flying a member-state flag, while catches 
made by them would not be regarded as of Community 
origin. See ibid., Annex I, p. 8 6 .
34 Greece agreed to apply upon accession the common 
structural policy in the fisheries sector but with 
a five-year derogation allowing certain fishing re­
strictions between Italy and Greece. See ibid..
Annex I, pp. 84-85, and Act of Accession,
arts. 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 .
35 MEMO-GR/9/78, pp. 1-2; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
pp. 82-84. These transitional measures were to 
follow the arrangements agreed upon for the other 
agricultural products.
36 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 10; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 16.
37 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 11; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 18.
38 CONF-GR/13/79, p. 26; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 10.
39 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 11.
40 Ibid., p. 12; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 17; MEMO-GR/19/78, 
p. 19; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 14; Act
of Accession, art. 65, par. 1. Before finally agreeing 
on this point, the Greek delegation had attempted
316
to establish that measures having an equivalent effect 
to customs duties should be abolised over the tran­
sitional period at the same rate as customs duties 
vis-a-vis the Community and third countries. See 
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 19. For a similar attempt with 
respect to import deposits see MEMO-GR/3/77, pp. 4-5.
41 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 17;
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 19; Act of Accession, art. 65, 
par. 1. Greece’s initial request for a gradual 
abolition of certain quantitative restrictions during 
the transitional period was not accepted. See 
MEMO-GR/3/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/55/78, p. 12; 
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 17.
42 MEMO-GR/3/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 10-11; 
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 16; 
Act of Accession, arts. 64, par. 1, and 65, par. 1.
An exception was made in the case of beef and veal, 
for which the progressive abolition of customs duties 
on imports was to be effected in five annual stages 
of 2 0 % each, at the beginning of each marketing year 
following accession (see Act of Accession, art. 64, 
p a r . 1 >.
43 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 10; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 16.
44 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 15; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17; Act of 
Accession, art. 64, par. 1.
45 CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 15, 28; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, pp. 23-24, 32-33;
Act of Accession, art. 64, par. 3.
46 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 15.
47 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 4.
48 CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 14.
49 MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/34/77, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/55/78, 
p. 11; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 17; Act of Accession, art. 64, 
par. 2 (a).
50 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 16; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 18;
CONF-GR/13/79, p. 26; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 11; Act of 
Accession, art. 64, par. 2(b).
51 CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 16-17; MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 18-19; 
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 17; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 7. 
According to the mixed method under (b), the com­
ponents of the two duties are determined as follows: 
the basic duty is gradually reduced to zero from
its initial level, while the target duty is gradually
317
increased from zero to its final level, both movements 
following the agreed timetable. The same method was 
also applied in the case of industrial products.
52 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 6 ; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 19. This 
principle was to apply in the case of imports as 
well as of exports.
53 MEMO-GR/1/77, p. 2; MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/4/77, 
p. 1 .
54 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 12.
55 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 20. This list is presented in 
Annex II Of CONF-GR/98/78.
56 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 19.
The agreed list of restricted products (Annex II
of CONF-GR/98/78) reappears in Annex III of 
CONF-GR/111/78.
57 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 20; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 16.
58 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 18; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 19.
59 CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 15.
60 MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 5. Cf. MEMO-GR/1/77, p. 9.
61 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 7; CONF-GR/55/78, p. 13;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 20.
62 CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 13-14; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 21.
63 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 14; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 20; Act of 
Accession, art. 117, par. 2. It was agreed that these 
procedures and principles would also be applied by 
Greece in adopting the Community system of generalized 
preferences with respect to agricultural products,
as well as any autonomous suspension granted by the 
Community. See CONF-GR/55/78, p. 15; CONF-GR/98/78, 
p. 22; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 23.
64 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 15; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 21.
65 Quite apart from these points, the question of Greece's 
trade relations was also raised in connection with
her fishery agreements. The Community reserved the 
right to propose the denunciation of these agreements 
before they expired, while allowing at the same time 
for the possibility of incorporating Greek fishing 
rights into the existing Community agreements with 
the third countries in question. However, if an 
existing agreement between Greece and a third country
318
was kept in force after accession, it was not to 
be renewed when it expired but replaced by the corre­
sponding Community agreement. See CONF-GR/24/79,
Annex I, p. 82.
<66 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 15; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 21. As an
exception to this rule, Greece was allowed to retain 
the quota of red wine granted autonomously to her 
by Switzerland (CONF-GR/98/78, p. 20).
(67 CONF-GR/55/78, P. 14.
6 8 MEMO-GR/19/78, P. 21 .
69 CONF-GR/14/79, P. 4.
70 CONF-GR/98/78, P. 2 1 .
71 Ibid.
72 MEMO-GR/19/78, P. 22; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I,
73 MEMO-GR/1/77, P- 8 ; MEMO-GR/11/78, p. 1 & Annex
74 CONF-GR/98/78, P. 2 2 .
75 CONF-GR/11/77 , P- 1 0 .
76 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 23; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, 
p. 23 & Corrigendum 1.
77 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/55/78, p. 7. 
Cf. CONF-GR/101/78, pp. 1-2.





9; MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 1; 
5.
80 CONF-GR/55/78, P- 4.
81 CONF-GR/34/77, P. 4; CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 5, 8 .
S 2 CONF-GR/55/78, P. 5; CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 4-5.
83 CONF-GR/98/78, P- 5.
84 CONF-GR/100/78 , pp. 1, 3; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 1.
85 CONF-GR/6/76, 
CONF-GR/101/78
pp. 6 , 9; CONF-GR/81/78, p. 3;
, pp. 1-2; MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 4-5




1, 3; C0NF-GR/20/77, p. 5; 
4; CONF-GR/101/78, pp. 1-2.
87 MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 1; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 2.
319
8 8  CONF-GR/101/78, p. 2.
89 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 7.
90 CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 8 ; Act of Accession, 
arts. 59, par. 2, and 73. Prior to accepting the 
final compromise, the Greek delegation had offered
a six-year transitional period, limited to processed 
tomatoes and fresh peaches and subject to the follow­
ing conditions: (a) the same six-year transitional 
period would apply to livestock products and milk 
products; (b) for certain products for which immedi­
ate, or almost immediate, application of the CAP 
provisions presented no problem, the immediate ar ­
rangement to be adopted should provide that the 
price plus aid would constitute the norm price and 
intervention price. See CONF-GR/110/78, pp. 1-2.
91 CONF-GR/14/79, Addendum; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
Addendum, p. 19; CONF-GR/31/79, Annex p. 3. In this 
as in other instances, it is useful to refer back 
to the initial statement of the Greek delegation 
during the opening of the negotiations; it helps place 
in the proper perspective a number of negotiating 
points, such as the one presently considered. See 
CONF-GR/6/76, pp. 8-9.
92 Greece’s considerable stocks of certain agricultural 
products--especially cereals, tobacco, olive oil, 
and sugar--arising from the Government’s policy of 
market regulation could interfere after accession 
with the management of the Community markets con­
cerned. An agreement was accordingly reached for 
the elimination of these stocks by Greece prior
to accession. Upon accession, any remaining stocks 
apart from normal carry-over quantities would have 
to be eliminated according to Community procedures, 
with Greece incurring the cost of their disposal 
and management. See CONF-GR/98/78, p. 44;
MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 38-39; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, 
p. 31; Act of Accession, art. 71. (Exceptionally, 
any stocks of tobacco and hops coming from harvests 
prior to accession were to be entirely eliminated.
See CONF-GR/31/79, Annex, p. 5; Act of Accession, 
a r t . 8 8 .)
93 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/81/78, p. 4; 
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 9; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 13;
CONF-GR/13/79, p. 7; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 3; Act Of 
Accession, art. 59, par. l; Final Act, joint decla­
ration on the joint examination procedure of the 
annual changes in prices of agricultural products 
in Greece during the period prior to accession. 
Greece’s preference was for the reference period
to be as close as possible to the year of accession. 
See MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 13; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 3.
320
94 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 9; Act of Accession, art. 58, 
par. 2 .
95 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/81/78, p. 4;
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 9; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 13;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 10; Act of Accession, 
art. 59, pars. 1, 3, 4.
96 CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 5, 9; MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 6 , 8 , 14;
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 4; Act of Accession, art. 60.
(Article 60 also provides for an immediate price 
alignment if the price in Greece or the price on
the world market for a given product is higher than 
the Community price.)
97 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/13/79, p. 8 ;
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 4; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 5.
98 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 14.
99 CONF-GR/55/78, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 7;
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 9; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 9; 
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 2; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 3; Final Act, declaration by the Hellenic 
Republic on monetary questions.
100 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 12; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 14; Act of 
Accession, art. 61, par. 1.
101 CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 12-14; MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 14, 16;
Act of Accession, arts. 61 (pars. 1, 2, 3(b)), 62.
102 CONF-GR/81/78, p. 4.
103 CONF-GR/110/78, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9.
104 CONF-GR/13/79, p. 22; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 17; Act of Accession, art. 61, par. 5 
(this article also provides for the possibility of 
derogation from this rule). For Greece’s objections 
and counterproposals see MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 15; 
CONF-GR/110/78, p. 6 ; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9.
105 Special rules were also established in the case of 
pigmeat, poultrymeat, and eggs. See CONF-GR/98/78,
p. 14; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 15; CONF-GR/108/78, p. 5.
106 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 13; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 5;
MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 14-15; CONF-GR/108/78, p. 5; 
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 13; CONF-GR/13/79, p. 22; 
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, 
p. 17.













MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 13; CONF-GR/110/78, p. 5;
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 8 .
CONF-GR/13/79, p. 18.
CONF-GR/110/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
Addendum, p. 16; Act of Accession, art. 75.
CONF-GR/6/76, p. 9; MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 2; 
CONF-GR/20/77, p. 5; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 38.
CONF-GR/34/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 43;
CONF-GR/13/79,' p. 20; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 8 . In a 
further attempt, the Greek delegation reformulated 
its position requesting a standard reduction in the 
accession compensatory amounts with respect to these 
products. Apparently, however, this proposal was 
not taken up in the negotiations. See CONF-GR/14/79, 
p. 9; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum.
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 11; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 11; 
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 11; Act of Accession, 
art. 6 8 , par. 2 .
CONF-GR/55/78, pp. 6 , 9; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 10; 
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 2; Act of Accession, art. 69, 
p a r . 1 .
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 8 ; CONF-GR/13/79, p. 6 .
MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 12, 17; CONF-GR/13/79, p. 6 ;
CONF-GR/14/79, pp. 3, 8 ; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
Addendum, p. 9.
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 27.
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 8 ; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 10; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, pp. 3, 27, 29-31; 
CONF-GR/29/79, Annex, annex 1; Act of Accession, 
art. 69; Final Act, joint declaration on the procedure 
for the joint examination of national aids granted 
by the Hellenic Republic in the field of agriculture 
during the period prior to accession. The Greek 
national aids, together with the corresponding cri­
teria applicable in each case, are listed in annex 2  
(pp. 12-25, 27) Of the Annex Of CONF-GR/29/79 (the 
conclusions reached with respect to table grapes 
appear on p. 27 of annex 2). In the particular case 
of fertilizers, national aid was to be maintained on 
a temporary basis--without, however, hampering the 
progressive liberalization of trade or the abolition 
of exclusive import rights for this product category, 
on which an agreement was reached under the customs- 
union chapter. See CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, annex 1, 
Addendum, p. 30; CONF-GR/29/79, Annex, annex 1, p. 9 
& annex 2, pp. 22. Cf. also MEMO-GR/1/78, pp. 4-5.
322
119 CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 4. See also 
Act of Accession, arts. 69 (par. 1), 70 (pars. 1,
2 tbl>.
120 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 8 ; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 10;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 9; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
Addendum, p. 31; Act of Accession, arts. 6 8 , par. 2, 
and 69, par. 1. Greek aids to which corresponded simi­
lar but lower Community aids are listed in annex 2 
(p. 26) of the Annex of CONF-GR/29/79, together with 
the criteria applicable in each case.
121 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 11; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 12;
CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 11; Act of Accession, 
art. 6 8 , par. 2 .
122 CONF-GR/98/78, p. 11; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 12;
CONF-GR/13/79, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 3; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 4; Final Act, 
joint declaration on sugar, milk products, olive
oil and products processed from fruit and vegetables. 
Rules were also laid down for products subject to 
a production refund, such as cereals for starch pro­
duction; in their case, the amount of the refunds 
would be calculated on the basis of the differences 
between Greek and Community prices during the tran­
sitional period. See CONF-GR/98/78, p. 11;
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 12; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 11.
123 CONF-GR/101/78, pp. 2-3; MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 11, 16, 
23-25; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 24 & Annex II,
p. 3; MEMO-GR/1/79, pp. 2, 9; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
p. 12 & Addendum, p. 6 .
124 CONF-GR/101/78, p. 5; CONF-GR/110/78, p. 2;
CONF-GR/13/79, p. 17; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 7.
125 CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 26.
126 Ibid. See also Final Act, joint declaration on sugar, 
milk products, olive oil and products processed from 
fruit and vegetables.
127 CONF-GR/100/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 3.
128 CONF-GR/101/78, p. 4.
129 CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 26; Final Act, joint 
declaration on sugar, milk products, olive oil and 
products processed from fruit and vegetables.
130 MEMO-GR/3/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/20/77, p. 5;
MEMO-GR/10/77, p. 1. The Greek delegation also in­
tended to submit a specific request with respect 
to alcohol; but, given that at the time of the ne­
gotiations a Community proposal was also under way
323
for this product, the submission of the Greek request 
was postponed and, apparently, finally cancelled, 
see MEMO-GR/3/77, pp. 4-5; CONF-GR/34/77, p. 5; 
MEMO-GR/10/77, p. 8 .
131 MEMO-GR/10/77, p. 9.
132 MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 4; MEMO-GR/10/77, pp. 6 -8 ; 
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 35; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 5.
133 In addition to the protocol, see also CONF-GR/34/77, 
p. 5; CONF-GR/98/78, p. 35; CONF-GR/101/78, p. 5; 
MEMO-GR/19/78, pp. 27, 32-33; CONF-GR/108/78, p. 3; 
CONF-GR/110/78, p. 2; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 27; 
CONF-GR/14/79, pp. 12-13; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, 
Addendum, pp. 20-22.
134 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 5; MEMO-GR/10/77, pp. 1-3; 
CONF-GR/98/78, p. 25; C0NF-GR/101/78, p. 5. The Greek 
delegation made another alternative proposal, ac­
cording to which the existing common organization
of the market for fresh fruit & vegetables would 
be adapted to suit the nature of the products in 
question; this, however, was clearly regarded by 
Greece as a choice inferior to her main proposal.
See MEMO-GR/10/77, pp. 1-3.
135 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 26; CONF-GR/108/78, p. 3;
CONF-GR/110/78, p. 3; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 24;
CONF-GR/14/79, pp. 6 , 13.
136 MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 26; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 13.
137 CONF-GR/98/78, pp. 24-26; CONF-GR/108/78, p. 3; 
MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 26; CONF-GR/111/78, Annex I, p. 24; 
Act of Accession, arts. 65, par. 2, and 70.
138 MEMO-GR/3/77, p. 4; CONF-GR/34/77, p. 5;
CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9; CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I,
Addendum, p. 18. As an alternative solution, Greece 
proposed the adoption of special measures for this 
product under the Community's sociostructural policy 
for agriculture. At a later stage, however, this 
proposal was also withdrawn. See CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, Addendum, p. 18.
139 CONF-GR/34/77, p. 5; MEMO-GR/10/77, pp. 3-6;
CONF-GR/13/79, p. 20; CONF-GR/14/79, p. 9;
Act of Accession, art. 65, par. 2.
140 CONF-GR/100/78, pp. 2-3; MEMO-GR/19/78, p. 10; 
MEMO-GR/1/79, p. 2.
CHAPTER VII
OTHER FIELDS OF COMMUNITY ACTIVITY
In the present chapter the analysis of the conduct 
and outcome of the negotiations is rounded off by examining 
the remaining dossiers, with an emphasis on substantive 
issues that were resolved within the mainstream of the 
negotiations. As with the previous chapters, the intention 
is not to be exhaustive down to the last detail, since, 
in many instances, points that were earmarked as substan­
tive from a legal perspective acquire in retrospect second­
ary significance, especially when viewed through the global 
prism of the negotiations as a whole. Similarly, certain 
dossiers which were almost entirely resolved at the tech­
nical level, i.e. within the examination of the Community 
secondary legislation, 1 are not examined below, following 
the methodological framework adopted in the present research.
A. Free Movement of Capital 
While accepting the acquis communautaire in this 
field, the Greek delegation maintained that in certain
2
cases transitional arrangements would have to be provided.
The principal justification for such arrangements was 
the fear of balance-of-payments difficulties, given that 
in recent years persistent deficits on the current account
had been financed to a large extent by the entry of private
. . , 3capital.
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The Community recognized the need for a transi­
tional period, agreeing with the Greek side that its length 
should generally be five years and be equally applicable 
in the case of transitional measures as in the case of 
temporary derogations.^ Although the Community’s preference 
was clearly on the side of transitional measures involving 
gradual liberalization, it was recognized that liberal­
ization could not be gradual in certain cases (such as 
those involving various investments by Greek residents 
made in the member states of the Community) which, owing 
to their nature, required the adoption of temporary de­
rogations .5
Within the above framework, a basic distinction 
was drawn between capital movements and current payments 
connected with capital movements: it was agreed that while 
transitional arrangements could be justified with respect 
to the former, the latter had to be liberalized upon ac­
cession, following the provisions of the Treaty of Rome 
(article 67, paragraph 2 ) . 6 This in turn led to the question 
of blocked funds belonging to Community residents. The 
negotiators agreed on specific rules for their gradual 
liberalization over a five-year transitional period; but 
the requirement remained that since current payments con­
nected with capital movements had to be liberalized upon 
accession, they could not be credited to blocked funds.7 
The analysis that follows focuses on different types of 
capital movements and their specific problems as identified 
and resolved in the negotiations.
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l. Direct Investments
Two cases were distinguished and negotiated sepa­
rately under this heading: direct investments by Greek 
residents made in the member states of the Community and 
direct investments by Community residents made in Greece.
With respect to the first case, the Community 
accepted the Greek request for a five-year temporary de­
rogation for the liberalization of the investments in 
question, on the understanding that Greece would proceed 
from the date of accession towards a substantial relax-
Q
ation of the rules governing them. On the other hand, 
current payments connected with such direct investments 
made prior to accession had to be liberalized upon ac­
cession, following the agreed general principle previously 
g
noted.
The case of direct investments made by Community 
residents in Greece involved a more complex set of questions 
and a greater effort on the part of the two sides towards 
a compromise solution. The difficulties centered not on 
postaccession investments, which were to be liberalized 
immediately upon entry, 10 but on investments made prior 
to accession and the repatriation of the corresponding 
capital and profits.
In the initial Greek position both capital and 
profits were treated symmetrically: the request was for 
a five-year temporary derogation for their complete liber­
alization. With a line of defence based on balance-of- 
payments difficulties, the Greek delegation wanted profits
327
accruing from direct foreign investments to be credited 
to blocked accounts and freed for export after the transi­
tional period. Similarly, capital was to be liberalized 
for repatriation only after the five-year transitional 
period, thus allowing for the retainment within the tran­
sitional period of the existing system of partial liberal­
ization of foreign capital and profits as it had evolved 
within the framework of Greece’s postwar foreign-investment 
policy . 11
The difficulties encountered in this area of the
negotiations stemmed from the differences between the
two sides in their treatment of capital vis-d-vis profits
and of capital vis-^-vis capital gains. The Community
rejected the Greek position and, referring once more to
its general principle, distinguished between profits and
capital: profits had to be liberalized immediately upon
accession; capital, although not allowed to be restricted
within a temporary derogation, could be liberalized pro-
12gressively within transitional measures. While recog­
nizing the relevance of Greece's worries with respect 
to her balance of payments, the Community also saw benefits 
accruing to Greece from such liberalization, especially
due to its positive effects on the general investment
13climate in Greece. The Community view coincided with 
an easing of Greece's demands, in particular with her 
willingness to move away from temporary derogations and 
towards progressive transitional measures . 14 However, 
this was not enough for a final agreement to be secured.
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For even though Greece had accepted the Community view
on profits, her willingness to accept the Community view
on capital did not extend to capital gains--much to the
Community’s disagreement, its requirement being that ca-
15pital and capital gains be treated inseparably.
In the final agreement reached, following a com­
promise proposal by the Greek delegation, separate treat­
ment was accorded to Community investments made after 
12 June 1975, i.e. after the date of Greece’s formal appli­
cation to join the Community, and to investments made 
before that date; the former category of investments was 
to be completely liberalized upon accession, while the 
latter was to be the subject of a three-year temporary 
derogation, both categories covering equally capital as 
well as capital gains . 16
2. Investments in Real Estate 
The dividing line in the debate on this topic 
was once more the distinction between investments and 
income accruing from such investments, with a further 
distinction between Greek residents and Community 
residents. 17
With respect to real-estate investments made by 
Greek residents in another member state, a special category 
that had to be singled out was investments by workers 
emigrating to another member state under the free-movement- 
of-labour provisions. Although it was easily agreed that 
the proceeds of their liquidation would be immediately
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liberalized upon accession, the question of exactly which
groups of workers were covered under this category pre-
1 8sented certain complications. Fearing balance-of-payments
repercussions, the Greek delegation wanted to exclude
from this liberalization capital transfers by self-employed
19workers, thereby limiting it to employees only. The
Community, on the other hand, regarded this distinction
as running counter to Community rules--a position on which
20the Greek delegation had to concede. However, its criti­
cisms were mainly centered on those capital transfers con­
nected with the free establishment of workers, whether em­
ployed or self-employed, in another member state--wi1 1 ing, 
in the final compromise reached, to accept limitations 
within temporary derogations on other kinds of capital
21transfers by self-employed Greek residents who emigrate.
This solution coincided with the granting of similar tran­
sitional derogations for the liberalization of real-estate
investments made in another member state by Greek residents
22in general, quite apart from the above special categories.
Turning now to Community residents, their real- 
estate investments made in Greece were distinguished be­
tween those made prior to accession and those to be made 
after accession. While the latter were to be immediately 
liberalized, the former were to be liberalized progres­
sively over a five-year transitional period, with the
proceeds of their liquidation credited to blocked funds
23and freed over the transitional period. Agreement on
this point did not come without criticism of the Greek
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delegation’s line of argument which, while raising once 
more the balance-of-payments issue, was not in a position 
to quantify the magnitude of the difficulties involved 
under the hypothesis of an immediate liberalization.2^
On the question of income accruing from real-estate 
investments made before accession by Community residents* 
the Greek delegation attempted to establish a five-year 
transitional arrangement, only to be opposed by the Com­
munity on grounds of principle, since such income (whether 
derived from preaccession or postaccession investments) 
was a current payment and as such had to be liberalized
25
immediately upon accession.
The above analysis has focused on various issues
raised in connection with capital movements under articles
67 et seq. of the Treaty of Rome. To complete it, mention
should also be made of the agreement reached with respect
to operations in securities, whereby the existing system
(which banned Greek residents from operating in securities
in another state) would be liberalized after a five-year
26temporary derogation. However, the negotiations under 
the present dossier were not confined to matters strictly 
related to capital movements but also covered questions 
on invisible transactions falling under article 106 (para­
graph 3) and annex III of the Treaty of Rome. In the final 
agreement reached, all such transactions were to be liber­
alized upon accession--with the exception of tourist allow­
ances for Greek residents for which five-year transitional
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arrangements were accepted, leading gradually and progres-
27sively to their total liberalization.
Looking at the dossier on capital movements as 
a whole, a common theme that stands out is Greece's repet­
itive signalling of potential balance-of-payments dangers 
should liberalization proceed immediately. Assuming that 
the magnitude of such a danger was indeed significant, 
one is impressed by the Greek delegation’s lack of sup­
porting evidence--which brings once more in the discussion 
a recurrent theme observed in the course of the negoti­
ations. The mere presentation of the Greek position without 
the rallying of hard facts and estimates proved once more 
an inadequate line of defence, no matter how real the 
problem or how eloquent its statement. This weakness, 
which unfortunately was never fully driven home, coupled 
with the Community delegation’s often-observed tendency 
to hold on to a rigid and narrow interpretation of the 
Community rules and regulations, meant that political 
manoeuvres could easily evaporate on the negotiating table 
if they lacked the support of solid evidence.
B. Right of Establishment and Freedom 
to Provide Services
Along with Greece's acceptance of the acquis com-
munautaire in this field came her willingness to align
upon accession her legislation with the corresponding
28Community legislation. The intended elimination of dis­
criminatory restrictions on Community nationals--while 
retaining them in most cases with respect to third-country
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nationals--covered both existing general or ’’horizontal”
restrictions and specific restrictions on certain occu- 
29pations. Greece’s commitment to such liberalization was 
limited, naturally, to those areas where the Community 
had, at the time of the negotiations, established common 
coordinating measures for occupations; for any new Com­
munity acts that might be adopted during the intervening
period up to the date of accession, Greece was offered
30a three-year transitional period for applying them.
Obviously, these transitional arrangements affected only
the application of common coordinating measures and not
the principle of eliminating restrictions with respect
to nationality and residence--a principle which held on
the basis of articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty of Rome and
was therefore immediately applicable for all activities
31covered by article 52.
Within the acceptance of the above framework,
the Greek delegation withdrew most of the reservations
that it had placed during the examination of Community
secondary legislation, a major exception being its reser-
32vations relating to the security zones. The problem 
centered on the existence of restrictions on foreign na­
tionals for real-estate transactions, imposed by Greece in 
its frontier regions for reasons of security and defence. 
Despite objections by the Community delegation, which 
could not see exactly how such discrimination against 
Community nationals could be justified in the name of 
national defence, the Greek delegation reserved the right
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to continue applying such restrictions--though on a more
narrow ’’control zone” along its northern borders--in ac-
33cordance with articles 48 and 52 of the Treaty of Rome.
C. Social Policy
l. Free Movement of Workers 
The introduction of the free movement of Greek 
workers within the Community as a principle to be imme­
diately applicable upon accession was the essence of the
34Greek delegation’s opening position in this dossier. 
However, as the negotiations progressed, it became clear 
that the Greek side could not hope for such an arrangement. 
Faced with serious social and economic problems connected 
with the presence of large numbers of foreign workers 
within its territory at a time of economic recession and 
high unemployment, the Community was not willing to extend 
freedom of movement to Greek workers without any con­
straints. It was Germany that had the most serious reserv­
ations on this matter given that it was the recipient 
of the vast majority of Greek migrant workers entering
35the Community (in 1971 the corresponding figure was 98%).
Referring to Greek demographic trends as well as to the
state of the employment market in Europe, the Community
delegation insisted that freedom of movement of workers
should be extended to Greece only within the maximum tran-
3 6sitional arrangements. This being its position on the 
general principle, the Community was nevertheless willing 
to offer immediate application upon accession of certain
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specific provisions relating to the elimination of discrim­
inatory treatment of workers from Greece and the granting 
of employment priority to Greek workers over workers from 
third countries (though not over Community workers). Al­
though these arrangements meant that the status of the 
Greek workers already employed in member states would 
be improved as from accession, they fell short of equal­
izing it with the status of workers from the existing 
member states .3 7
Quite apart from these considerations, the Greek 
Government continued to press for the free movement of 
workers--its insistence on this matter stemming to a large 
extent from a concern with public opinion at home and 
the fear that its acceptance of a transitional constraint 
on such an important principle of Community policy would 
be exploited by the opposition. In an effort to show that 
the Community reservations were exaggerated, the Greek 
delegation reacted by pointing to the recent trend (the
1973-76 average) of the inflow of Greek workers returning
38home being almost double their outflow; and by alluding 
to the fact that the Community’s fears lay not with Greek 
workers but with Portuguese and Spanish ones--the Greek 
issue being used as a front against the setting of pre-
39cedents vis-^-vis the future enlargement of the Community. 
(The Commission’s Opinion on the Greek application for 
membership and its views on enlargement contained in the 
Fresco provide an interesting contrast in this respect.4 0 ) 
This argument could easily be extended to cover the
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Community’s (especially Germany’s) fears with Turkish
workers, given the association provision for their free
movement by the end of 1986. According to a study by the
German Development Institute,
only if it is possible to achieve a restriction of 
the free movement of labour vis-&-vis the Applicant 
Countries, would it also be possible to come to terms 
with Turkey on an extension of the time-Jable for the 
realization of free movement of labour.
Greece even considered adopting a retaliatory 
move, by threatening to draw back from its agreement on 
the immediate application of the Community provisions on 
the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide ser­
vices and to request transitional arrangements similar to 
the ones requested by the Community in the present case-- 
the argument being that two legally equivalent prin­
ciples, i.e. freedom of movement and freedom of estab­
lishment, should be governed by equivalent transitional 
42arrangements. However, her efforts brought no signs 
of a favourable outcome. According to the final compromise, 
it was only at the end of a seven-year transitional period 
that freedom of movement of workers would be achieved 
(except for certain provisions which, as already mentioned, 
would be immediately applicable upon accession) . 4 3  And 
as it proved, this arrangement could only scrape the sur­
face of the problem, not adequate by itself to alleviate 
member states* fears (Germany’s in particular) of the 
impact that Greek accession might have on the social front. 
(Germany had in fact initially insisted for a twelve-year 
transitional period before finally agreeing with the common
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44position of the Nine for an eight-year period. ) What 
was needed in addition was an escape-valve; and it was 
provided in the form of a joint declaration annexed to 
the Final Act:
The enlargement of the Community could give rise 
to certain difficulties for the social situation in 
one or more Member States as regards the application 
of the provisions relating to the free movement of 
workers.
The Member States declare that they reserve the 
right, should difficulties of that nature arise, to 
bring the matter before the institutions of the Com­
munity in order to obtain a solution to this problem 
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities agg the pro­
visions adopted in application thereof.
Although the agreement reached on the free movement 
of workers was based on the principle of reciprocity, with 
Greece expected to make similar arrangements for workers 
of the other member states and their families,46 the burden 
of adjustment clearly weighed more heavily on Greek workers 
and their families.
2. Other Aspects of Social Policy
In a number of areas the Community secondary legis­
lation was readily accepted by the Greek delegation without 
any need for transitional arrangements or other specific 
requests. These related to equal pay for and equal treat­
ment of men and women, vocational training, occupational 
hygiene, programmes and studies relating to the combatting
of poverty, social research, and the rules governing the
47European Social Fund.
On the question of the Social Fund, given that 
the applicability of its rules was a matter that could
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not be contested, the crucial issue was not one that be­
longed to the negotiating table; it concerned instead 
Greece's potential effectiveness in absorbing credits 
from the Fund's resources. This is a point linked with 
the broader financial impl icat ions of Greek accession, 
and as such it belongs to a study that goes beyond the 
confines of the present research. What should be noted 
in the present context is the inherent weakness of the 
various budgetary projections made at the time of the 
negotiations: estimates of Social Fund assistance are 
especially difficult to make, since they are usually 
based on comparisons of unemployment levels among member 
countries involving different definitions of unemployment
and difficulties in assessing the role of underemploy- 
48ment. Furthermore, given the rules governing the Fund,
Greece’s absorption prospects were rather limited. The
allocation of its resources is not based on fixed and
predetermined national quotas (in contrast to a large
part of the European Regional Development Fund) but varies
with the quality and relevance of the projects submitted
for consideration. This meant that the extent of Greece’s
ability to benefit from the Fund’s operations would depend
primarily on the ability to restructure her administrative
49machinery and government expenditure. The situation 
improved considerably with the adoption of the new orien­
tations of the Social Fund in October 1983; but the in­
ternal organizational weaknesses remain as serious a 
bottleneck as ever.
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Turning now to the negotiating issues that surfaced
in the course of the examination of the Community secondary
legislation, it is observed that the main difficulties
arose in connection with the social security for migrant 
50workers. Like in other areas of Community activity, 
the main issue under this topic was the alignment of Greek 
legislation on the corresponding Community legislation.
At first sight, Greece’s overall legislative frame­
work did not seem to pose any serious problems of adjust­
ment, since the Greek social-security system laid down 
the principle of nondiscrimination with respect to nation­
ality. (An exception to this rule pertained to seamen, 
who had to be of Greek nationality to be eligible for
social-security coverage. Greece intended to abolish this
51provision upon accession.) However, when specific pro­
visions came to be considered, they proved to be a source 
of considerable bargaining, especially in connection with 
Regulation 1408/71 concerning the elimination of discri­
mination in the application of social-security schemes,
which eventually led to the establishment of certain tempo-
52rary derogations in favour of the Community but also 
to certain adjustments eagerly sought by the Greek dele­
gation. Although farmers were not covered by this Regu­
lation, its legal basis limiting it to wage-earning workers,
it was Greece’s contention that Greek farmers should be
53brought within its scope. In the final compromise, given 
the underlying aim of the social-security regulations to 
protect the freedom of movement of workers, the Conference
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agreed to amend Regulation 1408/71 so as to cover all
Greek agricultural workers insured by the State who have
left or leave Greece to take up employment in another 
54member country.
The Conference also resolved certain additional
issues raised by the Greek delegation and relating mostly
to the above Regulation--namely, family allowances under 
55Greek law, early retirement pensions for workers en-
56gaged in arduous or unhealthy occupations, and bilateral 
conventions or agreements.5 7
D. Regional Policy
The debate under the regional-policy dossier
centered not so much on matters relating to the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) as on the regional aspects
of Community competition policy. No special arrangements
were requested in connection with Greece’s participation
in the Regional Fund, given that the relevant acquis com-
munautaire left little negotiating scope. As Papaligouras
underlined in his opening statement, "Greece seeks nothing
which is not in accordance with [Community! rules and
58criteria already applied;" in other words, Greece was
willing to have her percentage ERDF quota determined on
the basis of the common allocative criteria introduced
at the time of the initial percentage distribution of
59the Fund’s resources in 1975.
The question of the Greek ERDF share was not dis­
cussed in the course of the accession negotiations. Since 
the Fund Regulation was due for reexamination, Greece’s
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share was to be determined together with the new revised 
shares of the other member states during the interim pe­
riod .6 0 On the basis of the new allocation of the F u n d ’s 
national quotas, finally agreed in December 1980 after 
three months of considerable debate, the Greek share was 
fixed at l3%--as against 15% that the Commission had ini­
tially proposed. However, this was seen as a provisional 
solution, enabling Greece to participate in the ERDF as 
from accession while postponing the more thorough and 
substantial review of the Fund Regulation for approximately 
one year .61
It is interesting to note that although the Com­
mission proposals for the Greek share were based on certain 
economic criteria (different from the ones employed in 
1975), the concluding compromise should more realistically 
be seen as a political, ad hoc solution. This is not sur­
prising, since the same scenario had occurred at the time 
of the Fund’s establishment, when the Commission’s formally 
determined allocative criteria had to be watered down 
by political "corrective” factors. Whether Greece would 
have benefitted from a stricter adherence to formal rules 
remains an open question. What is certain, however, is 
that the Community’s ultimate decision to exclude from 
its calculations the Athens-Piraeus area meant, quite 
apart from other considerations, that Greece had to accept 
a lower share than she had hoped for. Curiously enough, 
it was the Greek Government itself that had undermined 
its own position: the virtual exclusion of the Athens-
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Piraeus industry from the recently revised Greek regional - 
aid scheme provided the Commission with the raison d ’etre 
for the exclusion of these areas from its final quota 
calculations.
Important as it may be, the exclusion of these 
areas was by no means the central problem. Hidden behind it 
were much broader issues relating to the regional aspects 
of the Community’s competition policy. For what the Greek 
delegation was in effect aiming at was the designation 
of Greece as a single region in need of development and 
as a maximum-aid area from the point of view of the Com­
munity scheme for the coordination of state regional 
62aids. The maximum-aid request was implicit in the request 
for a Community declaration recognizing the importance 
of state aids for Greece’s industrialization and economic 
development--which in turn became the nucleus of Greece’s 
position in seeking such a declaration in the form of
C O
a protocol to be inserted in the instruments of accession.
Greece’s strategy was to have her national aids 
interpreted as regional aids. It would then take a short 
step to defend their consistency with the spirit of article 
92 (paragraph 3 [a)> of the Treaty of Rome, according to 
which state aids may be considered to be compatible with 
the common market if they are necessary for the economic 
development of an area with a low standard of living.6^
The rationale behind this approach becomes clear when one 
recognizes that, with almost half of the Greek industry 
being located in the greater Athens-Piraeus area, such an
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interpretation would enhance Greece’s hopes to retain 
certain horizontal aids (such as tax incentives for in­
dustrial exports) after accession.6 5
What throws additional light on Greece’s position 
is the way in which her regional problems reveal a strik­
ingly different picture when seen from a national as op­
posed to a Community perspective. Within a national frame­
work, it is reasonable to draw dividing lines among areas 
and apply a differentiated system of regional aids to them, 
distinguishing developed areas (such as greater Athens 
and Attiki) from underdeveloped ones (e.g. Epirus). From 
a Community perspective, however, such a distinction, 
though still valid, becomes secondary to the fact that 
it is the whole of Greece that needs to be developed vis-
Ft Ft
&-vis the rest of the European Community. Substantial 
as the internal regional differences may be, they tend 
nevertheless to be less pronounced than the differences 
in living standards that exist between Greece as a whole 
and the EEC average--all the more so given the widening 
gap between rich and poor Community regions.
Greece’s acceptance of the Community principles 
and rules of competition involved no adjustments or tran­
sitional arrangements.6 7 And of course, the compatibility 
of Greek state aids with these rules was not subject to 
negotiations but a matter that could only be settled after 
accession, since the review of a member state’s system of 
state aids was the task of the Commission, empowered by the 
Treaty of Rome to request for any necessary adjustments
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in the national aid system or the discontinuation of na-
68tional aids, as the case may be. Although not publicly 
admitted, such a prospect was a source of considerable 
concern for Greece; nevertheless, past experience did 
suggest that the exercise of this power was tempered in
practice with a certain degree of flexibility and dis-
69cretion. In turn, this was closely connected with the 
question of which regions and zones of the national terri­
tory would be eligible for ERDF assistance. Although they 
were limited under the existing Fund Regulation to those 
regions in which the member states applied their regional- 
aid systems, and thus determined in the first instance 
by the member states themselves, it was ultimately up 
to the Commission to assess the social and economic grounds 
for such a demarcation, on the basis of articles 92 et seq. 
of the Treaty of Rome and the compatibility of the national 
schemes with the Community rules.
Taken as a whole, these considerations underline 
the fact that Greece’s efforts for the designation of 
the whole country as a single development area within 
the enlarged Community did not constitute an issue that 
could possibly be negotiated with the Council but rather 
one to be examined with the Commission after accession.
This is in sharp contrast with the treatment that Greece 
received under her Association Agreement, which expressly 
recognized the whole of the country as a special devel­
opment area. However, given that Greece had negotiated 
her Association Agreement with the Commission and not with
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the Council, one cannot easily set up the two cases for 
comparison, let alone rely on the association experience 
as precedent for the accession negotiations as the Greek 
delegation attempted to d o .7 0 Since the association pro­
vision was envisaged as a ten-year transitional arrange­
ment, the link between the two cases had become too weak 
after fifteen years of rapid development of the Greek 
economy and equally rapid evolution of the Community in 
the fields of regional policy and competition policy. But 
even if such a link could theoretically be established, 
the Community was reluctant to recognize it, since so 
much more was at stake on the negotiation table with ac ­
cession that with association.
The only hope then left for Greece was to secure 
a "framework" protocol within the instruments of accession 
recognizing the country’s special problems of industrial­
ization and hence the importance of state aids for its 
economic development. In fact, the Greek delegation’s 
efforts focused on the acceptance of a protocol identical 
to the one negotiated by Ireland.71
The Community had no difficulty in agreeing to
such a protocol. An early evidence of this attitude can
be traced to the Commission’s Opinion on the Greek appli-
72cation for accession which contains such a suggestion.
What was effectively recognized with such a protocol was 
that articles 92 et seq. of the Treaty allowed for a flex­
ible interpretation in so far as their application was 
concerned, so as to take account in the case of Greece
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of one of the Treaty’s essential objectives as enshrined
in its Preamble — namely, the harmonious development of
the economies of the member states through the reduction
73of their regional disparities.
An extension of this position was that Greece’s 
requirements for industrialization and development would 
be duly considered within the means and procedures envis­
aged in the Treaty. At the same time, however, the Com­
munity .maintained that the protocol should also include 
a statement to the effect that the application of the 
Community rules on state aids should not be compromised 
and that the Commission’s postaccession assessment of
Greece’s regional development zones should not be pre- 
74judiced. Given that such a statement was not included 
in the Irish case, Greece insisted that it should not 
appear in the text of her protocol: although the principle 
to which the statement referred was not questioned, it 
was argued that its inclusion in the protocol might 
compromise Greece's freedom of policy choices within the 
limits of Community law— Greece having the option, theoret­
ically, not to resort to a designation of regional zones
75in the first instance. In the final compromise reached,
the controversial passage was excluded from the relevant
text, in which it was simply recognized that
in the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC 
Treaty, it will be necessary to take into account 
the objectives of economic expansion and the raising 
of the standard of living of the population.
As the postaccession experience revealed, the
protocol did provide a basis for defending Greece’s
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interests and development prospects within the Community, 
though the extent of its adequacy in this respect remains 
an open question. And looking at the Irish experience-- 
in particular the relative ease with which Ireland was 
eventually recognized as a single, maximum-aid development 
area--one cannot help wondering whether the Irish and 
Greek protocols might be different in their substance 
even though identical in their textual surface. The fact 
that a Community regional policy was at a prenatal stage 
during the previous enlargement negotiations, allowing 
for an additional degree of freedom in the relevant dis­
cussions, lends support to this view. Furthermore, the 
Irish protocol was supplemented with a Community and an 
Irish Declaration, inserted in the 1972 Final Act. Although 
they roughly correspond to a similar exchange of positions 
between the Community and Greek delegations in the course 
of the Greek negotiations, the fact remains that the Greek 
documents of accession do not contain such formal decla­
rations.
E. Transport Policy 
The examination of Community secondary legislation 
with respect to transport revealed a limited number of 
substantive issues, which were settled rather painlessly 
in the negotiations. The two major problems arose from 
the special geographical location of Greece vis-3-vis 
the rest of the Community, i.e. from the absence of common 
frontiers and the consequent need for all road traffic 
to and from Greece to pass through Yugoslavia and Austria.
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Firstly, Greece wanted to have the part of the road journey 
through the transit countries ignored or "neutralized” 
for the purpose of applying Community arrangements for 
the liberalization of transport, in the same way that 
sea transit was neutralized under the previous enlargement 
negotiations.7 7 Secondly, Greece wanted the Community to 
engage in negotiations with Yugoslavia and Austria with a 
view to facilitating the passage of traffic through their 
territory, thus ensuring that the Community liberalization 
measures with respect to access to the market in road trans­
port would be properly applied and that Greece would not
78be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the Community.
Greece’s request for the neutralization of its
road transit was not accepted; as the Community noted,
Greece’s situation was not unique, already existing in
connection with Community transit traffic through Switzer-
79land and Austria. On the other hand, this left room
for dealing with some of the Greek difficulties after 
80accession. With respect to the second request, the Com­
munity agreed to initiate negotiations with the transit 
countries after the signature of the instruments of ac­
cession; the negotiation procedure to be followed would 
be the same as the one concluded under the dossier on
external commercial relations in connection with prefer-
81ential agreements.
Greece was also granted grace periods ranging
in length from one to four years for the application of
82certain Community acts on transport.
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F. Economic and Financial Affairs 
The European Unit of Account (EUA> that had re­
cently been created presented the negotiators with the 
problem of the inclusion of the Greek drachma in the EUA 
basket. This was the main substantive issue identified
under the present dossier during the examination of the
83relevant Community secondary legislation.
The establishment of the EUA was one of the first 
steps towards monetary stability in Europe. For the attain­
ment of this objective, the EUA had to be used in all 
fields of Community activity, while its composition had 
to be kept as stable as possible. This latter requirement 
meant that the value of the national currencies making 
up the EUA basket should be determined on the same basis 
in all the member states' currency markets. Since the 
national-currency value of the EUA is calculated each 
day by applying to each fixed national-currency amount 
making up the basket the official market exchange rate, 
the first problem facing Greece stemmed from the lack 
of a foreign exchange market and of official drachma quo­
tations on the exchange markets of the Community (the 
drachma exchange rates were being fixed by the Bank of 
Greece). It was the Community's view that this problem 
came first; once solved, the question of including the 
drachma in the EUA basket could then be settled before 
the end of the maximum transitional period.8^
Greece objected to this position, seeing no reason 
why the drachma could not be included in the EUA basket 
from the date of accession, given her commitment to have
349
85an exchange market operational by then. In the words
of the Greek delegation,
the principle that the drachma should not be treated 
differently from the currencies of the other Member 
States is a consequence of Grggce’s equality of status 
with the other Member States.
The drachma’s relative weight in the EUA basket 
was to be very small, not exceeding 2 % according to the 
Commission’s calculations--which meant that a 5% change 
in the value of the drachma would affect the value of the 
EUA in the various currencies by only 0.1%. Hence, since 
the economic and monetary implications of the inclusion 
or noninclusion of the drachma in the EUA were expected 
to be minimal, it is not surprising to find such a tech­
nical matter being approached purely as a question of 
principle with hardly any economic debate.
According to the final compromise, and on the 
assumption of the drachma rate being determined in foreign 
exchange markets, the drachma would be effectively included 
in the EUA basket during the five-year transitional period 
if the basket (following the Community provisions) were to
be reviewed during this period, and in any event by the end
87of the transitional period at the latest. Since there was
no obligation to join the European Monetary System (EMS),
88the Conference did not discuss this question.
G. European Coal & Steel Community 
Certain ECSC issues conceptually linked with others 
belonging to different dossiers have been examined in pre­
vious chapters (as, for example, in the case of ECSC exter­
nal -relati ons issues, examined in chapter V in connection
350
with the dossier on external commercial relations.) On
the other hand, a number of points relating to the ECSC
were negotiated in a manner that parallelled the handling
of corresponding points under the EEC dossiers, especially
those on industrial customs union and external commercial 
89relations. To the extent that the agreements reached 
on these issues simply echoed similar agreements under 
dossiers already examined, the present analysis economizes 
on such duplications by simply noting them.
In this context, the following are the most impor­
tant of such "duplicate” agreements: (l) intra-Community 
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect on 
ECSC products would be abolished reciprocally following 
the same transitional period and the same progressive 
schedule as in the case of residual import duties applied 
by Greece towards the Community on EEC products (the 
twenty-two-year list); (2) Greek import duties would be 
aligned on the ECSC unified tariff within the same tran­
sitional period and the same progressive schedule as in
the case of the alignment of Greek import duties on the 
90CCT. The existence of such similarities does not imply 
that agreement on the above ECSC issues was reached effort­
lessly. In fact, the Greek initial positions were in many 
respects at substantial variance with the Community point 
of view. But the solutions negotiated under the customs- 
union dossier had created precedents strong enough to 
suggest that sooner or later the Greek ECSC positions 
would have to be aligned with them.
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A further case of parallel treatment concerned 
the Greek systems of import deposits and cash payments: 
they were to be progressively abolished, with respect to 
ECSC imports from both the Community and third countries, 
over the same transitional period and under the same tech­
nical arrangements as in the case of EEC industrial pro­
ducts. It should be noted, however, that the similarities 
are confined to the case of import deposits and cash pay­
ments: in contrast to the detailed negotiations with re­
spect to EEC industrial products, all remaining measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
and applying to ECSC products were grouped together and 
negotiated en bloc, with both sides agreeing to abolish 
them upon accession. In a similar fashion, they both agreed
to eliminate upon accession their respective quantitative 
91restrictions.
In addition to the above issues, the negotiators
were faced with certain problems connected with Greece's
application of the ECSC price rules. Based on the principle
92of nondiscriminatory and transparent pricing, the Com­
munity price-list system requires that, for any one pro­
duct, each producer publishes a price established on the 
basis of a single parity point; thus, variations in trans­
port charges are reflected in the delivery price, which
93includes such charges. However, the pricing system that 
Greece proposed was quite a different one: given her geo­
graphical location, she wanted more than one basing point 
to be related to price. What her request amounted to was
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something very close to a Mflat-rateM system according
to which transport charges would be equalized, delivery
94price remaining fixed.
The Community accepted the Greek proposal as a 
five-year temporary derogation. At the same time it recog­
nized that during the transitional period it would be 
necessary to adopt a complementary measure: Community 
producers would not be allowed to lower their delivery 
prices and align them on the Greek delivery price with 
respect to products actually produced in Greece at the 
time of accession--although they would be permitted to 
align their delivery prices in Greece (l) on their price 
lists with respect to other products and (2 ) on delivery
prices in Greece charged by third countries for the same 
95products. It is worth noting that these transitional 
arrangements were similar to those negotiated at the time 
of the previous enlargement.9 6
The above analysis of specific issues that were 
raised under the ECSC dossier should be complemented with 
an examination of certain broader aspects of the ECSC 
negot iati ons.
There were two sides to the problem of Greece’s 
accession to the ECSC: the integration of the Greek iron 
& steel industry into the ECSC and its development within 
the framework of the development of the Community iron & 
steel industry. On this basis, Greece was ready to accept 
the relevant acquis communautaire but with certain
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97transitional arrangements. In her view, the need for
transitional arrangements was deemed even more pressing
on account of two factors: the Association Agreement made
no provisions for ECSC products, and hence there was never
any attempt to align Greek policies with Community ones;
and compared to the Community industry, the Greek iron &
steel industry was underdeveloped, limited in size (its
production of primary steel amounted to less than 1% of
Community production) and mainly geared to the internal
market, lacking domestic sources of fuel and raw materials,
and operating at below capacity--a capacity that was
considered insufficient for the future needs of the eco- 
98nomy.
Although the Community did recognize that tran­
sitional arrangements were necessary in the ECSC chapter,
it was not prepared to grant them to the extent requested
99by the Greek delegation. In the Community view, Greece's 
proposals would end up securing for her iron & steel in­
dustry such a special position within the Community in­
dustry, that there would in effect be two separate poli­
cies, one for Greece and one for the rest of the Commu­
nity . 1 0 0 This became particularly evident when the question 
of the application of the Community's exceptional anti- 
crisis measures was raised: the Greek request amounted 
to a reservation of position on any future developments 
of Community secondary legislation until accession which 
might restrict the development possibilities of the Greek 
iron & steel industry. 101
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The Community’s opposition to the Greek proposals
did not come as a surprise, given that the steel sector
was just as sensitive for the Community as for the Greek
economy. In its view, transitional arrangements should
not end up favouring Greece but should aim at striking
a balance of reciprocal advantages, given that Greece
stood to benefit upon accession from improved access to
the Community market as well as from access to ECSC funds
102and to the Community price system. It was furthermore 
argued that the size of the Greek iron & steel industry 
could not justify transitional arrangements to the extent 
requested by Greece, since this would be discriminatory
103to other member states with an industry of similar size.
Although the Greek delegation did not accept the
Community’s reasoning, noting in particular that it was
the state rather than the size of the Greek industry that
had to be used for comparisons, it was nevertheless forced
to temper its various requests for transitional arrange-
104ments and come to an eventual compromise on this issue.
In particular, many of the Greek requests involving non­
progressive temporary derogations for a five-year period
had to yield to progressive transitional arrangments corn-
105mencing upon accession.
Quite apart from the question of the nature and 
extent of transitional arrangements, the Greek delegation 
was eager to initiate immediately a technical dialogue 
with the Community on the development of the Greek iron 
& steel industry and its outlook within the general ECSC
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objectives and restructuring policy . 1 0 6 The Community 
delegation, on the other hand, was reluctant to open such 
a dialogue concurrently with the accession negotiations, 
wanting evidently to avoid its linkage with the negoti­
ations for transitional arrangements. In the final com­
promise, it was agreed that the dialogue would be conducted 
within the general consultations procedure during the 
interim period; and that its conclusions would be taken
into account in the formulation of Community policy after 
107accession.
H . European Atomic Energy Community 
The EAEC dossier was negotiated rather swiftly: 
it raised only a few, easily resolved problems, and thus 
required only two position papers by each side for its 
completion. Leaving aside institutional issues, which 
together with similar issues relating to the EEC and ECSC 
were examined as a separate dossier, the only problems 
identified and resolved in the course of the negotiations 
related to Greece’s preaccession international obligations, 
health protection, certain confidentiality procedures, 
and capital movements. 1 0 8
*
The present chapter completes Part Two of the 
thesis. The detailed examination of the negotiation dos­
siers leads to the general conclusion that while an ana­
lysis of the relevant documents may help establish the 
pattern and sinuous record of the negotiations, it throws
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little light on the reasoning behind the detailed positions 
held by each side and their motivations in taking a firm or 
a weak line as they converged towards compromise solutions. 
This is a natural outcome of three factors: (1) the es­
sentially technical nature of the internal structure of 
the negotiations, mainly concerned with adjustments to the 
acquis communautaire through transitional arrangements 
rather than with changes in it; (2 ) the emphasis of the
Greek delegation on speed, often at the expense of careful
analysis and detailed argumentation; and (3) the ironing 
out of differences among member states through intra-Com- 
munity negotiations, leading to common positions that 
revealed little more than the tip of the iceberg.
Given these limitations, it has proved more mean­
ingful to interpret the negotiating behaviour of each
side at an aggregate level, considering each dossier in­
tegrally. In this manner, the overall view of the negoti­
ations developed in chapter II complements the sectoral 
analysis undertaken in chapters 111-VII--although the 
broad contours traced in the former inevitably become 
blurred at the more detailed level of the latter.
Up to now the negotiations have been examined 
as a self-contained system. In Part Three the analysis 
is expanded to consider certain wider themes, within which 
the Greek experience is viewed as one segment in the histo­
rical continuum tracing the widening process of European 
integration. In doing so, certain external factors are 
integrated in the mainstream of the analysis as major
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determinants of the overall progress and outcome of the 
negotiations. Within this framework, chapter VIII investi­
gates the causal link between Greece’s association and 
accession regimes (quite apart from the historical link 
examined in chapter I) while chapter IX places the Greek 
negotiations in the context of the Community's process 
of enlargement, both old and new.
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CONF-GR/30/77, p. 10; CONF-GR/35/77, p. 2;
CONF-GR/37/77, p. 3; MEMO-GR/6/78, pp. 1-2;
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application of the ECSC rules on competition--an issue
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that was settled under the ECSC negotiation dossier, 
and one that elicited a line of rather awkward ma­
noeuvres by the Greek delegation. According to the 
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ments were incompatible with the ECSC competition 
rules, then Greece should be granted a five-year 
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necessary adjustments; and, furthermore, the appli­
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Act of Accession, arts. 24 (par. l), 32 (par. l). A 
slight difference did in fact exist between the CCT 
and ECSC-unified-tariff alignment schedules. Alignment 
on the CCT would begin immediately upon accession 
with a 1 0% duty reduction, followed by a further 1 0 % 
reduction on 1 January 1982. On the other hand, align­














grace period of one year--with the first duty re­
duction, amounting to 20%, due on l January 1982.
Apart from this difference, the two schedules were 
identical, involving four annual duty reductions 
of 20% each. In both cases, full alignment was to 
be effected on 1 January 1986. (In the particular 
case of lignite, Greece secured some additional degree 
of protection for her small private lignite mines.
See CONF-GR/17/77, p. 5; CONF-GR/25/77, p. 5;
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108 The following detailed arrangements were concluded:
(a) Greece would respect its preaccession international 
obligations after accession, following the provisions 
of articles 105 and 106 of the EAEC Treaty (a similar 
arrangement was envisaged in the previous enlargement 
under article 5 of the 1972 Act of Accession);
(b) Greece was granted a twelve-month implementation 
period from the date of accession for the harmonization 
of Greek legislation with the provisions of Council 
Directive 76/579/Euratom; <c> a protocol was inserted
in the Act of Accession on the disclosure of research 
results intended for restricted dissemination (in con­
nection with article 13 of the EAEC Treaty); (d) the 
acquisition by Greek residents of EAEC securities
and the current payments referred to in article 1 0 0  
of the EAEC Treaty were to be liberalized by Greece 
according to the arrangements established under the 
EEC capital-movements dossier. An additional point 
touched upon in the negotiations concerned Greece’s 
request for an eighteen-month transitional period 
for the harmonization of Greek legislation according 
to the Commission Recommendations (65/42 & 66/22 Euratom) 
on the implementation of the Paris and Brussels Con­
ventions on civil liability in the field of atomic 
energy. This request raised no problems, given that 
there was no obligation on the part of Greece, in 
acceding to the Community, to accede to these Con­
ventions. The analysis of the EAEC dossier is based 
on the following Conference documents: CONF-GR/59/77, 
pp. 1-2; CONF-GR/43/78, pp. 2-7; CONF-GR/44/78, p. 2; 
CONF-GR/50/78, Annex I, p. 11; Commission document 
TAG/DD/13/78, pp. 20-21 annexed to CONF-GR/21/79; 
CONF-GR/24/79, Annex I, pp. 37-39; CONF-GR/29/79, p. 31; 
Act of Accession, art. 145 & annex XII & protocol 6 ;




THE IMPACT OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
ON THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
A . The MUniguenessM of Greece’s 
Association Agreement
A key element that has to be taken into account 
when analyzing the accession negotiations is the differ­
ence in the way that each side perceived the role of the 
Association Agreement.
Looking at its form as well as the substance of
its provisions, there can be little doubt that it was
indeed a unique agreement, the first and most wide-ranging 
contractual arrangement of its kind, very different from 
classical trade agreements. Its most striking aspect was 
the provision for eventual full membership, making the 
association an ante-chamber to accession; although the 
relevant clause was rather vague, its very existence was 
a recognition, less than four years after the signing 
of the EEC Treaty, of the special status of Greece.
The Community’s willingness to enter into such an
agreement was a reflection not only of the future role
that Greece could play in European integration but also 
of the vagueness surrounding the concept of association 
in the early years of the Common Market. The initial flexi­
bility of the concept was followed by more restrictive 
interpretations when it came to applying it to agreements
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with other countries. Even Turkey's Association Agreement, 
concluded two years after Greece’s and on the whole re­
garded as equivalent to it, was more cautiously worded 
with respect to eventual full membership.
By considering its legal framework alone, Greece's 
association clearly stands out as a unique contractual 
arrangement. For its real significance, however, one has 
to examine not so much the intentions as the actual record 
of performance. In doing so, the uniqueness of the Agree­
ment evaporates. Taking into account the extent of its 
implementation as chapter I has done, the conclusion is 
reached that its freezing and subsequent chequered develop­
ment limited its range of action within the field of cus­
toms union. And taking further into account the erosion 
of preferences due to the gradual proliferation of com­
peting trade agreements concluded between the Community 
and various other Mediterranean countries, one is left 
with a very weak agreement indeed--a far cry from what 
the negotiators had originally intended it to be (and 
inspite of article 64, according to which a balance should 
be preserved in the mutual interests of both parties, 
should negotiations proceed with another country or 
countries).
It was this gap between theory and reality that 
undermined Greece’s privileged status as an associate 
member and provided the main justification, on the economic 
front, for seeking full membership. On the other hand, 
the more the Agreement's economic erosion was rubbed home,
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the more Greece came to emphasize the uniqueness of its 
political dimension. And once the membership application 
was securely accepted and the negotiations formally opened, 
Greece held on to the association’s blueprint of action 
as a hard-won precedent, an anchorage from which she in­
tended to fight in the membership negotiations.
B. The Association Agreement within the 
Framework of the Community’s 
Mediterranean Policy
While the association was seen by Greece as pri­
marily a stepping stone to full membership, it was simply 
regarded by the Community as part of its policy towards 
the countries of the Mediterranean basin. Both approaches 
were of course equally valid, only that each side empha­
sized the aspect that was more relevant from its own per­
spective. And the closer the Community came to clearly de­
fining its Mediterranean policy, the stronger was Greece’s 
incentive to underline the link between association and 
accession. As explained below, this difference in the 
way that each side perceived the Association Agreement 
run through most of the negotiations and affected their 
conduct and outcome.
The need for a coherent Community Mediterranean 
policy arose out of the more or less haphazard prolife­
ration of individual bilateral agreements. By 1973 there 
had emerged a complex web of economic and commercial re­
lationships with twelve from the seventeen countries of the 
Mediterranean area (table 4) but hardly an overall and bal­
anced policy towards them. The impetus to bring all these
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Table 4. --European Community agreements concluded with 
Mediterranean countries, 1962-73










Greece Aa 238 unlimi ted 1.11.62
Turkey A 238 uniimi ted 1.12.64
Tuni sia A 238 5 1. 9.69
Morocco A 238 5 1. 9.69
Yugoslavia NPb 113 & 114 3 1. 5.70
Spain Pc 113 6 d 1.10.70
Israel p 113 5 1.10.70
Mai ta A 238 5G 1. 4.71
Lebanon P 113 5 f
Cyprus A 238 4® 1. 6 .73
Egypt P 113 5 1.11.73
Portugal9 P 113 unlimi ted 1. 1.73
A : Association agreement.
NP: Nonpreferential trade agreement.
cP : Preferential trade agreement.
The agreement was meant to have at least a six-year 
duration, with a second stage to be determined.
eThe duration of the agreement refers to the first 
stage. A second stage is envisaged with a five-year duration 
(in principle).
f
The agreement was signed on 18 December 1972 but 
was not ratified by Lebanon, and hence did not come into force.
9Portugal is included even though not a Mediterranean
country.
SOURCES: Tovias, Tariff Preferences, p. 6 6 ; EC, Commission, 
”Bibliographie sur les relations de la Communaut6 avec les 
pays du bassin m 6 diterran6 en," Documentation Bulletin. B/14 
(February 1983):10-49.
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agreements (both preferential and nonpreferential trade 
agreements as well as agreements of association) under 
a single ’’global" policy came from the first Community 
enlargement. In November 1972 the Council adopted the 
basic elements of such a policy, which was intended to 
apply not only to countries already linked with an agree­
ment but also to countries with which negotiations were 
in progress at that time, leaving open the possibility 
of including the remaining countries of the area; further­
more, it had to be not only internally coherent but also 
consistent with the Community’s wider external relations 
as well as with the Community’s obligations under the 
GATT. However, the results of these efforts were rather 
limited: instead of a global policy what emerged was a 
"common approach" to groups of countries (such as the 
Maghreb and Mashreq) 1 coupled with an individual approach, 
with provisions adapted to the specific circumstances 
of individual countries.
Even though these policy developments left Greece’s
(and Turkey’s) Association Agreement untouched due to
its special character, the attempts to establish a global
Mediterranean approach inevitably placed it in a different 
2
perspective. The preferential access to Community markets 
which it envisaged with respect to certain typically Me­
diterranean agricultural products was increasingly limited 
by the similar treatment accorded to other Mediterranean 
countries. Quite apart from this consideration, the fact 
that the association was frozen during the early efforts
towards an overall Mediterranean policy meant that, despite 
its special nature, it could be contained more easily 
within the scope of such a policy. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the subsequent reactivation of the Agree­
ment amounted to little more than the conclusion of the 
second financial protocol. (As explained below, its limited 
reactivation was also due to Community tactics connected 
with the accession negotiations.) Within its Mediterranean 
policy, agriculture was the crucial issue facing the Com­
munity. The principle established was that a global ap­
proach should not undermine ’’Community preference,” i.e. 
should not have an adverse impact on Community agricultural 
producers. The Community was accordingly not particularly 
keen to proceed with the harmonization of Greece’s agricul­
tural policy as envisaged in the Association Agreement.
Thus,' it was not only the proliferation of competing agree­
ments that provided the economic raison d ’etre for Greece’s 
membership bid but also the emergence, no matter how circum­
scribed, of a Mediterranean dimension in Community policy.
C . Association as a Preparatory Stage 
to Full Membership
Given the strength of the economic forces as well 
as the political motivation behind Greece’s decision to 
seek full membership, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
it mattered little in the last analysis whether or not 
Greece’s Association Agreement included a provision for 
eventual full membership; the opening of the negotiations 
did not depend on the existence of such a provision. In
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fact, taking the argument a step further, it did not depend
on the Agreement’s existence either: the Treaty of Rome
makes no distinction among applicants on the basis of their
status as associates or nonassociates, the eligibility
to apply for Community membership existing for any demo-
3
cratic European country. After all, the fact that Spain’s 
and Portugal’s relations with the Community were of much 
more limited range than Greece’s had little to do with 
the outcome of their membership applications.
Being eligible and being prepared for accession 
are, of course, two separate points to be considered. 
Accordingly, the issue that remains to be examined is 
the extent to which the Association Agreement contributed 
to Greece’s readiness to join the Community. There are 
separate strands in this question; the discussion that 
follows attempts to clarify them in the light of the pre­
vious analysis.
At a formal level, one has to consider the impact 
of association on Greece's economic development. This 
point has been examined in chapter I, where it has been 
noted that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
attribute developments in the Greek economy to the func­
tioning of the Association Agreement. On the other hand, 
even though the existing evidence may be incomplete for 
a watertight argument, certain general conclusions could 
still be drawn--if not for the economy as a whole, at 
least for the foreign sector--pointing to a rather positive 
impact of the association.
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At a less formal level, one in which analysis 
is mixed with political-party tenets or negotiation ma ­
noeuvres, the conclusions reached are invariably pre­
adjusted to fit the occasion. For example, PASOK’s verdict 
was that the association had functioned to the detriment 
of the Greek economy, being in tune with Community rather 
than Greek interests. The same position was at times also 
aired by the Greek delegation--although, seen as part 
of a tactical negotiating position, it should be inter­
preted within its proper context. However, leaving aside 
the restricted framework from which such positions were 
derived, it would be difficult to counter the view gener­
ally accepted by both the Greek and Community delegations 
that in those few areas in which it managed to function, 
the Association Agreement brought Greece closer to the 
Community. On the other hand, the evolution of Community 
policies since its coming into force meant that, even
if fully implemented, the Agreement’s integrative effects
4would still be confined to those areas covered by it.
The above discussion leads to a much broader issue: 
was Greece ready to join the Community? The answers to 
this question, as they surfaced in the debate surrounding 
Greece’s accession negotiations, depended on the weight 
assigned to political factors. Thus, although the Com­
mission had adopted the view that Greece's accession was 
premature, stressing in its formal Opinion the structural 
weaknesses of the Greek economy, the Council bypassed 
such reservations and opted for an immediate opening of
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the accession negotiations. The real diffence in the views 
of the two institutions lay not so much in their assessment 
of Greece’s economic situation as in their balancing of the 
political considerations that such an important decision 
requi r e d .
D. The Role of the Association Agreement 
in the Accession Negotiations
Quite apart from any influence that the association 
might have exerted on Greece’s move to full membership, 
what really mattered in the conduct of the accession nego­
tiations was the fact that each side chose to look at 
the relevance of the association experience from a dif­
ferent angle and to assign a different role to the Associ­
ation Agreement. Closely connected with this controversy, 
and a source of often unnecessary complications, was the 
debate surrounding the general principle that Greek ac­
cession would be examined on its own merits.
Although the general significance of the Associ­
ation Agreement was broadly accepted by both sides at 
the opening of the negotiations, such a consensus hardly 
rose beyond a vague recognition of its importance in paving
5
Greece’s way to full membership --a recognition that could
not hide the deep-seated differences of view existing
from the outset. In Van der Stoel’s words,
this official opening of our negotiations is there­
fore much more than simply a further step along the 
route we mappeg out in 1961. It marks a fundamental 
change . . . .
The view that the accession negotiations were breaking
totally new ground was not shared by Papaligouras, who
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saw them tied to the Association Agreement as if with
an umbilical cord that should not be severed:
Just as there is a Community patrimony, which is 
accepted by Greece, so ^he Association has also 
built up its patrimony.
Greece’s central premise regarding the association 
patrimony or ’’acquis d ’association” was subsequently trans­
lated into specific negotiating tactics. During the initial 
stage of the negotiations, for example, the Greek dele­
gation insisted in having the fields of customs union 
and external relations examined side by side, with issues 
properly belonging to the customs-union dossier appearing 
in the Greek position papers under the heading of external
O
relations. Apart from legitimate reasons of genuine over­
lappings between the two fields, this could be seen as 
an attempt to present the Association Agreement as part
of the acquis communautaire in external relations, re-
g
quiring acceptance by both sides. The Community stayed 
clear from this issue, and gradually managed to separate 
the two dossiers. 10
According to the initial formulations of the Greek 
view, the acquis d ’association formed such an integral part 
of the acquis communautaire, with Greece having already 
accepted within the association framework the basic prin­
ciples of the Treaty of Rome, that it could be conceivable 
for the association’s institutional organs to be closely 
connected with the conduct of the accession negotiations:
The Association Agreement . . . provides us with ap­
propriate instruments to facilitate our work, in par­
ticular: (a) the harmonization procedure which should
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be actively continued in order to reach decisions 
which are immediately applicable and could go directly 
into the Accession Treaty; (b) the consultation pro­
cedure on the development of, for instance, the common 
agricultural policy and commercial policy between now 
and when the Accession Treaty comes into force. This 
procedure should be resuscitated aijitj intensified, 
though with accession now in mind.
In other words, the Greek delegation’s efforts aimed at 
exploiting to the maximum the possibilities offered by 
the Association Agreement by attempting to negotiate ac­
cession issues within the association framework. This 
was particularly true in the case of agriculture: by pro­
gressing with the harmonization of agriculture within the 
association framework and by insisting on the equality of 
treatment between Greek and Community products, to the ex­
tent that this was attainable within the constraints of the 
association provisions, the Greek objective for the speedy 
integration of Greek agriculture into the Community system
could then be approached from a more advantageous position
12in the course of the accession negotiations.
The Community was careful to avoid opening two
negotiation fronts by ensuring that all substantive issues
that could have legitimately been raised in the process
of reactivating the Association Agreement were gradually
absorbed into the mainstream of the accession negotiations.
Thus, even though in theory the association was to progress
normally under its own rules pending the outcome of the
13 . .accession negotiations, in practice its development 
(especially the harmonization of agricultural policies) 
was virtually stalemated, the scope of its reactivation 
being reduced to the conclusion of the second financial
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protocol and the resolution of certain outstanding tech­
nical issues. And even this limited activity was adversely 
affected: for two and a half years following the reacti­
vation of the Agreement no real progress had been reg­
istered in connection with the protocol. (Without doubt, 
the inertia observed in the evolution of the association 
with respect to agricultural and financial issues was not 
exclusively due to Community tactics; it also reflected 
the Community’s internal difficulties in these areas.)
Greece’s strategy to enmesh the two negotiation 
fronts could not be sustained in the face of strong Com­
munity reactions. As the Community delegation noted, the 
procedures laid down by the Association Agreement for 
its implementation were not relevant in the present con­
text, which called for the accession negotiations' own 
procedures. For problems arising out of the implementation 
of the Agreement, on the other hand, it was the associ­
ation’s procedures that had to be followed, the relevant
14bodies being those envisaged by it. Nevertheless, this
gave rise to a second-best approach, whereby the Greek
positions in the course of the accession negotiations
were to have as their common objective the salvage of
the acquis d ’association as a broadly interpreted minimum
15process of integration.
Greece's repeated concern with the fate of the 
Association Agreement and her views on its importance 
were not limited to what had actually been achieved in 
the industrial sector but related equally to those aspects
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of the Agreement that had remained inactive. It was this 
imbalance, particularly manisfested in the trade gap be­
tween Greece and the EEC, which according to the Greek 
delegation had to be corrected and compensated for in the 
context of the accession negotiations: what was already 
achieved with association in the industrial sector had to 
be retained with membership; what was not achieved in the 
agricultural sector, especially the harmonization proce­
dure, had to be taken into account and made up for in the 
negotiations . 16 What Greece was suggesting in effect was 
that the relevant transitional measures for her accession 
should be defined with reference to the provisions of the 
Association Agreement. 17
The position adopted by the Community delegation 
was entirely different. Accession was seen not as the 
final stage of a gradual process but rather as a "quali­
tative leap” to a wholly new legal framework distinct 
from that of association; accordingly, any transitional 
measures to be established during the negotiations could 
not be a simple extension of the association provisions
but should be considered on their own merits and in the
18light of the existing economic circumstances.
At a formal level, mainly in ministerial sessions, 
the Greek delegation never accepted fully and explicitly 
the above Community view, continuing until the very end 
of the negotiations to present lofty statements in defence 
of the association precedents. In reality, however, as 
a result of a marked reorientation of its negotiation
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strategy, the Greek Government had long abandoned its
initial uncompromising position (in the words of one of
its critics, ’’the Association Agreement was mutilated
19on the altar of accession” ). With the adoption of a 
more pragmatic approach--a development which has already 
been noted in chapter 1 1 --the road lay open for a gradual, 
and often painful, alignment of the Greek position on 
that of the Community. The Greek delegation did hold on 
consistently to the principle that the Association Agree­
ment should not be ignored in the course of the negoti­
ations, that Greece should not find herself worse off under 
accession than under association. But she had to live with 
the Community view that, though important in bringing 
Greece closer to the Community both politically and econom­
ically, association was qualitatively and legally distinct 
from accession: problems existing under association might 
still to some extent persist after accession, but their 
solutions did not need to be the same under the two re­
gimes; both problems and solutions had to be reexamined
20within the new framework set by accession.
Although specific provisions of the Association 
Agreement were not defensible as precedents, the Agreement 
as a whole could not be ignored and was crucial in dif­
ferentiating Greece from the other applicant countries.
In Greece's view, (1) her association was unique among 
Community agreements in that it provided for the inte­
gration of major sectors of her economy into those of 
the Community; (2) given the association’s ultimate
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objective of full membership, the implementation of the
Agreement over a fifteen-year period, though incomplete,
helped the Greek economy adapt its structure to that of
the Community; and (3) during this period the interde-
21pendence of the two economies increased. Needless to 
say, Greece’s efforts to extricate her candidature from 
that of the other applicants could not rest solely on 
economic arguments which at best provided only limited 
support. The fact remains, however, that by persistently 
emphasizing in various ways the overall importance and 
relevance of her association, she paved the way for a 
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CHAPTER IX
THE GREEK NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF THE COMMUNITY’S PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT
While the gradual erosion of Greece's unique status 
as an associate was one of the reasons that led to her 
bid for full membership, concern with the success of this 
bid led to attempts to establish the uniqueness of Greece’s 
candidature as a case apart from those of Portugal and 
Spain. As a tactical move, the formal separation of the 
Greek negotiations from those of the Iberian candidates 
meant that Greece's accession would evolve into a consid­
erably less complex affair. From an analytical perspective, 
however, it would be a mistake to view the Greek case 
in isolation; it should be more appropriately examined 
as part of the Community’s overall process of enlargement. 
This theme is developed in the present chapter.
In comparing the two rounds of enlargement, the 
different economic environments in which they occurred 
should be borne in mind as an inevitable constraint: in 
contrast with the first round, the Greek and Iberian en­
largements took place in an unfavourable world economic 
climate. An additional factor that limits comparisons 
of this kind is the marked difference in the average eco­
nomic profile and level of development between the northern 
and southern applicants.1 For these reasons, the intention
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is not to enter into details of the membership negotiations 
of other countries but instead to examine how the overall 
process of Community enlargement relates to the Greek case.
A . The Experience of the First Round 
of Enlargement
l. Britain’s Early Attempts 
for Membership
To fully understand the Greek case, it is important 
to know how the earlier hands were played. The relevance 
of the British experience is further reinforced by the 
fact that Britain’s first attempt to join the Community 
(1961-63) coincided with the beginnings of Greece’s associ­
ation, interacting with it in certain important ways.
For example, it should not be overlooked that France’s 
tough line during the Greek association negotiations was 
at least partly dictated by a desire to avoid setting
any precedents which might be used to Britain’s advantage
2in the latter’s membership negotiations.
For Britain the freshly negotiated Athens Agreement 
opened a course of action worth considering. Whereas in 
the case of Greece full membership was clearly the ultimate 
goal with association viewed as a mere stepping stone in 
that direction,. Britain went through an initial period 
of soul searching, with the two alternative regimes re­
presenting for her a problem of choice. When the British 
Government finally decided to apply for full membership 
in 1961, association had come to be regarded as an inad-
3
equate arrangement. Even if the association negotiations
390
were to succeed, there could be no guarantee that associ­
ation would eventually lead to accession; and without 
such a guarantee, an agreement of this kind would be of 
no value to Britain.^ General de Gaulle’s first veto of 
Britain’s membership bid in January 1963 was accompanied 
by the suggestion for such an association agreement--with
eventual membership as an open-ended and distant possi-
5bility without any commitment as to its timing. It is 
interesting to note that de Gaulle’s negative stand in 
November 1967 which once more blocked Britain's entry 
was again accompanied by the suggestion that some form 
of association would be acceptable.
In a subsequent attempt to establish an ’’arrange­
ment” between Britain and the Community that would pave 
the way to full membership, France introduced the idea 
of a preaccession period--an idea that appealed to the 
Commission6 and was to resurface later as the central 
element in the Commission’s Opinion on the Greek appli­
cation for membership. According to this view, full member­
ship should be preceded by a period of adjustment enabling 
Britain to adapt herself to the orientations and structures 
of the Community.7
What was unacceptable to the British was not so 
much the idea of a preaccession period as the fact that 
its duration was to be left unspecified--a situation that 
could easily deteriorate into a de facto association.
Among the various proposals that were put forward during 
1968-69 with the aim of bringing Britain closer to the
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Community and preparing her for membership, a preaccession 
period came close to be regarded as a negotiable possi­
bility but only under the firm condition that it would 
provide for a built-in mechanism of automatic membership, 
in the form of a fixed term at the end of which entry
O
would be finalized; otherwise the situation would be,
in Peter Kirk’s words, similar to ’’Mohammed’s coffin sus-
g
pended halfway between heaven and earth.” On the other 
hand, however, even though the possibility of having such 
an arrangement was not excluded, the probability attached 
to its practical success was very low: it would be ex­
tremely difficult for Britain to adjust to a continually 
evolving Community unless she was actively involved in 
these changes.10 Given that it was not possible to provide 
for Britain’s participation in the Community decision­
making mechanisms prior to accession, the notion of a 
preaccession period had no appeal as a credible alternative 
to full membership with a postaccession transitional period.
A central theme that emerges from a comparative 
analysis that takes into account the origins of the en­
largement process is the remarkable consistency with which 
France has been formulating her policy towards Community 
enlargement over the past twenty-five years. Allowing for 
inevitable variations that reflect the particular histor­
ical context, the concept of a ’’noyau,” of a Community 
of Six around which are clustered the other West European 
states with a view to their gradual unification, represents 
a common theme that runs through French attitudes towards
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the process of European integration.11 To this should 
be added a second observation: that even though membership 
negotiations could be meaningfully analyzed at the aggre­
gate level, i.e. by looking at the Community positions as 
they emerged from the internal debate among member states, 
one would still have to take into account in many instances 
the French reactions and France’s bilateral relations 
with the applicant states. Although the membership negoti­
ations were a communal endeavour, it was France more than 
any other member state that left its individual mark on 
the negotiating table. This conclusion is supported by 
the previous analysis but is also reinforced by the dis­
cussion that follows.
2. The 1970-71 Accession Negotiations 
While Greece’s association suggested an alternative 
course of action for Britain to follow, Britain’s sub­
sequent accession to the European Communities on 1 January 
1973 together with Denmark and Ireland was regarded by
Greece as a potential source of precedents for her own
12accession negotiations. Although it was eventually agreed 
that no such precedents could be established in a strictly 
legal sense, an ”own-merits” approach in the Greek negoti­
ations could not preclude the taking into account of the
13experience of the first round of enlargement. In fact, 
besides adopting the organi zati oraland procedural framework 
of the previous accession negotiations, the Conference 
adopted their legal framework as well. Even though Greece's 
internal legal structure gave rise to a different set of
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problems and corresponding solutions, the overriding ob­
jective remained the same: the adaptation of the national 
legal system to the obligations deriving from Community 
membership.
Within this perspective, the Community had no 
objection to a given specific solution being similar to 
the one adopted in the previous enlargement, provided 
that the circumstances in the two instances were similar 
and justified such a course of action.1^ However, what 
is important for the purpose of the present analysis is 
not so much the identification of such similarities in 
the detailed record of the negotiations as the realization 
that the overall experience of the two rounds of enlargement 
bears certain broad parallelisms that become quite striking 
when one takes into account the differences in the economic 
and political environment of the two cases.
The close conceptual affinity of the two rounds 
of enlargement was implicitly symbolized during the formal 
opening of the Greek negotiations. On that occasion both 
the Council and the Commission Presidents chose to include 
in their speeches excerpts from the initial statements
of their predecessors made during the opening of the 1970-71
accession negotiations. Thus, Van der Stoel echoed Pierre 
Harmel’s remarks that the objectives of enlargement were 
not only economic but also political, while Ortoli quoted
Jean Rey on the wider implications of accession as a step
towards the building of a united Europe.16 The actual quo­
tations used in both instances are not as important as the
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fact that in looking beyond the technical aspects of the 
negotiations and in expressing its attachment to the wider 
political significance of Greece's accession, the Community 
appeared to view enlargement as a continuous and on-going 
process.17 Deriving from this philosophy, the previous en­
largement negotiations could not but provide an implicit 
frame of reference for the Greek talks.
It should be noted, however, that the formal frame­
work within which the Greek negotiations were conducted 
did not preexist in a ready-made form but evolved out 
of the trials and errors of the 1961-63 abortive negoti­
ations only to take its final shape at the time of the
1 81970-71 enlargement negotiations. The 1961-63 talks 
were conducted within a Conference between the six member 
states and the applicants--an arrangement that resulted 
in confusion and multilatentsm of the proceedings. The 
Commission did have the right to speak and advise the 
member states in the formulation of common positions, 
but its mandate lacked a clear focal point and was in­
evitably weakened by the fact that there were separate 
Commissions at that time corresponding to each of the 
three Treaties (EEC, ECSC, and EAEC).
The Hague Summit of December 1969 improved this 
situation by providing for a Conference not between the 
candidates and the Six individually but between the candi­
dates and the Community as a single entity. According
to the procedure established by the Council at its sessions
19of 8 & 9 June 1970 in implementing the Hague communique,
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the responsibility for the negotiations remained with 
the Council of Ministers, but in their formal conduct 
the member states were now represented through the Presi­
dency of the Council; they did of course participate in 
the negotiations with their national representatives but 
they now spoke with a single voice in their confrontations 
with the applicants. This was true for both ministerial 
and deputy-level sessions. The importance of the latter 
should be particularly emphasized, since it reflected 
the increasingly prominent role that the COREPER was be­
ginning to assume within the workings of the Council at 
the time of the first enlargement. Thus, most of the prob­
lems raised in the course of the negotiations were solved 
at deputy level, which on the Community side corresponded 
to the COREPER. This meant that in the majority of cases 
the Ministers would simply confirm the agreements reached 
at deputy level, leaving them with certain knotty problems 
that required a political solution. The fact that such a 
solution was often hard to reach meant in turn that on 
certain occasions, and on instructions from the Ministers, 
agreements reached at deputy level were kept unannounced 
until a subsequent ministerial session which would thus
be prevented from appearing empty-handed in its press 
20coverage.
The role of the member states at both the minis­
terial and deputy levels was to iron out their individual 
differences and to formulate common positions on the basis 
of proposals by the Commission (which was nou> a single
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institution, following the fusion of the executives in 
1967). It is interesting to note that these internal negoti­
ations often proved more time-consuming and more intricate 
than the actual Conference negotiations between the Com­
munity and the applicant countries--an observation that 
is equally true for the first round of enlargement as 
for the Greek and Iberian ones. This should not come as 
a surprise, since internal difficulties in the alignment 
of common positions seem to be the rule in the daily 
workings of Community decision making.
What the above framework implied in practice was 
that the Presidency could not respond immediately to a 
candidate’s counterargument. It had to adjourn the Con­
ference proceedings in order to seek a compromise formula 
among the Six (and later, in the case of Greece, among 
the Nine). The Conference would then reconvene to consider 
the new Community position, with the cadidate delegations 
either "taking note” of or accepting it. What made for 
a faster pace in the conduct of the Conference negotiations 
was the fact that the two sides often knew, through formal 
or informal channels of communication, of each other’s 
positions prior to the opening of a session and could 
thus determine in advance whether or not a particular 
position was acceptable.
This latter point needs emphasizing because it 
refers to a crucial but often overlooked aspect common to 
all the rounds of enlargement. The negotiations were con­
ducted at both a formal level, with the two-tier workings
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of the Conference, and an informal level, with a whole 
web of contacts and off-the-record exchanges between the 
two sides. In fact, the formal negotiations could be re­
garded as the visible tip of the iceberg; the real bar­
gaining and the preparation of the ground for solutions 
often took place within informal channels of communication. 
For example, confidential Commission documents outlining 
the basis for the establishment of common negotiating 
positions and addressed to the member states were invari­
ably secured by Greek officials in Brussels. The Greek 
delegation was thus aware of the approximate negotiating 
limits to be expected with respect to specific issues 
well in advance of the formal Conference sessions. In 
this informal manner, the Commission could oil the wheels 
of the bargaining process by indirectly suggesting ways 
in which the forthcoming Greek positions could be formu­
lated so as to take account of the likely Community re­
sponse and hence of the potential size of the substantive 
negotiating gap.
Such practices were perhaps a natural outgrowth
of the kind of open diplomacy with which the Conference
sessions were conducted: since the sessions were open
and their proceedings publicized, they could hardly provide
the right environment for an intimate exchange of views
21and the working out of compromises. What further reduced 
the flexibility of the formal sessions was the Community’s 
preoccupation with ’’harmonizing" the negotiations:
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For the sake of appearances, quite apart from the 
negotiating logic itself, each successive stage in 
the process of reaching agreement. . . had to be repre­
sented as a fair component package between the partici­
pants within what it was hoped would ultimately be a 
fair overall package deal: and that demand for internal 
symmetry of the parts as well as of the whole imposed 
its own limitation on the negotiations and invited 
deadlock, with neither side prepared to make the first 
mo v e .
The above comparative analysis of the British 
and Greek experiences in the conduct of their accession 
negotiations reveals certain interesting patterns and 
parallelisms that transcend the historical specificity 
of each case, pointing to a common dynamic process that 
underlies the politics and economics of Community enlarge­
ment and the world of diplomacy surrounding it. This sense 
of continuity disappears when one begins to examine the 
motivations, strategies, and tactics of each applicant 
separately.
Both the British and Greek delegations faced the
same dilemma: to begin with a ’’low" opening position and
accused at home of not safeguarding the national interests;
or to open the negotiations with a "high” bid, knowing
that its inevitable dilution on the road to a compromise
was bound to be presented by critics at home as a battle 
23lost. However, each delegation resolved this dilemma 
in a different manner, adopting for the most part sharply 
contrasting strategies. Britain leaned towards the second 
approach, hoping that public opinion at home would recog­
nize the need for the softening of an initially hard bar-
q i
gaining line in the final compromise. Greece, on the
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other hand, after a short-lived flirt with a hard line 
based on the defence of the acquis d 'association, switched 
to a soft approach with a built-in willingness for quick 
compromi ses.
These two approaches must be assessed within their 
specific historical context, taking also into account 
the relative weight of each country in an enlarged Commu­
nity. In the British Government's view,
it is for question whether the Communities without 
the United Kindgom can be as secure and prosperous 
as they need to be in the modern world. The entry 
of the United Kingdom into the European Communities 
is therefore an issue of historic importance, not 
only fgg . . . Cherl, but for Europe, and for the
world.
The fact that Britain’s desire to join the Community was 
largely matched by the Community’s desire to have Britain 
as a full member meant that Britain could afford to nego­
tiate from a strong stand; but this could hardly apply 
in the case of Greece. On the other hand, differences 
in negotiating strategies did reflect differences in preoc­
cupations. Britain’s ultimate aim may have been full mem­
bership, but her overriding concern lay with the economic 
issues of accession and hence with the terms of entry 
under negotiation. In contrast, Greece was caught in a 
race against time, where the political dimension of the 
task lying ahead often tended to dwarf the significance 
of the detailed terms of entry.
Seen from a longer perspective, however, such 
distinctions recede in the background; for what will even­
tually remain out of the whole process of enlargement 
will simply be the fact of membership itself:
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the most important fact about the first (British 
negotiation) was that it failed, and the most 
important fact about the second was that it succeeded.*-
The real drama was thus not centered on the terms of entry
but on whether the negotiations were being played for
success or failure. For this question one has to look
not so much at the detailed content of the negotiations
but rather, as Uwe Kitzinger puts it, at "the time they
took, the impression they gave outside, and the covert
mutual signals of a political content that were contained
in the economic and financial haggling.""' In both the
British and Greek negotiations, and for that matter in
the Iberian ones, these signals were nowhere else more
hidden or more crucial than in the role of French policy.
Ambiguous in appearance from the summer of 1969 until
the spring of 1971, French diplomacy gave no clear signs
until the end of the negotiations whether Britain’s entry
would be allowed to materialize. In the same spirit, once
France had clarified her stand on the principle of the
Greek enlargement, accession was within reach. This is
an important point to keep in mind when assessing the
impact of the Heath-Pompidou or the Karamanlis-Giscard
d ’Estaing meetings on the pace of the negotiations.
It was precisely this hidden political content 
of the formal negotiations which often led to agreements 
being reached with little effort to assess their analytical 
implications. The length of the transitional period is 
a case in point. In searching for the reasons that made 
Britain’s, and by extension Greece’s, transitional period
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gravitate to a five-year length, it seems reasonable to
share Ian Davidson’s view:
Because one year would be obviously far too short 
for Britain to make the necessary adjustments, because 
ten years would involve unnecessary delays, because 
five is a nice round number in between, because there 
is no evident reason for choosing four or six instead, 
because the idea of a five-year transition has been 
in the air for a very ^gng time (i.e., since the 
1961-63 negotiations).
It is worth noting in this respect that, in sharp contrast 
to the Greek experience, the length of the transitional 
period was an issue settled at an early stage in the 
British negotiations. And to be precise, a general five- 
year transitional period was not Britain’s opening pro­
posal. The request was for a three-year period for indus­
trial customs union and a six-year period for agriculture 
(with a still longer one for budgetary contributions).
But a compromise was eventually reached in the form of 
’’adequate parallelism” for industry and agriculture within
a five-year transitional period, having made allowance
29for certain exceptions.
The length of the transitional period was not
among the crucial issues that stood out in the 1971-72
negotiations, though the postnegotiation experience of
the first-round entrants did have an important message
for the new candidates in this respect--namely, that
changes in Community policies and in economic conjuncture
30can easily render transitional arrangements irrelevant.
On the other hand, the politically sensitive problems 
whose solution determined the overall outcome of the first- 
enlargement negotiations have little relevance in an
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analysis that focuses on the Greek experience. In Britain’s 
case, these issues related to New Zealand's dairy exports 
to the United Kingdom, sugar exports from the less de ­
veloped Commonwealth members to the United Kingdom, the
future of the reserve role of sterling, and the British
31contribution to the Community budget. It is nevertheless 
interesting to note that while Britain’s and Greece’s 
preoccupations with the Community budget were opposite 
in nature--the former attempting to minimize her contri­
bution, the latter to maximize her receipts--they repre­
sented a common factor that affected significantly each
32country’s postaccession relations with the Community.
Although the analysis of the present section fo­
cuses on the British experience, most of its general con­
clusions can be taken to apply to the first round of en­
largement as a whole. Ireland's, Denmark's, and Norway’s 
negotiations were not as complicated; and their terms 
of entry were in many respects similar to those of Britain, 
apart from special provisions accounting for individual 
needs and circumstances. Norway did not accede owing to 
the outcome of a national referendum on the issue of mem­
bership. Nevertheless, the successful completion of ac ­
cession negotiations by a potential tenth member provided 
ammunition in the hands of the Greek delegation, which 
could argue quite convincingly on the institutional viabi­
lity of a Community of Ten, with Greece taking the place 
intended for Norway.
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3. The Public Debate
It was recognized from the outset of the British 
accession negotiations that any discussion on the costs 
and benefits of membership would have to assess both the 
short-term and long-term aspects of the issue. As the 
Conservative election manifesto stated in 1970,
There would be short-term disadvantages in Britain 
going into the European Economic Community which must 
be weighed against the long-term benefits. Obviously 
there is a price we would not be prepared to pay.
Only when we negotiate will it be possible to determine 
whether the balance is a fair one, and in the interests 
of Britain.
Our sole commitment is to negotiate: no more, 
no less. As the negotiations proceed we will3geport 
regularly through Parliament to the country.
However, the public debate that followed tended to be one­
sided: it was mainly involved with the short-term technical 
aspects of the terms of entry rather than with the wider 
long-term implications of membership. The available evidence 
suggests that this was the result of a conscious choice 
of policy: it seems that Heath's administration refrained 
from publicly putting across the wider political and eco­
nomic advantages of entry in the fear that a publicly pro­
claimed enthusiasm for membership during the negotiations
Q  p
might undermine Britain's bargaining position. Although 
it is difficult to establish the extent of such an inter­
action, it may be argued that the excessive preoccupation 
with the narrow terms of entry left its mark on public 
opinion and was partly responsible for the general public’s 
confusion and lack of enthusiasm--creating, at the same time,
an advantage in the hands of the British delegation, which
35cculd now press for more favourable terms of entry.
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In the case of Greece, the picture was entirely 
different. Beginning from a weak negotiating base in the 
first instance, the Greek Government had no reason to 
play down its enthusiasm for the prospect of membership; 
on the contrary, it made every effort to nurture a public 
spirit of pageantry while at the same time blurring the 
hard facts and inevitable compromises surrounding the 
terms of entry.
This point has already been analyzed in chapter II 
but assumes a new perspective when seen against the back­
ground of the British experience. In the words of the 
1971 White Paper, setting the tone of the public debate,
The strength and prosperity of the United Kingdom 
depend partly on the efforts of its peoples, and partly 
on the economic conditions prevailing in the world 
outside. . . .  We have to consider whether these 
conditions will be more favourable to us if3ge join 
the European Communities than if we do not.
This statement provides a luminous reminder of the differ­
ences between British and Greek official attitudes: the 
question that it raises struck the Greek Government as 
hardly worth debating. With 1981 being both accession 
and election year, the ruling New Democracy party had 
a strong motive to contain the whole issue of membership 
at an emotional level and to avoid a confrontation on 
the terms of entry with the increasingly powerful and 
anti-Community PASOK party. Although the timetable of
37domestic politics also affected the British negotiations, 
the pressure that such an interaction exerted on the pace 
and outcome of the negotiations was much greater in the
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case of Greece. A factor that may have contributed to this 
difference is that, in contrast with Greece’s experience, 
the issue of membership created divisive rifts within 
Britain’s political parties.
In comparing Britain and Greece as candidates 
for Community membership, there is no presumption that 
economic strength as such is necessarily linked with a 
negotiating advantage. It would in fact be more realistic 
to view bargaining power as being derived from domestic 
economic weaknesses--or, more precisely, from the ability 
of the applicant to present such weaknesses in the proper 
light--as the record of the Greek negotiations often re­
veals. Greece may have conducted her negotiations from 
a politically weak power base; but when it comes to her 
terms of entry, the negotiations should not be seen as 
a David-Goliath confrontation or as a zero-sum game of 
bargaining. Their purpose was clearly not to extract the 
maximum advantage at the expense of Greece, since an entry 
based on adverse terms would be self-defeating: a weak
member would ultimately burden the rest of the Community
38and undermine its cohesion. *
B . The Prospect of the Iberian Enlargement
While the northern enlargement of the Community 
throws light on the legal and procedural framework of the 
Greek candidature, the Iberian enlargement is a crucial 
factor that must be considered when attempting to explain 
the pace of the Greek negotiations and, in a number of
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instances, the terms of entry that finally emerged. The 
Greek case may thus be viewed as something of a pivotal 
point between the two rounds of enlargement.
The Portuguese and Spanish negotiations were still 
at their preliminary stage when the bulk of the Greek 
negotiations had been completed. Accordingly, an analysis 
of their detailed record lies outside the scope of the 
present research. It is more relevant, instead, to look 
at the prospect of the Iberian enlargement and the ways 
in which it affected attitudes, policies, and negotiating 
strategies, and thus the conduct and outcome of the Greek 
negotiations. Before proceeding with these issues, however, 
it is worth examining briefly the Portuguese and Spanish 
cases.
1. The Candidatures of Portugal and Spain
In July 1972 Portugal concluded a free-trade agree­
ment with the Community providing for the progressive 
dismantling of tariffs etc. by 1985. Spain’s contractual 
relations with the EEC date from June 1970 when a six- 
year preferential trade agreement was signed providing 
for the eventual establishment of a customs union. The 
important point to note is that despite differences in 
the institutional aspects of their relations with the 
Community, the two countries showed a very similar degree 
of dependence in their trade with the Community of Nine-- 
very similar, in fact, with that of Greece.
Portugal submitted her membership application on 
28 March 1977, followed by Spain on 28 July of the same
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year; their accession negotiations were formally opened on 
17 October 1978 and 5 February 1979, respectively. As in 
the case of Greece, the issue of accession was essentially 
a political one, Community membership perceived once more 
as a means of securing and strengthening fragile democratic 
institutions at home. Preoccupation with the economic 
implications of membership became increasingly prominent 
as the negotiations progressed to their final stage. On 
the other hand, the question of membership never became 
a major domestic issue in Spain, since all political 
parties and trade unions were clearly in favour. The same 
does not hold for Portugal, where the Communist Party 
(together with small parties on the extreme left and ex­
treme right) and some business interests were strongly 
against.
There are two general observations to be drawn
from Spain's experience. Firstly, it could be argued that,
in contrast with the advantage that the Greek negotiators
extracted from the existence of a growing anti-Community
opposition at home, Spain’s internal consensus on the
question of membership reduced her bargaining strength
during the accession negotiations--although it is expected
to be an advantage in the country’s postaccession relations
40within the Community. Secondly, the fact that the Portu­
guese and Spanish negotiations lasted almost seven years, 
more than twice as long as Greece's, meant that their nego­
tiation marathon run evolved into some sort of a de facto 
preaccession period: even though the idea was rejected
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when it was formally put forth, its essential element 
survived as a result of protracted negotiations. On the 
other hand, this situation did have a positive by-product: 
it allowed for a more careful preparation of the negotiation 
dossiers and for more internal adjustments and adaptations 
to begin ahead of accession. Once more, the Greek expe­
rience is seen to be in contrast with that of the Iberian 
candidates--a conclusion reinforced by the lengthy tran­
sitional arrangements negotiated in their case (their 
general and maximum transitional periods are seven and 
ten years, respectively).
2. Member-States' Reactions to Enlargement
The membership applications of Portugal and Spain 
were lodged at a time when the economic climate in Europe 
could hardly be considered favourable to a further Com­
munity enlargement. There was anxiety over the crisis 
sectors of Community industry--such as steel, shipbuilding 
and ship repairing, textiles, garment manufacture, and
footwear--since it was in these sectors that the applicant
41countries appeared to have a comparative advantage; 
anxiety over the free movement of labour, since the role 
of emigration as a safety valve for domestic unemployment 
in the applicant countries could turn into a burden for 
the member-states' economies and aggravate their social 
problems; and fears that the increased competition from 
Mediterranean agricultural imports from the new entrants 
wculd hurt farmers in France's Midi region and Italy's
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Mezzogiorno. The problem of economic convergence in the 
Community was an issue of considerable concern and a re­
current theme in the discussions on the implications of 
enlargement (as, for example, in Roy Jenkins’ speech to
A <7
the Council of Foreign Ministers on 18 October 1977); “ 
regional disparities in terms of per-capita GDP were ex­
pected to increase from a ratio of 6 : 1 or 5:l--comparing
the richest to the poorest region of the existing Com-
43munity--to a ratio of 12:1 in a Community of Twelve.
Enlargement was also expected to have repercussions on the
Community’s external relations, especially those with
Mediterranean third countries. The debate on these issues
gradually engulfed other aspects of Community activity,
the prospect of enlargement providing ”a convenient new
peg on which to hang old arguments”
The political climate was no more encouraging,
given that the opening of the new round of enlargement
coincided with a preelection period in Europe, notably
in France, which made the whole issue often appear under
45the narrow prism of domestic political considerations. 
Public announcements in favour of enlargement should ac­
cordingly be discounted: member states tried to conceal 
their scepticism and apprehensions as well as their efforts
to retard the process of enlargement behind a fagade of
1 +■ 4-6welcome gestures.
Although the general problems posed by enlargement
were present in the particular case of Greece’s entry,
the small size of her economy meant that their magnitude
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in a Community context would also be small, especially 
when compared with the Spanish case. For this reason, 
the difficulties experienced during the Greek negotiations 
did not always derive from a concern with the implications 
of Greece’s accession but often reflected the Community’s 
apprehensions over the prospect of Spain’s entry: con­
cessions to Greece which certain member states could other­
wise have granted without much difficulty were seen as
a potential risk in creating unwelcome precedents for
47the Iberian applicants. For example, the establishment 
of a seven-year transitional period in the case of Greek 
peaches and tomatoes as an exception to the general five- 
year rule was partly due to this fear of precedents. And 
the same factor may also help explain Germany’s insistence 
for a long transitional period with respect to the free 
movement of Greek labour, much longer than the finally 
agreed seven-year period. Even though such precedents 
could not possibly be established in any legal sense, 
preoccupation with them did influence Community positions 
and compromise solutions during the conduct of the Greek 
negotiations. By the same token, delays and difficulties 
in the accession negotiations were often caused by member 
states as a means of extracting political leverage in
their efforts to achieve their own objectives within Com-
. . .  48munity policies.
The prospect of enlargement was perceived and 
assessed differently by each member state. It was mainly 
in France, and to a lesser extent in Italy, that it became
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a major political issue. Partly due to a consensus on
its desirability or inevitability, partly due to a feeling
that its domestic effects would be marginal, it remained
on the whole an issue of secondary importance among the 
49other members; even in West Germany--where the sectoral,
budgetary, and security implications of enlargement were
extensively pondered--the prevailing mood was one of
50’’optimistic fatalism.”
As already noted, French attitudes towards the
’’widening” of the Community show a remarkable consistency
over the years (with allowance for short-term oscillations
due to electoral exigencies), linking with a common thread
the first and second rounds of enlargement. A case in
point is the concept of a preaccession period which first
appeared in connection with Britain’s early attempts at
membership--only to reappear in the context of Greece’s
and, later on, of Portugal’s and Spain's membership bids.
An offshoot of this was the proposal for stage-by-stage
integration towards full membership, giving rise to the
notion of a Community deux vitesses” as a means of
solving the problems raised by enlargement. This idea
was first aired by Pierre Uri in connection with Greece’s 
51candidature but reflects a common theme in French atti­
tudes towards enlargement--a theme which, nevertheless,
52did not take root in Community thinking.
An equally important aspect of the French approach 
involved the notion of ’’globalisation.” This had less to 
do with joint negotiations and simultaneous entry of the
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three Mediterranean applicants and more with a "globali­
sation de r6 f 1exions"--the implication being that the
solution of the problems posed by enlargement should be
53a precondition for enlargement itself. A characteristic 
example was France’s insistence on changes in CAP mecha­
nisms applying to certain sensitive Mediterranean products 
as a precondition for Greek accession (this point has 
been examined in chapter VI).
Although the analysis of the present section fo­
cuses on French reactions, it is also worth taking a brief 
look at Britain’s attitudes. It seems that Britain was 
more concerned with the budgetary than with the economic 
implications of enlargement. This may partly be attributed 
to the essentially complementary nature of her agriculture 
vis-a-vis that of the Mediterranean applicants. But a 
more significant factor was Britain’s chronic preoccupation 
with her contribution to the Community budget, forming 
a filter through which all other issues were seen and 
assessed.
The political dimension of Britain’s attitudes 
to enlargement is of course another matter. The existing 
evidence suggests that the issue of Greek membership as 
such was of secondary importance, subordinate to Britain’s 
wider concern with political stability in the Mediterranean 
area. For example, the inclusion of references to the 
Greco-Turkish dispute in the Commission’s Opinion on the
54Greek application possibly reflected a British initiative. 
Moreover, Britain’s eagerness to see progress achieved
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towards a Community of Twelve, and not simply towards
a Community of Ten, led to a concern with parallelism
in negotiations with the three applicants rather than
55with progress in the Greek negotiations as such. Pro­
ceeding from the same policy considerations, Britain also 
insisted that the maintenance of pluralist democracy should
be a precondition for continuing Community membership
56and not just for entry. (The notion of the existence 
of a democratic regime as a precondition for entry is 
not stated explicitly in article 237 of the Treaty of 
Rome which forms the legal basis for a membership appli­
cation; it evolved gradually, together with requirements 
concerning the applicant’s level of economic development, 
as an implicit criterion for Community membership.) It 
is interesting to note that this idea coincided with one 
of the basic tenets of Greece’s instruments of accession:
The principles of pluralist democracy and respect 
for human rights form part of the common heritage 
of the peoples of the States brought together in the
European Communities and are therefore essen^al ele­
ments of membership of the said Communities.
Finally, British attitudes towards enlargement also re­
flected party ideologies on the future of the Community, 
with the then Labour Government leaning towards the view 
that the widening of the Community could serve as a means
of diluting it and transforming it into a looser, and hence
58preferable, entity.
Quite separately from the above analysis, there 
still remains the question of Greece’s own reactions to 
the prospect of the Community’s further enlargement. Given
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the available evidence, it is reasonable to argue that 
such considerations did not enter into the shaping of the 
Greek negotiating positions in any coherent and systematic 
manner. And preoccupied with problems of internal adjust­
ments during the interim period, it was only after ac­
cession that the Greek Government concentrated on the
implications of the Iberian enlargement for the country’s
59competitive position. Even then, however, there was 
more concern with the overall effect of Portuguese and 
Spanish entry rather than with any close monitoring of 
how the specific terms of entry under negotiation inter­
acted with Greek interests.
3. ’’Global isation des N£gociations" vs.
’’Globalisation de Reflexions”
As the previous analysis makes clear, the prospect 
of formal membership applications by Portugal and Spain 
posed a serious threat to Greece’s candidature, for it 
created an environment within which the linking of the 
three applicants into the same negotiation process, much 
the same as in the case of the previous enlargement, seemed 
a comfortable choice for those who were viewing Greece’s 
accession with increasing apprehensions. In fact, the 
Commission’s suggestion for a preaccession period for 
Greece provides an early indication of this tendency, 
since it could serve as a means of aligning and linking 
Greece’s negotiations with those of Portugal and Spain.
From the Commission's point of view, globalization of the 
negotiations and simultaneous entry could not but seem
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reasonable and even preferable, allowing for a more orderly 
institutional development of the Community .6 0
What brought Greece on the brink of globalization 
was the complications that arose, on the eve of the sub­
mission of Spain's formal application for membership, from 
the French and Italian preconditions with respect to Medi­
terranean agriculture. It was, in fact, the active personal 
involvement of Prime Minister Karamanlis, in particular 
his bilateral contacts with French President Giscard 
d ’Estaing and Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 
during the critical period between April and June 1977, 
which acted as a catalyst in averting the globalization of 
the conduct of the negotiations6 1 and led to the emergence 
(at the ministerial Conference session of 25 July 1977) 
of a political consensus to speed up the Greek talks. 
Clearly, the linking of the three applicants' negotiations 
would have been a serious blow to Greece with respect 
to the timing and possibly with respect to the terms of
r n
her accession (in retrospect, the blow to her candidature 
could have been fatal, given the post-1981 domestic poli­
tical developments).
However, such a consensus could not prevent the 
globalization of the problems posed by the enlargement of 
the Community from nine to twelve member states. It was per­
haps natural for the Community to perceive a common profile 
of the three applicants and to view Greek accession from 
the wider perspective of its Mediterranean enlargement.6*^ 
Thus, although the negotiations with Greece continued to be
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formally conducted on their own intrinsic merits, the Com­
munity could nevertheless not ignore the broader impli­
cations of its further enlargement65--the more so given 
that Greece’s terms of entry could eventually be used 
by Portugal and Spain as precedents in support of their
c  c
own negotiating positions vis-a-vis the Community.
The most comprehensive attempt at such a ’’reflexion 
d ’ensemble” was undertaken by the Commission in a set of 
three documents that came to be known as its "Fresco.” 
Recognizing the many-faceted impact of enlargement on the 
institutional, budgetary, and economic spheres of Community 
activity, the Commission emphasized the need for action 
to ensure that this impact would be positive--that enlarge­
ment would become a motor of Community development rather 
than a source of inertia. The action proposed took the 
form of specific measures within a coordinated approach 
involving all Community policies. Although the Fresco 
included certain specific points relating to the conduct 
of the negotiations, it was mainly concerned with the 
postaccession period. It made, for example, proposals for 
substantive institutional changes that went beyond the 
narrowly-defined realm of the accession negotiations and 
the adoption of the acquis communautaire by the applicant 
countries: while the negotiations were limited to numerical 
adjustments of the Treaties, the Fresco raised the issue 
of majority voting in an enlarged Community and the 
question of the Commission’s own powers in the use of
C O
Community legal instruments. (The Community’s proposals
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for institutional changes were not confined to those of 
the Fresco. At its meeting of 5 December 1978, the European 
Council nominated a Committee to study the problem and 
suggest specific reforms. Its Report on European Insti­
tutions Cknown as the Report of the Three Wise MenD was 
presented to the European Council in October 1979. It 
was followed by the Spierenburg Report, made at the request 
of the Commission, on the institutional reform of the 
Commission.itself and its services.)
The Commission’s views on enlargement rested on 
the central premise that the Community aims not only at 
the smooth functioning of the common market but also at 
the establishment of economic and monetary union; and 
that the attainment of this latter objective depends on the 
convergence of the member-states’ economies, completion 
of the common market, deepening of common policies, and 
the overcoming of structural problems. Since disparities 
between old and new member states would strain the economic 
and monetary cohesion of the Community, action was needed 
to help Greece, Portugal, and Spain raise the level of 
their development and implement structural changes.
Within this framework, the Commission proceeded 
to establish its guidelines for action. What was needed 
was Community financial aid coupled with appropriate ad ­
justments of the available budgetary instruments. However, 
this line of action was to form part of an integral ap­
proach encompassing all areas of Community policy, the 
overriding objective being the cohesion of the enlarged 
Community and its move towards economic and monetary union.
A 18
The Fresco’s significance derives not only from 
its analysis of the impact of enlargement but also from 
the impact that itself had on the enlargement process. With 
the Greek negotiations and the candidatures of Portugal 
and Spain having become electoral issues, there was little 
progress being registered until the end of 1977. The break­
through came after the French parliamentary elections of 
March 1978 when the scene was cleared for a political im­
petus to the Greek negotiations and a favourable decision 
on the principle of Portuguese and Spanish memberships.
Within this climate, the Commission's Fresco of
69April 1978 represented an affirmation of enlargement.
The product of long and difficult internal negotiations, 
it put an end to a series of previous schemes aiming at 
delaying the enlargement process. Greece was placed some­
what apart from the other two candidates; after all, the 
talks in her case had already progressed to an advanced 
stage. And in analyzing the problems associated with 
Greece's entry, the Fresco steered away from proposals 
that might interact directly with the terms of entry under 
negotiation, emphasizing instead postaccession measures .7 0  
On the other hand, by driving home the wider and often 
serious problems of enlargement, the Fresco also exerted 
a negative impact on the Greek negotiations: even though 
the effects of Greek entry were regarded as relatively 
small in magnitude, the Commission analysis inevitably 
placed them in the limelight at a time when the negoti­
ations were entering their most sensitive stage.
*
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The above analysis completes the examination of 
the external forces that influenced the Greek negotiations; 
this has been the object of Part III of the thesis, and 
it is now possible to provide a synthesis of the main 
themes developed in it.
What clearly stands out as a recurrent pattern 
is the difference in the way that Greek accession was 
perceived by each side. From Greece’s point of view, Com­
munity membership was a choice of profound historical 
importance casting its shadow on all other considerations 
and relegating other national issues to a lower level of 
priority. From the Community’s point of view, the prospect 
of Greek accession was seen from the wider perspective of 
its further enlargement and the Meditarranean dimension of 
its policies. Thus, while Greece continuously strived to 
assert and establish the uniqueness of her case, the Com­
munity attempted to dilute it and submerge it into the 
broader contours of its common policies.
This basic difference of approach manifested itself 
in a number of ways and left its mark on the conduct and 
outcome of the negotiations. In particular, Greece’s 
application for full membership, submitted at a time when 
her position was undermined by the proliferation of Com­
munity preferential agreements and attempts to establish 
an overall Mediterranean policy, could partly be seen as a 
reassertion of her unique status. The Community, in turn, 
reacted by attempting to restore an equilibrium in its 
relations with Greece and Turkey. With the negotiations
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under way and Greece now charting her path towards ac­
cession, an attempt was made to globalize her negotiations 
with those of Portugal and Spain. Greece managed to ex­
tricate herself from the other candidates but only in 
so far as the formal conduct of the negotiations was con­
cerned: the Community globalized the problems posed by 
the three candidates, thereby viewing the impact of Greek 
accession within the broader framework of Mediterranean 
enlargement.
Seen from this perspective, the Community’s atti­
tudes towards Greece are linked with a common theme: even 
though the economic, budgetary, and institutional impli­
cations of Greece's membership were generally regarded 
as relatively small in magnitude, her entry was neverthe­
less seen as affecting the balance of Community policies 
and mechanisms in a number of ways. Thus, enlargement 
emerges as a process involving much more than simply a 
static Community absorbing a new member state; in the 
meantime, membership affects not only the entrant but the 
evolution of the Community itself. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, to ask whether the Community was prepared to 
accept Greece. In a sense, it could never be fully prepared 
since the process of its completion and deepening inevi­
tably interacts with the process of its enlargement. 
Furthermore, Greece’s candidature caught the Community 
still trying to absorb the impact of its previous enlarge­
ment under the handicap of an unfavourable economic 
c 1imate.
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Why, then, a new enlargement? The answer derives 
partly from the nature of Community evolution: the widening 
of the Community involves an adjustment to external initia­
tives rather than an actively sought and internally con­
ceived development. But more significantly, what led the 
Community to accept the challenge of its further enlarge­
ment was its deep conviction that the political benefits 
would in the long run outweigh the practical difficulties 
and economic costs. Although the internal implications of 
enlargement for the Community’s north-south balance were 
perceived differently by member states, its external poli­
tical implications for the Community’s role in the east- 
west balance of power and stability in the Mediterranean 
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CONCLUSION
The present research has examined in detail Greece’s 
accession negotiations in an attempt to establish a proper 
analytical framework within which to interpret their in­
ternal structure, progress, and final outcome. According 
to the functional relationships that constitute the working 
hypothesis on which the research is based, the detailed 
structure of the negotiations was largely determined by 
internal mechanisms of Community decision making within 
the constraint of the acquis communautaire; on the other 
hand, the opening of the negotiations, their overall pro­
gress, and successful conclusion were influenced by a 
set of external considerations.
The general conclusion reached is that even though 
it was the overriding influence of political considerations 
that led to the acceptance of enlargement in principle 
and oiled the wheels of the bargaining process, it was 
economic and technical issues that dominated the actual 
negotiations. It may be argued, in fact, that the success­
ful completion of the Greek negotiations--like those that 
preceded and fol1 owed--was largely due to the fact that 
the task was narrowly confined to the adoption of the 
existing acquis communautaire.1 It was the submersion 
of high-policy issues into often mundane technical consi­
derations which, by limiting the alternatives open to the
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negotiators and hence the range of bargaining conflicts, 
helped transform the vision of Greek membership into a 
hard-won reality.
These results are thus seen to be generally con­
sistent with the central hypothesis of the research. They
are also consistent with the conclusions reached by other
2
authors--notably those of Tsoukalis, whose work represents 
the major contribution in the present field of study, 
broadly considered, and whose analysis of Greece’s ac ­
cession within the on-going and dynamic process of the 
Community’s Mediterranean enlargement has suggested the 
most appropriate conceptual framework in designing the 
wider aspects of the research.
At a more abstract level, the results obtained 
are also generally consistent with theoretical interpre­
tations of the nature of the Community negotiating and
3
bargaining processes. Accordingly, Greece’s accession 
negotiations may ultimately be interpreted as an ’’inte­
grative” bargaining process aiming at an ’’innovation” 
agreement: even though at specific instances a better 
bargain for one party did mean less for the other, the 
negotiations as a whole should not be seen as a zero-sum 
game of ’’distributional” bargaining but as a process of 
reaching a mutually profitable outcome; as Hutton points 
out, ”in innovation, as opposed to redistribution, it 
is the common interest, or alleged common interest, which 
gives meaning to the objective, while conflicting interests 
are relegated to the details.”4 On the other hand, the
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complications that arose from the different role that 
each side assigned to the acquis d'association derived 
from an initial difference in the way that each side per­
ceived the nature of the accession negotiations--with 
Greece attempting to inject in them an element of 
"extension” bargaining by defending the status quo of 
her association as a source of important precedents.
viewed from the perspective of the present state 
of knowledge in the field of European integration, the 
contribution of the research is twofold. Firstly, the 
detailed examination of the entry negotiations provides 
an analytical link between the preaccession and post­
accession periods of Greece’s relations with the Community; 
it thus helps fill a gap in the study of Greece's "policy
5
style.” Secondly, it helps identify the negotiating mecha­
nisms underlying the process of Community enlargement 
within an approach which might hopefully provide a useful 
extension of established lines of research. These consi­
derations, together with the conceptual constraints that 
were initially imposed on the design of the present thesis, 
suggest in turn three areas for future research: the sys- 
stematic integration of security considerations into the 
wider analytical framework of Greece’s relations with the 
Community; the treatment of Greece’s accession as a case 
study relating to a more general analysis of enlargement 
negotiations; and the examination of Greece's postaccession 




The signing of the Treaty of Accession may have 
marked the successful completion of Greece’s membership 
negotiations but has also signalled the beginning of a 
new era, one in which daily intra-Community negotiations 
form a continuous theme underlying Greece's relations with 
the other member states and her participation in the open- 
ended process of European integration. Seen in this con­
text, a study of the accession negotiations that sheds 
light on the internal and external mechanisms involved 
acquires a more lasting relevance that goes beyond the 
often ephemeral nature of the Greek terms of entry.
In assessing the terms of entry it is tempting, 
with hindsight, to point to mistakes in bargaining tactics 
and strategy and to perceive postaccession difficulties 
as products of deficiencies in the conduct of the negoti­
ations. Seen in a vacuum, without reference to the exi­
gencies of the negotiations period, the terms could never 
be seen as entirely satisfactory--the more so, given the 
initial burden of adjustment in the early years of member­
ship. But as the facts surrounding the negotiations gather 
dust and yesterday’s headlines recede in the background, 
the formal terms of entry gradually assume a much smaller 
significance than the fact of membership itself--with the 
drama shifting from the microcosm of the negotiations to 
their successful completion. Thus, in the rectifying mirror 
of time, it is the very emergence of Greece as a full member 
of the European Communities--out of the fragile balance 
of the political and economic circumstances of the period--
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that will ultimately remain among the significant events 
in the history of modern Greece and of European inte­
gration.
The question that nevertheless gnaws at the heart 
of the whole issue is whether Greece stands to benefit 
from joining the Community. An inherently complex question 
that defies easy analysis, it has been treated in the 
hands of opposing political parties in a manner that fits 
their preconceived stands on the issue of membership: 
depending on the length of the time horizon and breadth 
of criteria adopted, the answer may easily swing from 
negative to positive. The fact remains that entry and 
the terms under which it was secured do not necessarily 
entail a set of automatic consequences; their impact de­
pends to a large extent on domestic attitudes and policies, 
on the ability to maximize the potential benefits and 
minimize the costs of membership within the prospects 
of an evolving Community and the constraints of the inter­
national economic environment. Greece may have come a 
long way from one among the "Forgotten Five"--as Greece, 
Turkey, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal were called in 
the early days of European cooperation--to a full Community 
member. But her ability to harness the economic stimulus 
of integration will depend on her choice and implementation 
of internal adjustments and policies as well as on the 
extent to which the European dimension of these policies 
are absorbed in her economic and social structures. To 
the extent that internal policies fall short of this
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objective, and given the endemic structural problems of 
the Greek economy, Community membership could easily be 
made a scapegoat for political and economic difficulties 
at home, having lost its predominance in the hierarchy 
of foreign-policy considerations.
With the deeper issues and challenges of membership 
coming into full view, a new entrant is bound to experience 
disillusionment as the reality of membership is translated 
into the daily grind and low politics of mostly technical 
negotiations. In the case of Greece the problem was more 
serious, since the Socialist Party (PASOK) that came in 
power following the national elections of October 1981 
lacked a clearly defined European policy: while its earlier 
categorical commitments to pull the country out of the 
Community had begun to be qualified before the elections, 
the gradual moderation of its positions reflected an am­
biguity with respect to Greece’s role as a member state.
For example, during a discussion meeting at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs in London in November 
1980, PASOK’s President Andreas Papandreou ruled out the 
withdrawal from the Community as a policy choice; and 
while leaving his options open (as, for example, on the 
question of a referendum), he favoured the renegotiation 
of Greece’s terms of entry in the British manner. After 
the elections, however, although the idea of a bid for 
renegotiation was maintained for some time as the formal 
policy line of his government, it was eventually seen 
by critics as a tactical move serving domestic political
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expediencies. On the other hand, its eventual abandonment 
probably resulted from a sober assessment of the prospects 
of success that such a course of action would have, and 
perhaps from the realization that the British experience 
could hardly be extricated from its specific historical 
context and used as an example.
The Socialist Government’s options were finally 
crystallized in the ’’Greek Memorandum,” which was an attempt 
to establish the uniqueness of the Greek case by high­
lighting the structural weaknesses of the economy; and 
to use this as the basis for a series of demands for d e ­
viations from Community rules (in an effort to obtain 
a greater degree of freedom for the protection of sensitive 
sectors) and requests for substantial increases in fi­
nancial assistance. It is worth noting that Greece's em­
phasis on the uniqueness of her case is a continuation 
of a recurrent theme of the negotiations period.
Processed through the channels of Community d e ­
cision making, the Memorandum had to shed most of the 
demands for derogations, while the requests for increased 
financial assistance were eventually absorbed and handled 
within the Community's integrated Mediterranean programmes. 
These are integrated programmes of regional development-- 
their objective being the comprehensive development, adap­
tation, and support for employment and income of specific 
Community Mediterranean areas for which the impact of 
Iberian enlargement would be felt more strongly (areas 
from the whole of Greece and certain French and Italian 
regions are eligible in this respect).
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While the Greek Memorandum’s primary concern with 
the problem of economic convergence coincided with one of 
the major issues facing the enlarged Community, its effec­
tiveness as a policy instrument in this respect proved 
limited. The Government's singleminded preoccupation with 
formulating and defending its often ill-fated proposals 
evolved into a lengthy process which diverted scarce admin­
istrative resources from the more pressing internal adjust­
ments dictated by the membership requirements--as, for 
example, in the case of the introduction of the common 
system of VAT for which the Greek Government sought twice, 
and was granted, extensions of the deadline. Furthermore, 
preoccupation with the quantifiable aspects of budgetary 
flows and Community credits, combined with an ephemeral 
attention to the wider financial implications of Community 
membership (a theme that may be traced in the accession 
negotiations), left little room for a systematic approach 
to the persistent difficulties facing Greece’s balance 
of payments--difficulties which pose a serious constraint 
on her prospects for economic growth and development and, 
hence, on the convergence of her economy within an enlarged 
Communi t y .
Quite apart from criticisms on the necessity and 
sufficiency of the Greek Memorandum as a policy instrument, 
the fact remains that the qualitative aspects of Community 
financial transfers have been largely neglected. Given 
the nature of Community rules, domestic weaknesses could 
more clearly be observed in connection with an "open”
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financial instrument, such as the Social Fund, than with 
the ERDF, where the existence of funds specifically ear­
marked for Greece eased the strains of adjustment. But 
underneath the surface the structural flaws could be uni­
formly seen everywhere, giving rise to the ’’watering-can" 
effect associated with the dispersal of aid too thinly 
over too wide an area, with little attempt to establish 
a coherent and systematic plan for the effective absorption 
and efficient allocation of Community funds within a 
broader development-policy framework. In this respect, 
and independently of the size of the transfers involved, 
the establishment of the integrated Mediterranean pro­
grammes may have a catalytic effect.
What perhaps marked a turning point in the Govern­
men t ’s attitudes towards the Community was the first Greek 
Presidency during the second half of 1983. Although the 
agreed order of holding the Presidency limited the time 
available for its preparation and hence the scope of 
Greece's role, confining it to the handling of admin­
istrative duties, the generally recognized efficiency 
with which these duties were carried out generated a sense 
of achievement and self-confidence among the Greek bureau­
crats and helped clarify the Government's real attitudes 
towards the Community.6 On the other hand, one could not 
fail to observe a tendency to deviate from traditional 
Community practice as Prime Minister Papandreou consciously 
attempted to publicly expose the failure of the Athens 
Summit of December 1983 rather than diffuse it through the
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diplomatic language of a communiqu£--his motives largely 
deriving from a concern with the internal cohesion of 
his party in the light of the coming European elections 
of June 1984. But taken as a whole, the Greek Government's 
experience with the Presidency probably marked the end 
of an identity crisis with respect to Greece’s role as 
a member state. Problems continued to exist, but they 
were in many respects shared by other members and reflected 
certain common themes in national attitudes towards the 
Communi t y .
One such theme is the tendency by member states 
to use Community institutions as an instrument for the 
promotion of national policies and the maintenance of 
internal political balances. In the case of Greece this 
may be observed distinctly in the field of European poli­
tical cooperation (EPC)--where her idiosyncratic attitudes 
on various issues have often led to positions that were 
at a significant variance with the rest of the Community, 
while being translated at home as a "nationally proud 
stance." However, Greece's move to raise her dispute with 
Turkey as a Community problem at the Hague Summit in June 
1986 and her intention to maintain it as such within the 
EPC framework may lead to a closer alignment of her po­
sitions with those of the Community on other issues. The 
lifting of her veto on the reactivation of the Turkish 
association agreement and the normalization of Turkey’s 
relations with the Community has thus been made dependent 
on a set of primarily security conditions. Quite apart
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from their detailed content, what merits attention is 
the reemergence of the idea of preconditions as a scenario 
reminiscent of Greece’s conditional agreement to Iberian 
enlargement at the Dublin Summit in December 1984 (made 
dependent on a substantial increase of Community funds 
for integrated Mediterranean programmes).
Another theme that has characterized Greece’s 
postaccession record is her willingness to retreat from 
anti-Community positions as a result of, or in anticipation 
of, greater economic benefits--as, for example, in con­
nection with the securing of high agricultural prices for 
Greek farmers. In practice, however, this change of atti­
tude has simply led to a passive adjustment to the process 
of European integration, to a ’’reactive” rather than an 
active policy making,7 and to the virtual reduction of 
relations with the Community into an accountant’s balance 
sheet of financial transactions and transfers. It is 
natural, of course, to observe the unalloyed passions 
of the negotiations era gradually giving way to a more 
pragmatic approach to Community membership. But in the 
case of Greece what may further be observed is the emer­
gence of "pragmatic interest politics,” of a concern with 
simple economic gain combined with a lack of any strong 
ideological commitment to Community efforts towards further 
integrati o n .8
This problem becomes more acute when account is 
taken of the continuously changing dimensions of Community 
policies and the fact that Greek accession coincided with
£39
an extensive reappraisal of a large spectrum of the acquis 
communautaire. With the deepening of the Community, issues 
that were once the exclusive domain of national governments 
are gradually dealt with at the supranational level, as 
solutions are sought within the Community’s institutions 
and decision-making processes. For Greece this may prove 
a painful development: the need for a more effective struc­
tural policy might require not only a redistribution of 
expenditure within the Community budget but also a more 
optimum redistribution between the Community and the 
national budgets--which would inevitably imply the transfer 
of certain tasks and responsibilities from the member 
states to the Community and hence a loss in the degree 
of manoeuvre in domestic politics.
The resistance to proposals aimed at increasing 
the Community’s capacity for common action is a theme 
not peculiar to Greece but shared by other member states, 
especially Britain and Denmark--as seen, for example, 
in their fears and reservations with respect to recent 
moves towards European Union and the revision of the 
Treaties. But what perhaps sets Greece apart is the fact 
that this conflict between Europeanism and nationalism, 
even though it has left its indelible mark on her post­
accession relations with the Community, is more a re­
flection of the ambivalence that characterizes Greece's
9
attitudes and policies and less the result of clearly 
defined political ideologies.
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It is this ambivalence that points to the challenge 
facing Greece: the extent to which it will be limited 
will determine the extent to which the integration process 
will be absorbed in her economic and social structures. 
This, however, will largely depend on Greece’s ability 
to view Community membership not as an external parameter 
but as an integral element in the formulation of a stable 
and internally transparent policy towards Europe--a policy 
that treats the furthering of both the long-term national 
interest and European integration as two mutually con­
sistent objectives. In such a context, and despite the 
prosaic realities of Community life, the idealism that 
briefly resurged at the time of Greece’s entry might not 
be entirely lost. The record of her accession is the record 
of a pilgrim’s progress towards the European ideal, and 
perhaps it would not have succeeded if it didn’t signify 
the completion of a cycle that began in the 18th century 
with Europe’s pilgrimage in search of the Hellenic ideal.
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